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Western democracies, especially the United States, increasingly utilize foreign 
assistance to influence the policies of developing nations (“curative politics”) despite 
extensive literature that this assistance is often ineffective. Cross-national data on the 
impact of bilateral and multilateral aid are cautionary, but these studies put the interaction 
between donors and recipient governments in a black box, obscuring empirical dynamics 
that condition success—or failure—in reform outcomes. 
Using a “controlled comparison” of two cases in which international donors have 
tried to steer reform in Romania between 1990 and 2004, this paper asks: How does 
foreign assistance influence the process of indigenous reform?  By selecting two cases 
(child welfare and healthcare reform) in the same country, during the same period, 
macro-economic and political factors can be controlled, allowing an analysis that 
highlights critical differences in domestic interests, institutions, and international 
engagement.  
The dissertation concludes that foreign assistance is beneficial when credible 
international commitments spur difficult, complex change. However, the rational 
tendency of organized interests to undermine reform—especially if the extraction of rents 
is allowed by partial reform—is a strong countervailing current. Foreign assistance, too 
often fixated on teleological end-states and normative goals, is inefficient when: 1) 
Reform recommendations rely on national legislation, with little attention to intra-
governmental bargaining, especially regarding budgets; 2) Reform plans fail to anticipate 
short-term “winners” and ignore financial incentives to subvert reform; and 3) Donors 
exaggerate the break between past and present, missing opportunities to better understand 
contemporary constraints as a function of historical legacies. 
Although the ideology of state socialism was defeated in Romania in 1989, post-
communist reform left bureaucratic coordination in place, especially in the provision of 
public services. With norms such as the reliance on soft-budget constraints maintained, 
and without competition or independent monitoring to enforce accountability, outside 
attempts to help reorganize health services failed. Performance-based conditionality tied 
to credible international threats led child welfare reform beyond stalemate, although deep 
change in the form of employment cuts or financial decentralization was resisted. 
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One hot Romanian morning in summer 2004, my friend Annie and I brought our nine 
children to the biggest, nicest public swimming pool in Bucharest. She wanted to 
enroll her four children in lessons; mine were already installed. We stood at the 
pool’s gate reading the rules regarding class size, payment, pool hours, and pre-
enrollment requirements. 
 
For each rule Annie read aloud, I explained how the pool community really worked. 
“Two-week classes are limited to ten students per one-hour class,” she recited. There 
are around twenty children per class; most parents stay and watch, so it’s safe, I 
explained. 
 
“60,000 lei [$2 USD] per session. Payment required if student misses a class.” We 
pay 100,000 lei [$3.25] but never pay if we miss a class, I corrected. 
 
“Classes: 14:00-15:00. Pool maintenance: 15:00-16:00.” Not really, I said. The 
teachers use maintenance time as class time. That way they can teach more children. 
If you’re late for the 2:00 session, you stay for the 3:00, which is good for us because 
we’re late a lot. 
 
“Medical certificates required for each session.” Never, I contradicted again. It’s too 
time consuming and expensive. The teachers don’t ask for them, but they won’t let 
anyone who is coughing get in the pool. 
 
By the end of our exchange, Annie was really annoyed. “This is what I hate about 
Romania. No one follows the rules. It’s confusing and perverse,” she grumbled. 
Annie’s husband was an American law enforcement advisor to the Romanian 
government. I had heard him make similar remarks about the Romanian legal 
environment. 
 
In that instant, I saw how remarkably relevant my dissertation research is to real life. 
Within the ideal framework of pool regulations, the primary players, parents and 
teachers, negotiate agreements that are mutually beneficial. In exchange for more 
money than they are supposed to get, the teachers offer a more flexible schedule and 
don’t penalize students for absence. By not requiring medical certificates, transaction 
costs are reduced for parents, representing a savings of money and time. Parents have 
no financial incentive to push sick children to swim—what parent would do that 
anyway? 
 
The exchange is premised on significant discretion for individual teachers—who 
collude to offer similar pricing and pool-time arrangements—and low enforcement by 
pool administrators or Ministry of Sport inspectors. In terms of health and safety, the 
summer pool community is largely self-policed. Teachers are drawn from elite 
national squads, so they take pride in maintaining an attractive pool, sharing life-
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guarding responsibilities, and providing excellent instruction. As a parent, I could 
only assume they also knew how to manage the chlorine. 
 
Whether teachers pass along a sufficient part of their earnings to administrators who 
keep the water flowing, parents have no idea. The facility’s larger financial posture is 
beyond us and probably beyond the teachers’ understanding too. What was important 
was that the summer swimming lesson arrangement had achieved equilibrium. 
Neither parents nor teachers had any reason to abandon agreements—except Annie, 
for whom the pool’s reliance on informal practices suggested inadequate attention to 
proper health and safety controls. Similarly, as I will explore, foreign donors are often 
more fixated on what is wrong, technically and in terms of law abidingness, in many 
public policy sectors than the central government is itself. But that might be because 
foreign advisors are unencumbered, whereas government actors are tied to all the 
people already at the pool—making money, socializing, learning, and functioning 
within ongoing, living institutions. 
 
The interaction between well-meaning foreign advisors focused on end-states and 
government agents embedded in domestic relationships driven by chronic scarcity is 
what I am interested in exploring in this dissertation. 
 
*** 
For much of the time I was conducting field research on this topic (2001-2003), I was 
working at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in 
Romania, first as a program development advisor, then as the senior democracy 
advisor. In the first position, I had to work on a five-year plan for U.S. Government 
assistance to Romania. In the second, I managed programs in the democracy 
portfolio, including USAID’s largest program in the region of support to local 
government. This experience convinced me that there was precious little learning on 
the dynamics of institutional change driving the expenditure of foreign assistance 
dollars. Rather, the Mission set up a framework of admirable goals—Increase 
Effectiveness of Local Government Service Provision; Increase Involvement of Civil 
Society in Local Decision Making—toward which you could only hope your field 
programs were heading. 
 
The origins of the intellectual inquiry that became this dissertation lie in an attempt to 
understand the real-world, empirical mechanisms of governance, which could help 
explain why the best-laid plans elaborated in multilateral and bilateral conference 
rooms so often appeared to take a different course in real time. I intentionally selected 
case studies outside the area of my professional responsibility in order to maintain a 
line between work and research. However, the phenomenon revealed in a closer look 
at child welfare and healthcare held true in the programs I oversaw for the U.S. 
Government—namely, a disconnect between agreements achieved between donors 
and central government versus program results implemented by sub-national, 
especially local, organizations; reform goals blocked by organizations of interest that 
gained authority and rent in the first stages of change; the inability of public entities 
to maintain hard budget constraints; and rational attempts, by organizations and 
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individuals, to secure resources through the exploitation of public assets in ways that 
dated back to the communist era. In systems of governance far more than in public 
opinion or preferences, the old system was dying hard.  
 
*** 
My two case studies focus on important policy regimes. The health of a population is 
an essential aspect of any nation’s human capital; citizens are deeply concerned, with 
good reason, about the healthcare regime on which they must rely. Health is a public 
policy issue in which most every household has a stake. Child welfare as a policy 
regime normally affects a society’s most vulnerable, and often marginalized, 
population. Because it became an international symbol of Nicolae Ceausescu’s 
perverse disregard for human life, the Romanian child welfare system gained unusual 
prominence worldwide—and became a powerful magnet for donor attention. 
 
Dissecting how foreign assistance has, and has not, influenced change in these sectors 
should yield useful lessons for other development schemes. In the required survey 
course, GVPT 799, Karol Soltan emphasized that dissertations should confront 




Pentru familia mea. 
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Western democracies, especially the United States, increasingly utilize foreign 
assistance to influence the policies of developing nations and to promote economic 
growth and democratic institutions (Lancaster, 2000; Carothers, 1999; Potter, 
Goldblatt, Kiloh, and Lewis, 1997; Smith, 1994). Fascinating cross-national data have 
been generated in the last ten years specifying which institutions, or aspects of 
governance, are most essential to improve economic performance and increase 
political accountability (Berthelier, Desdoigts, and Aoudia, 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Zoido-Lobaton, 2003, 2002, 2000; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2002; 
Knack, 2001; Campos, 2000; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 1999; Knack and Keefer, 
1995). This research is particularly relevant to bilateral and multilateral foreign 
assistance programs criticized for being ineffective (Lovell, 2005; Perkins, 2004; 
Collier, 2002; Collier and Dollar, 2001; Dollar and Svensson, 2000; Durbarry, 
Gemmell, and Greenaway, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 1997; Boone, 1996; 
Hadjimichael et al., 1995; Mosley, Hudson, and Horrell, 1987; Dowling and 
Hiemenz, 1983; Bauer, 1976; Voivodas, 1973). The problem with most studies of the 
impact of foreign aid is that they put the interaction between international donors and 
recipient governments in a black box, obscuring empirical dynamics that condition 
success—or failure—in reform outcomes. Using a controlled comparison of two 
cases in which international donors tried to steer reform in the Romanian child 
welfare and healthcare sectors between 1990 and 2004, this dissertation investigates 
the impact of foreign assistance on indigenous reform, and the role of organized 
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domestic interests, local decision-making institutions and procedures, and legacies of 
the past in redirecting reform initiatives. Micro-institutional case studies of reform 
offer instructive lessons for donors—and insight into the political nature of 
institutional change. 
Rational choice and historical institutionalism provide the intellectual 
framework for the inquiry, and help explain how a combination of donor leverage 
(exerted, or not, through Euro-Atlantic institutions), stakeholder rational interest 
(which finds entry points into political and budgetary decision making, or not) and 
institutional legacies drove reform outcomes. Although the radical transformation of 
child protection and healthcare is indisputably complicated, studying this process is 
simplified because the politics of reform involves a limited number of actors.  
When I began intensive field research, in 2001, it was not clear whether either 
case study would represent a successful example of post-communist reform. The two 
major donors deeply involved in child welfare reform, the European Union (EU) and 
the United States (U.S.), were locked in an intense debate regarding inter-country 
adoption, with the EU promoting a moratorium on foreign families adopting 
Romanian children, and the U.S. favoring the continuation of this practice as a partial 
solution to Romania’s social problem of abandoned children living in state-run 
institutions. The only thing the donors agreed on was that Romania had made 
insufficient progress in closing large, state institutions for abandoned children and 
developing family-oriented, community-level  alternatives. From the Romanian 
government’s perspective, the child welfare issue was a top political priority, with 
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Cabinet-level attention, and the government was frustrated with donor discord 
(Coman, 2005).  
In healthcare, a complex reform program approved in 1997 successfully raised 
more revenue but there was confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of new 
health insurance funds versus the Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), which had dominated the sector for decades before reorganization. A positive 
sign of reform progress in 2001 was top level participation—including the Minister of 
Health herself—in a new donor-inspired program to confront hospital inefficiency by 
assigning prices to hospital services.  
What was clear, though, was the comparability of the two sectors. In both 
cases: 1) Decision making and finance had been highly centralized before the 
initiation of reform. 2) Despite the contribution of hundreds of millions of dollars in 
humanitarian initiatives between 1990 and 1997, donor programs had not had a 
substantial impact on institutional performance. 3) The primary method for 
“engineering” deeper institutional change was donor-recommended legislation 
approved in 1997. 4) After the implementation of legislative change, reform was 
derailed by organized professional interests that extracted significant rents by taking 
advantage of procedural uncertainty, access to decision making, and political veto 
points. 5) Despite the much ballyhooed reforms, many institutional attributes and 
norms that characterized both sectors under communism continued, including 
resource insecurity, collusion between management and mid-level public employees 
to secure resources, low enforcement of formal rules, wide discretion on the part of 
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unit managers, and inattention to conflicts of interest. Table 1 presents a schematic 
representation of the comparability of child protection and healthcare. 
 
Table 1 
Comparability of Child Welfare and Healthcare Institutions 
 
CHILD WELFARE INSTITUTION HEALTHCARE INSTITUTION 
1990: Baseline 
Decision making Centralized  Centralized 
Financing Centralized  Centralized 
Dominant governing 
institution 
No – Multiple ministries Yes – Ministry of Health 
Dominant service delivery 
institution 
Yes – Residential institution Yes – Hospital 
Dominant profession Medical Medical 
1990-1996 
Decision making Centralized  Centralized 
Financing Centralized  Centralized 
Dominant donor(s) No: Multiple donors - 
NGOs, multilateral, bilateral 
Yes - World Bank 
Humanitarian aid? Yes  – Target: improve institutional 
infrastructure; provide goods to 
residential homes 
Yes – Target: improve 
institutional infrastructure; 
provide goods to 




Promoted decentralization Promoted family physicians as 
gatekeepers, a kind of 
decentralization 
Legal reform? Yes – International conventions 
signed; inter-country adoption laws 
adopted  
No – Attempted in Senate 
Development of local 
reform champions? 
Yes – Social work renewed as a 
profession, supported by donors 
Yes – Institute of Health 
Services Management supported 
by donors 
1997-2001 
Decision making Dominated by executive; increased 
input from counties  
Divided between new National 
Health Insurance House and 
district-level HIHs, Ministry of 
Heath, and Ministry of Finance 
Financing Divided between national, county, 
and local budgets 
Mandatory contributions from 
employers/employees; small 
percentage from national budget 
Dominant donor(s) Yes – European Union followed by 
USAID 
Yes – World Bank 
Dominant organization, 
benefited by partial 
reform? 
Yes – Romanian Adoption 
Committee and members of adoption 
agency boards 
Yes – Doctors based in hospitals 
Legal reform? Yes – 1997: Redefined rights of the 
child and prioritized local care 
Yes – 1997: Adopted mandatory 
payroll tax to finance healthcare; 
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solutions including domestic adoption established Health Insurance 
House system to negotiate 
contracts; designed family 
doctors as gatekeepers to 
healthcare system 
Humanitarian aid? Minimal  Minimal 
2001–2004 
Donor assistance made 
conditional? 
Yes No 
Credible rewards for 
successful reform? 
Yes No 
Short-term winners beat? Yes No 
Reform results: technical 
success? 
Yes No 
Reform results: financial 
success? 
Yes, in that Romanian government 
effort secured significant, ongoing 
donor dollars, and costs per child in 
the system decreased, but can’t prove 
that reform led to more domestic 
financial efficiency. 
Yes, in that reform increased 
revenue available to healthcare. 
No, in that reform did not lead to 





The policy sectors investigated, child welfare and healthcare, are fit for comparison 
because the respective reform agendas are distinct, involving different constellations 
of strategic actors on the domestic and international sides, but they are both aspects of 
the nation’s social welfare regime. As well, the impetus for a great variety of 
bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental foreign donors to get involved was, in 
both cases, humanitarian and political. By selecting two cases in the same country 
and during the same period, political and macro-economic factors can be controlled, 
allowing a narrative that highlights variables constraining or facilitating reform. 
These are not marginal targets for foreign aid: Between 2002 and 2003, for example, 
approximately 30%  of bilateral donor dollars entering Romania were expended on 
health and child welfare (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD)], 2005b). 
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Sources for the case study research include participant interviews, donor reports, 
newspaper accounts, and annual statistical summaries in addition to secondary 
literature. 
Case studies are useful for theory testing, and the comparative method, using a 
small number of cases, is especially beneficial in trying to discern causal relations. 
Among the strategies of controlled comparison, a classic approach (described by John 
Stewart Mill) is the method of difference. Here, the substantial comparability of child 
welfare and healthcare allow me to hone in on critical differences in how reform 
initiatives were promoted by donors and processed by recipient institutions and 
interests.  My objective is to account for positive change in the child welfare—an 
example of success in implementing a reform strategy recommended from abroad—
and unsuccessful reform in the field of healthcare.  
 
Indicators of Success 
Economists Yingvi Qian and Chenggang Xu (1998) developed a useful distinction 
between successful outcomes and unsuccessful ones. They consider a successful 
outcome one that engenders both technical and economic success, while an 
unsuccessful outcome can be either an overt technical failure or a technical success 
but an economic failure. In these two case studies, quantitative indicators support the 
conclusion that child welfare reform has been a technical and economic success, 
whereas healthcare reform has been neither.  
There are at least three quantitative indicators of successful reform in 
Romania’s child welfare regime: 1) Fewer children lived in residential childcare 
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institutions in 2004 than in 1990. 2) More abandoned children were cared for in 
family-like settings in 2004 than in institutional settings. 3) The rate of child 
abandonment in 2004 was lower than in 1990. In 1990, approximately 150,000 
children lived in state-run institutions. In December 2004, the number was down to 
32,6791 children protected in state or private institutions (out of a national population 
of some 5 million minors) and 50,239 children under age eighteen protected in 
substitute families, of which 34,405 were living with their extended families or other 
individuals/families and 15,834 were in foster care—a form of child protection that 
did not exist in 1990. These indicators of progress were goals heavily promoted by 
outside actors, including multilateral donors such as the EU, international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, bilateral development agencies funded by 
at least fifteen nations including the United States,2 and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) from around the world. 
 The objective of a responsible national or local child welfare system is to 
protect the best interests of a child at risk for physical or psychological harm. It is 
widely agreed that big, old-fashioned orphanages are detrimental to a child’s normal 
development, and a variety of schemes for providing family-like settings for 
abandoned children are preferred over institutions. The existence of a growing variety 
of these alternatives in Romania is both a socially beneficial reform and a financially 
efficient one: Almost every alternative service is less expensive for government to 
 
1 All statistics: National Authority for the Protection of Children’s Rights (ANPDC, 2004) confirmed 
by European Commission, 2004. 
2 There is no comprehensive database of donors, but I viewed documentary evidence of involvement 
by the following countries, confirmed by Coman (2005): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and United States. 
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provide than assuming full care and responsibility for an abandoned child (Wulczyn, 
Orlebeke, and Haight, 2000). In December 2004, the average cost per child/month in 
foster care was $246 USD; in state-run day care centers, $163 USD; in state-run 
institutions, $312 USD; but in mother/baby centers, the cost was $368 USD (National 
Authority for the Protection of Children’s Rights, 2004). This last option is 
financially efficient in the long term since the purpose is to prevent abandonment by 
giving at-risk mothers and infants time to bond (typically six months) while being 
supported financially. 
While child welfare reform has largely succeeded, healthcare reform has 
largely failed. Some important health outcomes improved between 1990 and 2004, 
but other indicators reflect little improvement in the overall health of the Romanian 
population. In 2004, infant mortality rose to 16.8 deaths/1,000 births, the highest rate 
in Europe (Agence France Press, 2005). There was an explosion of infectious 
diseases including tuberculosis (twice as many new cases per capita as in any other 
Central or Eastern European [CEE] country), and sexually transmitted diseases. Child 
and maternal mortality rates improved, but remained unacceptably high. The maternal 
mortality rate was five times higher than the EU average, for example (Galan et. al., 
2003). Stagnant since the 1970s, life expectancy was stuck at about 68 years for 
males, significantly lower than life expectancy in the EU and CEE (Peretianu, 2004). 
 Regarding policy reform, within five years of sweeping legislative change 
enacted in 1997 to turn the Semashko3 Soviet-style healthcare system into a German-
 
3 In 1918, in Moscow, Dr. Nikolai Semashko chaired a conference on medicine and public health that 
resolved that universal access to healthcare, funded by the central budget and managed by a central 
institution, would be the hallmark of Soviet healthcare. This system, under direct government control 
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inspired mandatory insurance system, progress had veered off course: Change 
recommended—in fact, directly inspired—by international donors was undermined 
by recentralization of decision making and finance as well as a hospital sector that 
would not give up power. Chronic debts generated by hospital overspending and run 
away drug costs placed healthcare on crisis footing. Reform goals related to increased 
efficiency, financial stability, and prioritizing the role of general practitioners over 
hospitals had not been achieved by the end of 2004. The public was overwhelmingly 
disappointed with government management of the sector (Metro Media Transilvania, 
et. al., 2004), as were medical professionals. Neither technical nor economic success 
had been achieved.   
 
Explaining Reform Outcomes 
What caused institutional reform to occur in child welfare but not in healthcare? This 
dissertation locates the answer within the framework of historical institutionalism. In 
the child welfare case study, donors and the Romanian government functioned within 
redefined Euro-Atlantic institutions and overcame rational local resistance to deep, 
structural change. Specifically, there are at least five reasons for the child welfare 
outcome manifest by the end of 2004:  
1) Major donors had credible leverage over the central government as a function 
of the link created between child welfare and larger geo-political goals, 
namely North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership and EU 
accession.  
 
with an extensive national network emphasizing workplace facilities, became the model for other 
countries in the Soviet sphere (Marrée and Groenewegen, 1997). 
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2) Despite decentralizing reforms in 1997, the institutional configuration of child 
welfare was still dominated by a powerful center, maintaining control over 
money (directly contributing over 40% of the child welfare  budget and 
indirectly controlling donor contributions totaling 21%) and employment, 
much as it had under state socialism.  
3) Besides a briefly successful inter-country adoption cabal that emerged 
between 1999 and 2001, there were few organized domestic interests, 
including professional organizations, with access to national level child 
welfare decision making.  
4) The nature of the structural reform favored by donors reorganized child 
welfare in a way that expanded the sector, thereby protecting employment and 
allowing the central government to satisfy its main constituency, public 
employees. 
5)  Donors put their money where their mouths were: while making aid 
conditional, they also invested heavily in the deeper changes they required. 
In contrast, in healthcare, foreign donors were not able to compel structural 
reform—and trump domestic stakeholders who were benefiting from partial reform. 
Donors offered concepts and technical assistance, but there was no “fear factor” to 
enforce compliance or cajole follow-through. Why not? There are at least three 
reasons: 1) absence of child welfare’s “800-pound gorilla,” the EU and the promise of 
EU accession; 2) lack of a unified position regarding the “best” way to organize 
healthcare; and 3) inexistence of a coordinating mechanism to pool donor power. 
First, the Acquis Communitaire, which guides the EU accession process, has no 
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chapter devoted to health. Thus, healthcare was never an EU priority, despite some 
activities that tangentially involved the field. Second, within the EU there are a range 
of national solutions. The British National Health Service and the German health 
insurance houses are considered to be rival models with unique and respective pros 
and cons. The Romanian reform program drew from both. A tacit assumption was 
held among donors that the politics of health would have to be worked out 
domestically, while donors concentrated on technical pieces of the reform puzzle. 
There were bilateral health reform–related activities led by governments that had very 
different healthcare systems at home. Therefore, in health reform, local actors drove 
outcomes within a political, or institutional, framework that allowed well-organized 
interests to exploit, especially, the budget process, while in child welfare, 
international agreements trumped local preferences, and the political, or institutional, 
process ultimately gave minimal access to interests that opposed closing state-run 
institutions and moving abandoned children into family settings. 
 
Rational Interest and Constraints on Institutional Change: The Healthcare Case 
Study 
The investigation of healthcare reform required a more detailed exploration of 
interactions within the domestic sector once it became clear that the contributions of 
foreign assistance were weak. As well, there was little secondary material on the 
problem. Therefore, this case study is a more lengthy narrative than the narrative in 
child welfare, yet, hopefully, it represents a more thorough exploration of the 
hypothesis: The extent to which organized interests influence reform outcomes 
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depends on institutional procedures that determine who has input into decision 
making, whether veto points exist (and who gets to use them), and the organizational 
skill of interests. 
Within the political framework, heavily controlled by the institutions of 
executive authority, the healthcare budget-making and allocation decision points 
allowed little access to organized interests besides elite doctors associated with the 
hospital sector—who were often simultaneously political decision makers. This 
hospital-based constituency made strategic choices within the political economy of 
healthcare in the first years of reform implementation that maximized the freedom of 
doctors (to treat, to prescribe, to spend), then used the national budgetary system to 
confirm the legitimacy of hospital profligacy, a rational set of behaviors that directly 
contradicted the original goals of health reform. Once sanctified, the cycle of hospital 
overspending and pharmaceutical inflation was virtually impossible to break.  
Donor programs first emphasized humanitarian aid, which was seized by 
recipients but had negligible impact on the institutions governing healthcare. Then, 
donors offered well-considered, but highly technical, policy recommendations that 
tended to be out of sync with the politics of reform. What we see in the healthcare 
sector is the process by which an “insider lobby” in Mancur Olson’s phrase (2000), 
rationally subverts a plan for institutional change. Occupation-specific lobbies are 
able to organize for collective action and the impact harms efficiency. Interestingly, 
hospital doctors, at the heart of the problem, do not necessarily realize the impact of 
their daily decisions. 
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Angry at the MOF’s cynical treatment of healthcare surplus, convinced that the sector 
was under-funded, not penalized for overspending, medical professionals based in 
hospitals made daily decisions that optimized their professional autonomy but 
jeopardized the financial stability of the entire national health system. The decisions 
that each doctor makes is rational. The cumulative effect of all these individual 
decisions is socially inefficient.  
 
The Historical Legacy of State Socialism 
One of the most important conclusions reached—not because it is surprising, but 
because it is so palpable yet often ignored in donor programming—is that the 
informal norms of state socialism continue to influence institutional design and 
performance years later. While exploring certain “unintended consequences” (in 
donors’ eyes) in the evolution of child welfare and healthcare reform, patterns with 
antecedents in state socialism emerged, including these three tendencies: 1) Although 
reform initiatives typically start by enshrining the concept of decentralization in law, 
there is a discernible centripetal tendency in the implementation of reform, moving 
decision making back to the organizations of central government. 2) Sub-national 
organizations charged with managing financial resources are consistently incapable of 
maintaining hard-budget constraints. Instead of enforcing budget limits through 
regulatory or punitive action, central government tends to acquiesce, finding 
advantage in profligacy. 3) Central-level decision making is notably ad hoc, with 
Emergency Ordinances utilized by the Cabinet in order to bypass Parliament, laws 
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promulgated with minimal impact analysis, and changes announced without 
consultation with important stakeholders. 
 These patterns can be traced back to the political economy of state socialism. 
Central control, bureaucratic coordination, and managing uncertainty through the 
routine exploitation of soft-budget constraints were attributes of state socialism being 
utilized some fifteen years after the death of the old regime in the healthcare 
institution as well as in aspects of the child welfare institution. So was collusion at the 
enterprise level among managers and members to skim off state assets. Collusion 
served as a kind-of protection racket against economic uncertainty; today, donors call 
it corruption. 
Following Douglass North’s concept of institutional change and informal 
constraints (1990, 1993a, 1994a, 1997, 2000) in addition to notions he draws from 
cognitive science (1996, 1994b, 1993b; Denzau and North, 1993), it is clear that the 
informal norms of state socialism continue to influence institutional design and 
performance years later—an element of the Romanian reform story that donors find 
puzzling, even infuriating. The mental models that evolved in the forty-year course of 
state socialism in Romania included behavior that rationalized, even required, 
persistent aggrandizement of one’s own organization or institutional sub-unit; 
disregard for budget limits; hoarding of information and goods; a tendency to revise 
and rework rules in a way that increases uncertainty; the use of public and work-
related networks to increase personal/family “stability” (or “gain,” in the view of 
analysts not experiencing profound shortage); and a complicated attitude toward the 
state of both dependence and rejection: A deep expectation that the state should 
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provide employment and services for free, such as health and childcare, coexists with 
a distain for ubiquitous state property, such that hospitals or state-run institutions for 
children are fair targets for rent seeking. This belief system informed how 
organizations and individuals adapted to, and adapted, formal post-communist reform 
initiatives.  
There is no thick line between the past and present: the notion of a “collapse” 
of communism is the wrong metaphor. Institutions provide structure and some 
certainty in a fluid, uncertain time, so these patterns continued to define post-
communist political interactions especially around policy implementation. Therefore, 
political development requires not just legislative change and institutional reform but 
changes in attitudes and the political culture—a conclusion that places limits on how 
much political development can be externally imposed.  
 
A New Look at “Corruption” 
For much of what is still not going right in Romania, observers sing one refrain: 
corruption. Often applied quite generally, it is not necessarily a useful category of 
understanding. Reports on Romania written by donors in the late 1990s constantly 
allude to rampant corruption and assert, explicitly or implicitly, that corruption 
inhibits or prevents achievement of program goals. However, I reexamine donor 
assumptions regarding corruption in light of the reform narratives developed in the 
case studies. It is certainly true that central governments, which systematically steal, 
are virtually hopeless candidates for foreign assistance as the World Bank outlines 
well in its 1997 World Development Report.
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 But the category “corruption” is being applied so freely that donors are 
missing important empirical dynamics: Rational actors assessing options in a 
resource-scarce, low-enforcement environment, faced with institutional incentives 
that reward overspending and organizational aggrandizement, will opt to ignore 
spending limits and position their organization advantageously, especially if 
intergenerational learning accepts these norms. As Douglass North was fond of 
saying, if piracy is rewarded, people will be pirates (North, 1993a). When public 
employees in a resource-poor environment employ public assets for some level of 
private gain, that’s rational, especially if no one is enforcing rules that ostensibly 
prevent it. Also, behaviors described as “corrupt” are often related to helping gain 
positive advantage for one’s organization, not necessarily one’s self. This strategic 
positioning has a long, proud heritage, especially under state socialism, as I will 
explore in Chapter Six. 
Today, using public assets, or public networks, for private or organizational 
gain is sanctioned in Romania by: 1) the commonly understood need for resources 
(by any means) and informal norms that accepted the use of public assets to survive 
under communism; and 2) a legacy that blurs the line between public and private 
property, allowing individuals to rationalize practices deemed corrupt in the West. 
Healthcare in Romania, for example, is not in crisis because of petty 
“corruption.” It has been overwhelmed by weak budget constraints; poor financial 
management at the level of the Ministry of Finance and individual hospitals; lack of 
competition; lack of procedural enforcement especially related to the framework 
contract; a high level of confusion regarding institutional roles and responsibilities, 
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which shrinks the planning horizon for all actors; and professional collusion between 
decision makers and a well-organized professional sector. Simply put, the national 
healthcare institution lacks the incentives to control costs! Corruption is more a 
symptom than a cause of dysfunction in Romanian healthcare. Bu corruption is so 
often evoked as a root cause of Romania’s current problems that it merits 
consideration in the context of exploring the legacy of state socialism.  
 Development professionals should be discouraged from employing the 
corruption construct as a blanket excuse for programs not turning out as expected and 
hoped. The use of public resources for private and organizational gain should be 
included as an assumption in post-communist program planning. This expectation 
will, then, help development professionals shape programming to focus on the 
incentives within a policy regime, especially rules governing budget allocation and 
public procurement—rules which differ in every context, and every country. 
 
General Conclusions 
Foreign assistance is especially beneficial when credible international commitments 
spur difficult, complex change. However, the rational tendency of organized interests 
to undermine institutional reform—especially if opportunities to extract rent emerged 
in the first phase of reform implementation—is a strong countervailing current. 
Foreign assistance, too often fixated on teleological end-states and normative goals, is 
inefficient when: 1) Reform recommendations rely on national legislation, with little 
attention to domestic, intra-governmental bargaining, especially regarding budgets; 2) 
Reform plans fail to examine institutional procedures and vagaries that constitute 
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financial incentives for short-term “winners” to subvert reform; and 3) Donors 
exaggerate the break between past and present, missing opportunities to better 
understand contemporary constraints as a function of historical legacies. 
With norms such as the reliance on soft-budget constraints maintained and 
little competition—or independent monitoring to enforce accountability—outside 
attempts to help reorganize health services failed. Performance-based conditionality 
tied to credible international threats led child welfare reform beyond stalemate, 
although deep changes in the form of employment cuts and financial decentralization 
are resisted. If donors are too mesmerized by Western models being promoted, too 
fixated on the end-states toward which assistance is driving, then much of the real-life 
institutional drama that intervenes as reform unfolds over time is lost—and donor 
expectations are foiled.  
But we have cut to the chase without introducing the case studies, or the 
origin of post-communist foreign engagement in the two sectors under consideration.  
 
Background of the Cases and Foreign Involvement in Reforming Child Welfare 
and Healthcare 
At a hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe4 on 
September 14, 2005, members of Congress lashed out at the EU5 (Europa Libera,
4 The CSCE, or Helsinki Commission, is an independent U.S. Government agency established to 
monitor progress toward implementing the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Most of its members are drawn 
from Congress: nine from the U.S. Senate, nine from the U.S. House of Representatives, and one 
member from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce, respectively. 
5 The State Department’s press release regarding the hearing summarizes the U.S. Government 
position: “Romanian Adoption Policy Examined as Human Rights Issue: Congressional Panel 
Criticizes EU Adoption Ban Pressure on Bucharest” (2005a, p. 1). In later chapters, the dispute will be 
discussed in greater detail. For their part, Europeans also refer to child welfare in Romania as a human 
rights issue. Earlier this year, a Council of Europe document declared, “The fate of children in 
19
2005). In itself, that’s not an implausible scene. But the hearing’s subject, Romanian 
adoption policy, seems marginally relevant to trans-Atlantic security and cooperation, 
and the spectacle of U.S. officials struggling against the EU to define an aspect of a 
third country’s social policy—well, that’s just unusual. 
 It is not unusual when the international standing of post-communist Romania 
is under discussion: One of the defining political issues in Romania’s relations with 
the West over the last fifteen years has been its child welfare policy. Normally, child 
welfare is a domestic problem, but it was catapulted into the world’s consciousness 
when, in early 1990, repugnant images of thousands of abandoned children, tied to 
beds and fed like animals in forsaken state orphanages, were broadcast from re-
opened Romania. Worst of all, the majority of these children weren’t orphans at all, 
but unwanted children—“economic orphans” in the lexicon of the EU (Council of 
Europe, 2005). 
 The heart-breaking humanitarian crisis inspired a torrent of private, 
philanthropic, bilateral, and multilateral assistance. If ever there was a problem 
foreign assistance could fix—considering the dollar amount of donations, the army of 
paid and voluntary advisors eager to move to Romania in order to dedicate 
themselves to reform, and the explicit commitment by the Romanian government to 
fix the policy with guidance from abroad—it should be this one. 
 
institutions has ceased to be a matter for the social welfare field, and has now become, first and 
foremost, a human rights issue…” (2005). However, the European Commission had already deemed 
Romania’s child welfare crisis a human rights issue within the EU accession process (1999b). 
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 Sure enough, the contrast between Romania’s child welfare regime6 today and 
in 1990 is dramatic. Most state-owned facilities are now structured on the model of 
family-like residential units. A range of services are offered—from day care facilities 
to maternal-child shelters to more generous child allowances for poor families—to 
help prevent families from giving their children to the state. The government is party 
to international conventions governing the well-being of children that even the United 
States has not signed.7
When donors engaged with the child welfare system8 in 1990, they quickly 
made the connection between child welfare and the healthcare system: Within the 
complicated division of authority over abandoned children, the Ministry of Health 
was charged with managing state facilities caring for infants and toddlers aged 0-3 
years. These crucial years of child development were categorized mainly in medical 
terms, rather than psychosocial ones.9
In assessing the causes of Romania’s high child abandonment rate and 
miserable reproductive health outcomes, many analysts concluded that Nicolae 
Ceausescu’s ban on contraception and abortion, which extended from 1966 to 1989, 
was a driving factor (Dickens and Groza, 2004; Booth et al. 1999; Kligman, 1998). 
 
6 Romanians use the term child protection (protectie a copilului), while the American system uses the 
term child welfare. The meaning is essentially the same. 
7 The main difference is that Romania is a party to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which the U.S. has never signed. 
8 I use the term “system” in the sense of a network designed to deliver something or serve a common 
purpose, such as the telephone system or the highway system. When non-state actors become involved, 
including NGOs, adoption lawyers, potential parents, and so on, it is more descriptive to refer to a 
child welfare “regime,” which I do as reform evolves. 
9 It must be noted that these medically oriented overseers managed to create Europe’s largest pediatric 
AIDS population: Through the repeated use of intravenous needles and the overuse of transfusions 
(using untested blood) for any sign of ailment, including anemia and malnutrition, the Ministry of 
Health spread HIV/AIDS to over 4,000 children, most of whom lived in state care. To this day, 
Romania has the largest number of pediatric AIDS cases in Europe, accounting for over half of all 
European cases (Leigh, 1999). 
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The combination of “pro-natalist” policies and rapidly increasing national poverty 
throughout the late 1970s and 1980s10 conspired to create families without means to 
care for unwanted children. Illegal abortions led to the highest maternal mortality rate 
in Europe between 1979 and 1989. About 85% of these deaths11 were related to 
abortion, yielding maternal mortality ten times higher than any other European 
country (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1995); the children of deceased 
women were often assumed into state care. In addition, children with disabilities 
(either as a result of weak neonatal care, insufficient maternal nutrition, or failed 
abortions) were almost automatically declared wards of the state and tracked into a 
dizzying array of special hospitals, homes, and residential schools. 
 The primary explanation for this inhuman crisis, besides these socio-medical 
factors, was an aggressive child welfare institution that asserted the priority of the 
state over families vis-à-vis the care of children. There are poor countries with big 
families all over the world. No where in, for example, Latin America or Asia, is it 
routine to turn babies over to the state never to see them again. In Romania, as part of 
the ideology of state socialism, institutions and rules governing the disposition of 
children were implemented that rationalized the warehousing of infants and children 
under state supervision. For example, children born with disabilities—ranging from 
hair lips to mild retardation to anemia—required a doctor’s signature for parents to 
assume care. Very often, doctors withheld signatures and placed the children in 
institutions where, more often then not, the disabilities worsened (Booth et al., 1999). 
This institutional control of the child welfare domain was particularly difficult to 
 
10 Romania channeled national wealth to international lenders in order to pay back debt (Judt, 2001). 
11 In 1989, the rate was 169.4/100,000, which dropped to 83.6/100,000 in 1990 (Petre, 2002). 
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undo; from 1990 to 1996, most donor initiatives (inadvertently) contributed to the 
ongoing empowerment of state-run institutions. 
 In 1990, confronting this complex of child abandonment and health-related 
issues, many donors introduced aid programs to address reproductive health and 
health service delivery, alongside programs to add heating facilities to orphanages, 
train new social workers, and introduce play therapy. Although the origin of donor-
sponsored health programs was related to child welfare, health reform efforts 
broadened in 1991 with a major $150 million World Bank loan. One of its first 
analytical products was a 400+ page report compiled by the University of Leeds and 
King’s Fund College and delivered to the Ministry of Health in 1993 (World 
Bank/Government of Romania, 1993). It provided a detailed plan for the 
transformation of health delivery, financing, human resources, and technology—a 
soup-to-nuts scheme that aimed to turn a highly centralized, ministry-dominated 
system into a decentralized, family physician–friendly model. 
 These were the beginnings of child welfare and healthcare reform in post-
communist Romania. Fifteen years later, reform programs in the two sectors appear to 
have taken markedly divergent paths. What can we learn from a side-by-side 
comparison of child welfare and healthcare reform in Romania between 1990 and 
2004? This is the substance of my dissertation, explored in detail in Chapters Three 
through Six.  
 
So What? Global Trends in Foreign Assistance 
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The foreign aid that flowed into Romania in order to support reform goals is much 
like foreign assistance dispersed around the world: a combination of loans to the 
central government, grants to indigenous organizations, technical assistance 
implemented by expatriate advisors and consultants, and training opportunities (both 
in-country and abroad) provided to local people. It would be beneficial if in the 
process of dissecting the course of reform in child welfare and healthcare—and how 
foreign assistance helped, hurt, or didn’t do much at all—some observations can be 
applied to other reform efforts. 
 This exercise is valuable because bilateral and multilateral assistance is 
increasing. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which 
coordinates the aid policies of twenty-two members and tracks Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA)12 flows, global foreign assistance increased by 4.6% 
in 2004 to $78.6 billion USD, which follows a 4.3% increase between 2002 and 2003 
(OECD, 2005a). Of the twenty-two DAC members, fifteen countries increased aid 
flows after controlling for inflation. Approximately 20% of ODA is provided by IFIs, 
primarily the World Bank which provided $20.1 billion to 245 projects worldwide in 
2004 (World Bank, 2005a). 
 Since the Second World War, U.S. foreign policy has doggedly pursued the 
assumption that financial and technical assistance provided to allies can change the 
course of domestic policy in countries ranging from Japan to Columbia, from Haiti to 
 
12 The OECD defines foreign assistance as ODA, which consists of grants or loans that one 
government or multilateral organization provides to a developing country in order to promote 
economic development and social welfare. ODA includes concessional assistance as well as loans of 
which at least 25% is given in the form of a grant. 
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Iraq. Under George W. Bush’s administration, development assistance has attained an 
even more paradigmatic role (National Security Council, 2002; U.S. Agency for 
International Development [USAID], 2002). 
 Besides the United States, which created USAID in 1961, most industrial 
democracies created national entities between 1960 and 1975 to lead bilateral 
development efforts, prompted in some places by changing colonial relationships and 
supported by a growing body of academic research on development and 
modernization (Carothers, 1999; Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh, and Lewis, 1997; Smith, 
1994; Huntington, 1991, 1968; Almond and Coleman, 1960). Although the bilateral 
development programs of different countries have different orientations, they 
generally use the same methods to channel aid: grants to government organizations or 
NGOs, technical assistance, study tours, and in-country training. Although this 
dissertation largely concentrates on three donors—the EU13, the United States, and 
the World Bank—because they assumed the highest profile roles in the sectors I 
examine, conclusions are applicable to foreign assistance offered by other bilateral 
and multilateral donors. 
Numerous studies regarding the impact of foreign aid on economic 
development have reached consensus that a state’s governing institutions must be 
suitably mature and free of corruption for international assistance to make a 
significant positive contribution (Tanzi and Tsibouris, 2001; Knack, 2001; Chhibber, 
 
13 According to the OECD’s most recent ODA summary (2005b), the European Community led, by 
far, all donors in assistance to Romania, providing $275 million USD between 2002 and 2003. Japan 
and the United States were virtually tied for second place, giving $50 million USD and $49 million 
USD, respectively. Although it is impossible to know how much foreign assistance has been received 
by the child welfare and healthcare sectors between 1990 and 2004, guesstimates range from 
$800,000,000 to $1.5 billion.  
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1998; World Bank, 2002d, 1998, 1997; Ades and DiTella, 1997; Brunetti, Kisunko, 
and Weder, 1997; Commander, Davoodi, and Lee, 1996; Dia, 1996). The critical 
impact of efficient governing institutions on aid effectiveness is now acknowledged 
in presidential announcements. In July 2005, in anticipation of the G-8 summit, 
President Bush announced his intention to double aid to Africa, raising U.S. 
assistance to $8.6 billion in 2010 from $4.3 billion in 2004 (Associated Press, 2005). 
The President said: 
 
Over the decades we’ve learned that without economic and social freedom, 
without the rule of law and effective, honest government, international aid has 
little impact or value. But where there’s freedom and the rule of law, every 
dollar of aid, trade, charitable giving, and foreign and local investment can 
rapidly improve people’s lives. Economic aid that expects little will achieve 
little. Economic aid that expects much can help to change the world. 
(President George W. Bush, 2005) 
 
It’s encouraging that the White House speechwriting team absorbs lessons 
from studies by the World Bank.14 But the final sentences in the passage quoted 
above are worrisome: “Economic aid that expects little will achieve little. Economic 
aid that expects much can help to change the world.” Without overburdening this 
speech, based on the case studies in this paper, it is exactly the big think, blueprints, 
and meta-solutions that miss the mark in curative politics. This dissertation seeks to 
demonstrate that for change to succeed, donors must focus on institutional 
relationships and political and administrative procedures governing money, keeping a 
 
14 Further evidence of this intellectual reliance can be traced to 2002 when the president announced the 
creation of the Millennium Challenge Account, a U.S. Government–supported investment and 
development fund that explicitly ties increased aid to national performance on indicators of democratic 
governance and economic freedom generated by the World Bank, Freedom House, and the 
International Monetary Fund. Learning about foreign aid has moved from academic and IFI circles to 
political ones, but not deeply or widely enough. 
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wary eye on organized interests that benefit from early phases of reform and insisting 
that donor investments be tied to measurable goals. 
 With the rush of assistance to post-communist countries after 1989, Western 
advisors have recommended a plethora of substantive legal and policy reforms to 
transitioning countries not always giving sufficient attention to: 1) the decision-
making processes, procedures, and incentives that shape, in critical ways, the 
implementation of reform; 2) the strategic interactions between governing institutions 
and local stakeholders that drive outcomes; and 3) the strong incentives that “partial 
winners” have to stall reform somewhere between reform initiation and the 
achievement of public goods. 
A reoccurring assumption is that getting the right laws—modeled on 
functioning Western regimes—in place, will yield desired reform results. Reform 
prescriptions are often presented as end-states that obscure the process by which 
change is sorted out. The impact of donors on domestic political relationships (at 
central and local levels), the key roles played by institutions implementing policy 
change, and the importance of budget procedures in creating incentives that favor, or 
work against, reform have too often been ignored. 
 
Curative Politics 
This is where the notion of “curative” politics comes from: Too much foreign 
assistance, emphatically normative and driven by a notion of full health, is 
administered like a seventeenth-century cure for deleterious symptoms with scant 
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attention to an accurate diagnosis of the patient.15 As well, the language and posture 
of foreign aid often assumes that the recipient government’s institutions are sick.16 
This metaphor, paradoxically, confounds the assistance effort because, as I hope to 
show, the recipient institutions are quite alive and thriving—not always thriving in 
ways that contribute to the common good, but thriving in the sense that they are 
functioning, rationally, to secure resources and maximize opportunities to increase 
authority. The curative politics of foreign aid (practiced in North America, Western 
Europe, and the Asian Pacific countries such as Japan and Australia with traditions of 
engagement in bilateral development) contributes to partial, naïve, and misleading 
assessments of what development fixes to offer. The case studies I treat constitute an 
autopsy of this outmoded form of treatment. 
 International actors do many good things, no doubt. Humanitarian assistance 
is welcomed by those in immediate need; individuals on fully sponsored trips to see 
life in more settled countries usually appreciate the investment. In the fields of basic 
healthcare, including immunization and services such as water sharing schemes, 
foreign donors present convincing data linking assistance to improvements in human 
welfare (USAID, 2002; Congressional Budget Office, 1997; Gordon, Gwin, and 
 
15 The Oxford English Dictionary (1944) defines “curative” as having the tendency or power to cure 
disease, from “cure” a Middle English word first used in a medical sense in 1592. Earlier, the word 
signified caring for the spiritual interests of a parish (think of a curé or curate) or removing an evil. To 
“cure” is also a process of preserving meat. So, a “cure” is generally used to describe a process of 
change in which one agent works on another to fix a problem—spiritual, medical, or chemical. 
16 This analogy occurred to me long before I read Jeffrey Sachs’ latest book The End of Poverty: 
Economic Possibilities for Our Time (2005a) in which he develops the concept of “clinical economics” 
to describe a “new method” for development economics. He writes, “Development economics today is 
not like modern medicine, but it should strive to do so. It can improve dramatically if development 
economists take on some of the key lessons of modern medicine, both in the development of the 
underlying science and in the systemization of clinical practice, the point where science is brought to 
bear on a particular patient” (Sachs, 2005a, p. 75). For Sachs, the “particular patient” is whatever 
nation, or government, he is advising. This passage represents a contemporary example of curative 
politics from one of its best-known practitioners. 
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Singing, 1996). In beneficial scenarios, foreign and multilateral donors play the role 
of presenting policy alternatives normally articulated in national parliaments or 
through electoral contests in the West. International actors also sometimes represent 
the voices of average people, clients for state services, who are frustrated with the 
lack of transparency or accountability but have few mechanisms for articulating this 
frustration. What donors are distinctly not good at is anticipating how local 
organizations, through local institutions, will absorb, and refract, change. 
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
Following the literature review in Chapter Two, in Chapter Three we consider the 
explanatory power of electoral politics vis-à-vis the evolution of policy changes in 
child welfare and healthcare between 1990 and 2004. Many political observers of 
post-communist Romania describe change in terms of the rivalry between leaders and 
political formations with ties to the old regime (which governed 1990-1996 and 2000-
2004) versus political parties that can be considered part of a democratic opposition, 
which governed between 1996-2000 and recaptured power in late 2004. It is certainly 
true that soon after the opposition coalition came to power in 1997, we quickly saw 
passage of important legislative reforms in child welfare and healthcare. But 
implementation was problematic between 1996 and 2000 much as it was before. The 
discussion concludes that in terms of institutional reform, electoral politics has weak 
explanatory power.  
 However, the political need for central government to remain attentive, and 
work through, sub-national government entities has an interesting impact on the 
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implementation of foreign aid. In the second part of Chapter 3, we examine the 
interaction between donors, central government, and sub-national units with special 
attention to the overwhelming concern among domestic organizations to secure 
resources. This rational concern dominates inter-governmental relations and helps 
explain some executive level behavior that donors consider ambivalent.  
 But the two-level bargaining approach, while interesting, is episodic. It does 
not explain outcomes in a way that is tied to the procedural rules governing 
interactions between organized interests and institutions. In Chapters Four and Five, 
we attempt to penetrate the conditions for success and failure in social welfare reform 
promoted by foreign actors by tying performance outcomes back to institutional rules 
and procedures, especially procedures governing budget allocation. In both case 
studies, data drives analysis whenever possible, because numbers offer insights that 
point back to politics. Looking for the institutional antecedents of dysfunction 
described in Chapters Five and Six sends this investigation to the legacy of state 
socialism in Chapter Six, where reference to the institutional past allows a deeper 
understanding of post-communist reform patterns; informal norms, mental models, 
and ideology help explain how the past continues to inform the present. Operationally 






Institutional Theory and New Institutional Economics 
Institutional theory is the cradle of this dissertation, which is not to say much. At the 
core of the new institutionalist approach is recognition that politics often entails the 
adjudication of conflicts of interests or preferences within an institutional framework 
that itself—via its rules, procedures, incentives, loopholes, and enforcement 
mechanisms—helps determine political outcomes. Rules do not determine 
outcomes—this is not a deterministic theory—but rules (i.e., institutions) comprise an 
essential frame of reference within which political decision makers and organized 
interests function, making certain strategies or tactics optimal or not. Within this 
scholarship, the individual is assumed to be rational and instrumental. This 
assumption can be confusing, because much of the literature talks about institutions 
constraining or facilitating individual and corporate actors, so it seems to be about 
structures, not choice. Yet individuals create institutions and change them, even as 
they function within them. Although two distinct intellectual strands in the study of 
institutions, rational choice (RC) institutionalism and historical institutionalism, are 
purportedly moving closer together (Soltan, Uslaner, and Haufler, 1998), I will 
discuss institutional theory and RC separately in order to clarify their respective 
contributions to this dissertation. 
 Political economist Douglass North provides the most salient definitions of 
institutions and institutional change (1990, 1993a, 1994a, 1997, 2000), definitions 
that have probably launched thousands of dissertations. Institutions include the formal 
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and informal constraints devised to shape human interaction, and the enforcement 
characteristics of both. Formal constraints include constitutions and laws; informal 
constraints include codes of behavior, norms, and unwritten customs. The major role 
of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by providing a stable structure to human 
interactions. Institutions define incentives that shape the choices made by 
organizations and individuals. Ultimately, these choices generate efficient or 
inefficient outcomes. 
 North recognizes that institutions are always evolving, which means that 
choices available to individuals are continually altering. Organizations—groups of 
individuals bound by common purpose to achieve certain objectives—are important 
agents of institutional change since they are created in response to institutional 
constraints and, in turn, their activity causes institutions to evolve. Institutional 
change is typically incremental: “Marginal adjustments to the complex of rules, 
norms, and enforcement that constitute the institutional framework… Stability is 
accomplished by a complex set of constraints that include formal rules nested in a 
hierarchy, where each level is more costly to change than the previous one” (1990, p. 
83). For North, the “complex mix” of formal and informal constraints, together with 
enforcement, are the critical elements in producing efficient—or inefficient—
outcomes (1990, pp. 83, 53). 
 When change is dramatic and conclusive, such as the revolutionary actions 
that ended communism, North refers to “discontinuous institutional change.” He 
suggests, in just a few paragraphs on the subject in Institutions, Institutional Change, 
and Economic Performance, that radical chance is rarely as dramatic as it first 
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appears because although formal rules can change overnight, informal constraints 
never do. Thus, informal constraints, especially those imbedded in culture, will 
reassert themselves to structure “basic exchange problems among the participants be 
they social, political, or economic. The result over time tends to be a restructuring of 
the overall constraints… to produce a new equilibrium that is far less revolutionary” 
(North, 1990, p. 91). 
 North is especially interested in tracing how institutions affect economic 
performance. At the heart of this investigation is, again, the relationship between 
formal and informal constraints. The final paragraph explicitly points future 
investigators toward an exploration of the relationship between formal and informal 
constraints: “One gets efficient institutions by a polity that has built-in incentives to 
create and enforce efficient property rights. But it is hard—maybe impossible—to 
model such a polity with wealth maximizing actors unconstrained by other 
considerations… Informal constraints matter. We need to know much more about 
culturally derived norms of behavior and how they interact with formal rules to get 
better answers to such questions” (North, 1990, p. 140). 
 An extremely important point that North makes in his Nobel Prize lecture and 
elsewhere (North, 1993a, 1993b) is that institutions are not usually created to be 
socially efficient. Formal rules, especially, are created to serve the interests of 
organizations with the bargaining power to make (or strongly influence the making 
of) new rules. What we will see in the healthcare case study, in Chapter 5, is an 
excellent example of an organization with significant bargaining power (doctors) and 
access to central-level decision making, influencing the implementation of rules in a 
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rationally self-serving way within a formal, technical framework promoted by 
donors—with results that grossly disappoint donors.17 
North’s theory is now widely accepted. For example, Chhibber (1988) offers 
as an aside, “Institutional change is difficult, because it involves changes in the 
formal rules. Informal norms change even more slowly” (p. 45)—a synopsis of 
North’s observations. What remains far less explored is the dynamic between formal 
rules and informal norms. 
 The importance of focusing on change within a theory of institutions stems 
from the fact that change, or evolution, represents the dynamic and, therefore, living 
aspect of the theory. It follows that through a study of change, the investigator has an 
opportunity to see the components of institutional power and the relative importance 
of these for living decision makers. Change is also key to the issue of performance 
since poorly performing institutions might be reformed if the dynamics of 
institutional change are better understood. For North, it is the continuous interaction 
between institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of an 
economy (1994a, 1994b)—and an institutional policy regime in the cases here. North 
suggests that empirical research is essential to test his theory and push it further. He 
asks: 
If poor countries are poor because they are the victims of an institutional 
structure that prevents growth, is that institutional structure imposed from 
without or is it endogenously determined or is it some combination of both? 
The systematic study of institutions should answer these questions. 
Specifically, we must develop empirical data on transaction and 
 
17 In its latest country assistance evaluation, the World Bank (2005b), which was the lead donor for 
healthcare reform throughout the 1990-2004 period, called the performance of its major health reform 
loan (1991-1999) “moderately unsatisfactory,” summarizing: “Health sector financing reform limited. 
Urban/rural disparities remain large.” The same language was used to describe “progress” between 
2000 and 2004. 
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transformation costs in such economies and then trace the institutional origins 
of such costs… Still to be undertaken is systematic empirical work that will 
identify the costs and underlying institutions that make economies 
unproductive. (North, 1990, p. 135) 
 
Chhibber concludes succinctly, “Empirical work on institutions and institutional 
change has been scanty” (1998, p. 37). This type of empirical effort is at the center of 
my dissertation. 
 Chhibber (1998) also provides an example of how the lack of research on 
institutional change allows important analysts like him to make overbroad statements 
that do not track with important cases. He states, for example: “Typically, the groups 
in society that benefit from the existing rules and control the power of the state are 
likely to resist changes in the formal rules. Hence institutional change is a slow 
deliberate process or it occurs in discrete jumps through war, revolution, or upheaval” 
(p. 45). Some analysts (Campos, 2000) recognize that while institutional change may 
be slow in the developed world, it can be fast-paced in transitioning economies. In 
post-communist Romania, the political elite have often led efforts to change formal 
laws—radically and rapidly—at the behest of foreign donors. Change has hardly been 
a “slow and deliberate process”; rather, it is a chaotic and confusing series of 
initiatives that have hardly affected informal norms within institutional settings. 
 Douglass North is one of a legion of academic institutionalists—be they 
further termed historical, sociological, RC, or simply new—who share the analytical 
assumption that institutions structure political, economic, and social behavior and 
outcomes; therefore, institutions are at the center of their investigations and theories 
about politics. Two reviews of this sprawling literature (Peters, 1999; Hall and 
Taylor, 1998) demonstrate the many divergent versions of institutional theory. Two 
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key differences in institutional approaches pertinent to this inquiry emerge in these 
reviews: 1) the degree to which institutions are perceived to be mutable, and 2) the 
relative weight given to values and norms versus formal rules as instruments of 
constraint. Some institutional approaches assume that since institutions move toward 
a state of equilibrium, since they are stable when they serve to reduce uncertainty, 
institutions are slow to evolve (Krasner, 1984; Steinmo et al., 1992). RC 
institutionalists tend to assume that institutions are highly mutable, non-equilibrium 
structures because institutions and rules are created by individuals who can, then, 
change them. In this approach, rules are constantly being negotiated between 
individuals who make strategic decisions based on their expectations regarding how 
others will behave (Riker, 1980; Ostrom, 1990; Grafstein, 1992; Geddes, 1994). 
 Institutional design choices are therefore subject to revision in order to shift 
the incentive structure motivating individuals.  
In transition economies,18 the degree of institutional mutability is startling, 
and the stated motivation for replacing laws or regulations is often, explicitly, to 
change behavior by changing incentives. At the same time, informal norms are slow 
to change and can constitute a set of institutional constraints not immediately 
apparent, especially if desirable formal (legal) constraints are in place. Thus, this 
dissertation is oriented within a framework that accepts institutions as undergoing 
continual, intentional and unintentional, change, focusing on the actor-driven 
dynamics inside political institutions and state administration that promote or inhibit 
 
18 A transition economy is one in which the economy is in the process of being transformed from state 
ownership to private ownership, in varying degrees. The term is most often used to refer to the 
experience of post-communist countries.  
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change, within a context that also privileges values and norms (for example, norms 
regarding acceptable behavior) derived from historical legacies. 
 Peters (1999) finds that many versions of institutionalism suffer from weak 
methodology and a lack of rigor in measuring the phenomena they seek to describe 
(p. 145). He also concludes that future institutionalist research should focus more on 
the formation and transformation of structures and on testing theory (p. 150). This 
dissertation aims to respond by detailing the design and redefinition of institutions 
and by specifying the relative role of formal rules and informal norms. 
 One of the most empirically grounded theorists, Elinor Ostrom, offers a strong 
research model. Ostrom sets out to learn from the real-world experiences of people 
facing common-pool resource problems. She shows that institutional design can help 
overcome the collective action problem. Early in Governing the Commons (1990), 
she emphasizes that the researcher must move back and forth between theory and 
practice. In organizing her field research, she assumes multiple levels of analysis: At 
an operational level, the investigator assumes that the technology and institutional 
rules are known and unchanging. However, the rules governing operational choice 
differ from collective-choice rules, which vary from constitutional-choice rules. For 
Ostrom, institutions are the set of working rules that define participation, procedures, 
and pay-offs in some arena. 
 Ostrom draws an important distinction between formal rules and working 
rules: 
 
Working rules may or may not closely resemble the formal laws that are 
expressed in legislation, administrative regulations, and court decisions. 
Formal law obviously is a major source of working rules in many settings, 
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particularly when compliance to them is actively monitored and sanctions for 
non-compliance are enforced. When one speaks about a system that is 
governed by a ‘rule-of-law,’ this expresses the idea that formal laws and 
working rules are closely aligned and that enforcers are held accountable to 
the rules as well as others. (1990, p. 51) 
 
Rules can change but that is not always beneficial: “Changing the rules at a level of 
analysis will increase the uncertainty that individuals will face. Rules provide stability 
of expectations, and efforts to change rules can rapidly reduce that stability” (Ostrom, 
1990, pp. 53-54). 
 There have been almost continual changes in the formal rules governing some 
institutions in transition countries. How have these affected the operational level 
where working rules structure decision making? Like North (1990), Ostrom 
concludes that both structures and values figure into the strategic calculation that 
leads to the resolution of collective action problems. Ostrom (1990) is primarily 
interested in how people overcome the difficulty of organizing collectively to solve 
problems. Her research interests flow from the paradoxical collective action problems 
memorably identified by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action (1965): 1) 
Since an individual can’t be excluded from enjoying a public good, such as clean air, 
once it is achieved, she has no strong incentive to personally work toward the goal if 
others are already organized. 2) If others are not already organized to achieve the 
public good, there is no strong incentive for the individual to join the campaign since 
the marginal contribution of one individual, next to the cost of participation, argues 
against participation. 
 Thus, it is not rational for the individual to participate in achieving the good at 
issue—unless the group is small and able to organize because members have strong 
38
personal incentives to participate. Although, superficially, cooperation to achieve a 
public good seems self-evident and underlies political approaches such as interest 
group politics, cooperation is unlikely when seen through the RC prism. Individuals 
or groups who benefit from public goods they did nothing to earn are termed “free 
riders.” In the case of child welfare, the Romanian government can be considered a 
free rider, during some phases of reform, when it benefits from donor funding without 
implementing changes that would make the sector more efficient. In the healthcare 
case study, we will see how doctors overcome barriers to organization—and 
effectively block the achievement of efficiency in healthcare allocation. 
 Some of Ostrom’s most provocative research involves close study of small 
groups. The case studies in this dissertation involve large, complex institutions. In a 
comparative study of Soviet institutional collapse, Solnick (1998) employs a research 
model that more closely approximates mine. His “micro-institutional” approach 
involves studying three Soviet institutions overseeing youth policy in order to 
describe in minute detail the trajectory of hierarchical breakdown. He theorizes that 
the devolution of control within communist hierarchies, as well as information 
asymmetries between high-level and street-level decision makers, led to widespread 
opportunism, expropriation of organizational assets, and, ultimately, institutional 
disintegration—an overlooked phenomenon in most explanations of Soviet collapse. 
Instead of concentrating on elite politics, Solnick convincingly points to destabilizing 
forces within state institutions by utilizing a micro-institutional analysis within an 
institutional framework to explain motivation and change-making behavior. 
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 Solnick borrows insights from new institutional economics, one branch of 
which uses principle-agent theory to analyze problems in political economy. 
Managers of state institutions and employees are conceptualized as having principle-
agent relationships determined by two primary factors: the assumption that 
opportunism exists on both sides, and that both are constrained by bounded 
rationality, which entails lack of full information on the part of decision makers. 
Although organizations are supposed to enforce constraints on the opportunism of 
agents (as employees), the reality of bounded rationality makes full monitoring 
impossible. Solnick (1998) cites studies of local Soviet party officials demonstrating 
that opportunism on the part of some local bureaucrats allowed them not only to 
benefit from chaos, but encouraged them to help create it! Assuming that bureaucrats 
are opportunistic, the prediction must be made that bureaucrats will ignore established 
rules if so doing furthers their self-interest and the risks of enforcement are low. 
 In the chaotic transitional environment of post-communist Romania, internal 
enforcement governing personnel has been weak and bureaucratic discretion wide. 
Therefore, the new institutional paradigm predicts that opportunistic agents will 
pursue self-interest, including job security, resource control, and organizational 
prestige, instead of necessarily following formal rules, many of which are new, 
untried, and even contradictory. This is what we find in both case studies. 
 New Institutional Economics (NIE), a termed coined by economist Oliver 
Williamson in 1975, is a field of political economy that assesses institutional 
arrangements using techniques such as transaction cost analysis, principle-agent 
theory, bounded rational choice models, and the logic of collective action. The 
40
diverse economists working under the general NIE banner share an assumption that 
institutions matter, and that the relationship between institutions and economic 
performance constitutes a critical set of public policy questions (Richter, 2002). 
Analysts with the international financial institutions (IFIs) have seized on the utility 
of new institutional economics as a tool for assessing the quality and capability of 
state institutions. Wiesner (1998) highlight two critical aspects of this approach: 1) 
the recognition that within, and between, public institutions a mixture of hierarchy, 
cooperation, and competition are necessary for the achievement of positive social 
outcomes; and 2) the central emphasis on incentives as structuring behavior in the 
public and private sectors. With the accent on incentives, the strategy in terms of 
promoting institutional reform is no longer simply stating certain ideal objectives 
(i.e., democracy or the rule of law), but analyzing institutional restrictions to the 
achievement of effective governance: “What matters in effective policymaking is not 
so much what the objectives are but what stands in the way of their achievement” 
(1998, p. xii). Although Wiesner describes a “development consensus” in favor of the 
centrality of institutions as key determinants of economic, social, and political 
progress, they cite an “urgent need” to direct empirical analysis toward specific 
institutional and organizational factors: “If the potential of neo-institutional 
economics is to be realized…the challenge is to focus on micro-analytical issues such 
as transaction costs, property rights, incentives, public sector rent-seeking, 
informational constraints, and the interplay of governments and markets” (1998, p. 
xiii). 
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 Others (Chhibber, 1998; Alston, 1998; Alston, Eggertsson, and North, 1996) 
reiterate the importance of case studies in this area. Alston specifies: “We need more 
micro studies over time at the country or regional level. Such studies would allow us 
to better control for the role of informal norms and thereby to isolate the importance 
of formal rules…We need more micro studies of specific institutions—both their 
causes and effects. This issue is especially important for policymakers, because 
countries’ macro-institutional capability environments are less amenable to change 
than specific laws and policies” (1998, p. 49). These observations support the 




In RC theory, the individual is the primary unit of analysis, and the individual is 
assumed to be a goal-oriented, rational creature: Faced with a variety of strategic 
options, she will choose an alternative that maximizes her chance of achieving her 
goal. Although an individual is often motivated to maximize wealth, there is no fixed 
RC assumption about what goals are driving choices. The goals could be institutional 
prestige, reelection, or promotion, just as well as money. The three RC assumptions 
that are common to various applications of the theory are: 1) Individuals choose 
means most appropriate to their ends; 2) individuals can rank order their goals; 3) 
their preferences are transitive or consistent (Levi, 1997; Hinich and Munger, 1997; 
Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991). 
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 Barbara Geddes (1995) makes the point that RC arguments “work best” when 
the rules governing interactions are clear and known to all actors (p. 87). RC 
arguments can also make sense of situations in which full information is not 
available, assuming that repetition allows learning that can yield more effective 
decisions. Also, although typically applied to individuals, especially in political 
analysis, the RC approach can be applied to organizations that behave like a unitary 
actor due to the shared goals of its membership (Scharpf, 1997). 
 In RC theory, institutions enter the picture as factors shaping the strategies 
available to individuals (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). When it comes to analyzing 
political behavior, the RC approach is elastic enough to give a prominent role to 
institutions as constraints on behavior, constraints that shape outcomes (Tsebelis, 
1990). Changes in formal rules and other relevant circumstances can affect the 
incentives facing a rational actor who will make choices based on those incentives.19 
Therefore, the RC approach is attentive to the incentive structures created by 
institutions. 
 The fundamental tenet of RC theory is appealing: The central concept is that 
individuals—from the Prime Minister to a street-level bureaucrat, together with 
voters and clients of public services—make choices that maximize their chances of 
achieving strategic goals. Rational individuals size up any institutional environment, 
than select the means (allowed by that institutional framework) with the best chance 
of leading them to the ends they want to achieve. There is a common-sense quality to 
 
19 Note how this description of rational choice could accommodate the ideas of Douglass North—
despite the fact that he sometimes writes critically about the rational choice paradigm (Denzau and 
North, 1993), namely because he sees “strong uncertainty problems at the individual level” (1993, p. 1) 
that make it impossible for people to make decisions truly in their self interest, and he wants to give a 
more prominent role to “myths, dogmas, ideologies, and ‘half-baked’ theories” (Ibid).  
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the premises of RC. And there are unexpected results—still more appealing for being 
unexpected—when two or more rationale actors interact, all pursuing their strategic 
first choices. A common criticism of RC (Green and Shapiro, 1994) is that despite the 
strides made in the theoretical development of this approach, it is far less useful when 
applied to the real world.   
 What we see more and more is scholarship that assumes RC’s fundamental 
principles but then proceeds to use language and concepts drawn from new 
institutional economics (NIE), transaction cost economics, agency theory, 
organizational theory, and so on. An excellent example of the increasingly 
postmodernist pastiche of knowledge comes in Stealing the State. Steven Solnick’s 
micro-institutional approach (1998) employs two important assumptions about 
policy-making institutions: Individual actors within the institution make decisions, 
and their decisions are made in an environment shaped by organizational structure. 
Further, regarding individual actors, they make decisions based on the perceived costs 
and benefits of options (utility maximization), although their preferences are not 
fixed, and changes in institutional rules can alter individual perceptions of the 
cost/benefit ratio. This framework is largely an RC framework, but Solnick’s 
empirical work is more journalistic than theoretical in its attention to documents and 
interviews as the basis for discerning patterns of institutional change in “linked case 
studies.” 
 The research conducted for the case studies, summarized in Chapters Three 
through Five, is similarly based on many primary sources, field visits, and 
implementation reports that take me far away from intellectual journals; this research 
44
provides an important view of transition from the ground up in an actor-centered 
approach that privileges the people at the center of big plans for big change—a view 
into the beautiful complexities of real life that, when analyzed a step removed, calls 
for a rich borrowing from various intellectual strains. 
 
Cross-Country Research 
The significance of the quality of a country’s institutions to economic growth (or 
level of development) has been demonstrated in several significant cross-country 
studies. These studies aim to prove that institutions and governance have a 
quantifiable impact in economic terms. Using a panel data set of thirty years and 
ninety-four countries, Commander, Davoodi, and Lee (1996) demonstrate that 
institutional capability and policy distortion influence economic growth, but 
institutional capability is more important than policy distortion. An example 
regarding property rights makes the distinction more clear: Policy defines property 
rights while institutional capability reflects the enforcement of rights. Without 
enforcement, policy is merely words. Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1997) surveyed 
3,600 local firms in sixty-nine countries, creating an index of institutional capability 
using five measures: predictability of rule making, perception of political stability, 
crime against persons and property, reliability of judicial enforcement, and freedom 
from corruption. They conclude that high levels of institutional capability correlate 
with greater investment and economic growth. Because both studies represent an 
aggregate of indicators, the index ends up representing institutions as a black box 
with no distinction between rules, informal norms, choices made by decision makers, 
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social conditions, or growth. For the impact of institutions on performance to be 
properly understood, the internal aspects of institutional decision making and 
behavior must be deconstructed. 
 One of the first important early empirical studies of governance and 
development was executed by Knack and Keefer (1995). Using an index constructed 
from five International Country Risk Guide variables (“Corruption in Government,” 
the “Rule of Law,” “Expropriation Risk,” “Repudiation of Contracts by 
Government,” and “Quality of the Bureaucracy”), they concluded that the quality of 
governance was positively associated with investment and growth rates. In order to 
more precisely identify the most significant dimension of governance to growth and 
social welfare, Campos (2000) constructed a panel set of yearly data covering twenty-
five Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and former Soviet countries 
between 1989 and 1997. He found that the rule of law is the most important 
institutional dimension in terms of per capita income and school enrollment. The 
quality of the bureaucracy was most important as a determinant regarding life 
expectancy. Compos’ research is especially valuable because he aims to map 
institutional change during transition. However, the weakness in Compos’ 
quantitative work is similar to a major weakness in similar studies: The causality is 
concealed.  
More recently, Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi 
constructed aggregate governance20 indicators (covering more than 200 countries) as 
 
20 Governance is defined as the “traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised 
for the common good” (Kaufmann, 2003) including the political dimension (the process by which 
leaders are selected and monitored) and the economic dimension (effective management of resources 
and implement sound policies).   
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part of a long term World Bank project. The indicators include six dimensions of 
governance: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. The indicators are used to 
track the relationship between governance and development, and to monitor 
performance. Overall, the research finds a strong, positive correlation between 
measures of governance and per capita incomes. Increasingly, donors are more 
concerned with governance as a critical element in aid effectiveness. 
 
Transition Literature 
Upon the dissolution of state socialism in 1989 in CEE and in the Soviet Union in 
1991, there was virtually no contestation regarding the adoption of democracy and 
market economics as models for political and economic organization. Certainly in the 
CEE, there was a spontaneous, popular assumption of these goals even as pacting 
among elites shaped the transfer of power in some countries. Experts, especially 
economists and lawyers, were quickly deployed—by Western governments, by IFIs, 
by private firms, and on their own—in order to guide early decision making related to 
the transition from a command economy to a free market. Literature on the transition 
is vast. Transition economics explores the process of implementing economic 
reform—for example, the relative merits of macroeconomic “shock” therapy 
(liberalizing prices, pursuing tight monetary policy and balanced budgets, and 
privatizing state-owned assets) versus more gradual, managed change (Marangos, 
2002; Roland, 2000). Proponents of the so-called Washington consensus, such as the 
high-profile Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs (1994), were ascendant in the early 
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1990s. They expected market forces, once unleashed, to create a positive environment 
for growth without explicit involvement of government or particular attention to 
ancillary institutions, such as contract-protecting judicial systems. 
Most recent assessments of the early 1990s policy prescriptions—typically 
financed through a variety of foreign assistance programs—conclude that they were 
simplistic and inattentive to the importance of a variety of institutions that under-gird 
capitalist economic success. Neo-liberal assumptions that mass privatization, price 
liberalization, and tight monetary policy would kick-start capitalism have been 
replaced by more sober acknowledgment that institutions under-girding competitive 
markets—such as contract enforcement and property rights—are essential (Manzetti, 
2003; Arrow, 2000; Roland, 2000; Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs, 2000; Stiglitz, 1999; 
Olson, 2000, 1992; North, 2000, 1997; Dewatripont and Roland, 1995; Manser, 1993; 
Murrell, 1992).  
Although this amounts to a negative assessment of the impact of the first phase of 
post-communist economic assistance, it is instructive in that it reinforces the 
institutionalist perspective: Reform efforts that are not grounded in adequate 
institutions are bound to fail, falter, or yield unintended consequences. The debate 
highlights the importance of institutional rules and institutional design in directing 
socially beneficial political and economic activity. Large-scale institutional change 
requires strategic attention to: 1) political constraints and the rules that determine 
which actors have access to the policy-making process, and running room within that 
policy regime; 2) allocative changes and how the locus of decision making regarding 
funding strongly influences outcomes; and 3) governance, especially the monitoring 
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and enforcement of compliance with legislative reform. The lack of consistent 
attention to these elements in reform schemes promoted through foreign assistance 
programs is detrimental to long-term reform goals. Although this literature is not 
precisely about foreign assistance, it is directly applicable to reform efforts financed 
by bilateral and multilateral donors. 
 
Political Economy and Partial Reform 
In his essay “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, 
Focused Comparison,” George (1979) is keen to merge the methods and interests of 
historians and political scientists. Certainly, there has been extensive blurring of the 
lines between political science and many other disciplines, particularly economics at 
the level of theory. However, in reading for this dissertation, I was consistently 
surprised to find a certain disregard for money, and the power of financial motives, in 
political science literature. On the ground, in legislative bodies, electoral campaigns, 
and policy debates worldwide, money and the distribution of resources is the very 
blood of politics. It is worth considering why it is dropped from many accounts of 
political phenomena. 
 This is relevant because the most compelling research on transitions is very 
savvy about financial motives. Joel Hellman’s work (1998; Hellman, Jones, and 
Kaufmann, 2000a, 2000b) on partial reform is an excellent case in point. He 
challenges the assumption (which became common wisdom) that short-term losers in 
the post-communist transition—including workers and pensioners and bureaucrats—
were potentially dangerous obstacles to reform who had to be compensated and 
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placated in order to successfully accomplish the market transition. Instead, he 
concludes that short-term winners threaten reform: Short-term winners gain 
substantial rents from distortions in the partially reformed system then have huge 
incentives to resist further change. He criticizes the “voluminous literature” that 
argues for state autonomy in the implementation of economic reform in order to 
insulate the state from the pressures of short-term losers. This logic argues for a 
reform strategy that builds up a constituency of winners who will then become local 
champions of change. Just the opposite is true, explains Hellman. The costs of 
transition have been high; uncertainty is ubiquitous. So those who secure rents during 
the early rounds of reform would be irrational to let go—and, typically, they don’t. 
 Hellman is concerned with economic rents in the quasi-private sector. His 
path-breaking observations are true in public sector reform as well. Most public 
facilities are construed as “profit centers” in one way or another by those who work 
there, and actors use public sector assets for private activities. For example, doctors 
use public hospital equipment to run tests on personal patients, entirely off the 
hospital books. Or state employees of the child welfare system work hand-in-hand 
with private adoption agencies to secure babies for—and tips from—families from 
the West. This can be termed corruption. But corruption is a blanket normative 
judgment with little power to explain phenomena. It is more instructive to see the 
doctors and state employees as short-term winners who secure certain rents as a 
function of partial reform in the healthcare and child welfare sectors. As a result, they 
(rationally) resist the larger reform program that would invariably undo opportunities 
for financial gain. 
50
 Much of the operational literature of post-communist transition is normative. 
With regard to foreign assistance, project design and program implementation are 
normative almost by definition. This normative orientation often prevents foreign 
assistance from identifying the most significant obstacles to the reform agenda. 
 
Assessments of International Assistance 
The World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
donor coordination committee have sponsored extensive research on the impact of 
international assistance which informs country-specific progress reports. Most 
importantly, researchers for the World Bank concluded in numerous studies 
(Commander, Davoodi, and Lee, 1996; Dia, 1996; Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 
1997; World Bank, 1997; Chhibber, 1998; World Bank, 1998) that a state’s 
governing institutions must be suitably mature, predictable, and free of corruption for 
international assistance to have any positive impact. The World Bank’s seminal 1997 
World Development Report analyzes the nature of state capacity and concludes that 
development requires an effective state.21 The report is especially valuable because it 
places institutional reform at the center of the challenge for foreign assistance. 
 However, there is a tautological quality to the conclusions of this and a study 
published a year later, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why? (World 
Bank, 1998) To say that foreign aid will be effective in countries that are being run 
well has a certain circularity. To say, “Countries without good policies, efficient 
public services, or properly allocated expenditures will benefit little from financing” 
 
21 Two of the five core state tasks identified by the report are “Investing in basic social services and 
infrastructure” (health) and “protecting the vulnerable” (child welfare), the two sectors I will examine. 
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World Bank, 1998, p. 5) treats as a black box the entire donor-recipient dynamic that 
has yielded unimpressive results. To be fair, the reports offer alternative assistance 
strategies for countries with weak governance, for example, channeling money 
through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or supporting local reform 
champions. But these suggestions skirt the central dilemma: understanding the 
dynamic of dysfunctional assistance apart from chastising weak governments. 
 There are surprisingly few critical academic assessments of foreign aid 
directed toward post-communist political assistance, although there are a few that are 
particularly strong and, in every case, grounded in close readings of programming on 
the ground (Carothers, 2002, 1999; Dryzek and Holmes, 2002; Cooley, 2000; Stark 
and Bruszt, 1998; Wedel, 1998; Verdery, 1997; Lubin and Ware, 1996). In a sharp 
critique of the transition paradigm that was hotly contested by the U.S. Agency for 
International Development and some democracy program implementers, Carothers 
(2002) concludes that five core assumptions underpinning assistance provided, 
especially by the U.S. “democracy-promotion community” (including public and 
private implementing organizations), have been disproved by the great number of 
“stalled” transitions. The five assumptions are: 1) Any country moving away from 
dictatorship is moving toward democracy. 2) Democracy unfolds through a 
sequence—opening, breakthrough, and consolidation. 3) Free elections are key to the 
generation of further reform. 4) Underlying conditions including history, traditions, 
and institutional legacies will not impede the transition. 5) Transitions modify already 
functioning states that require little in the way of state building. Contrary to these 
assumptions, Carothers considers that most of the “transitional countries” suffer from 
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serious democratic deficits, including poor representation of citizen interests and poor 
performance by state institutions. He notes, “The seemingly continual surprise and 
disappointment that Western political analysts express over the very frequent falling 
short of democracy in ‘transitional countries’ should be replaced with realistic 
expectations about the likely patterns of political life in these countries” (Carothers, 
2002, p. 18). Carothers’ observation is particularly apt in terms of Romania.   
In an impressive thirteen-country survey of post-communist democratization, 
Dryzek and Holmes (2002) are particularly critical of the teleological nature of 
transition assistance and its supporting literature. Their book is also valuable for 
restoring the notion that political generalizations can be drawn about the post-
communist experience, considering that the majority of regional studies since 1989 
emphasize the difference between cases. 
 
Globalization Critique 
Another critique of foreign assistance is offered by international political economists 
who fear that foreign assistance undermines the sovereignty of aid recipients, 
especially through the imposition of conditionality that is, on occasion, contrary to 
local preferences or interests (Perkins, 2004; Stiglitz, 2003, 2002;). The globalization 
rubric includes both this negative assessment of foreign aid and neutral analysts who 
don’t necessarily criticize assistance but observe how globalization changes the 
nature of inter-state relations. The aspect of this critique useful for this paper is its 
warning that by creating a dynamic between international lenders/donors and central 
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governments bargaining to gain resources, recipient governments can be discouraged 
from reflecting on the domestic impact of certain recommendations. 
 
The Gap Between Academics and Policymakers 
There is a noteworthy gap between assumptions among Western policymakers about 
the impact of foreign aid and academic conclusions: Even as some policymakers 
strenuously advocate for intensified efforts in transferring technical assistance, 
training, and grants to the developing world, many superior academic minds have 
concluded that this effort can not be expected to succeed. One common intellectual 
refrain, especially from economists functioning within an institutionalist perspective, 
is that change is so complex, it is impossible to impose it. In a short article that places 
him with the “gradualist” camp, Kenneth Arrow warns, “The readjustment of 
institutions is an extended process. They can not simply be imported as ready-made 
copies of those in the United States or Western Europe” (2000, p. 13). Similarly, 
Douglass North cautions, “I want to emphasize the limits of our understanding 
because there is a certain amount of hubris evident in the annual surveys of the World 
Bank and in the writing of orthodox economists who think now we have it right… 
[E]ven if we did have it right for one economy, it would not necessarily be right 
tomorrow” (2000, p. 6). In the final pages of his insightful book Democracy and the 
Market, Adam Przeworski proved to be an early skeptic: “Market-oriented economic 
reforms are an application of a technical economic blueprint based on theories 
developed inside the walls of North American universities and often forced on 
governments by the international lending agencies. They are based on a model of 
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economic efficiency that is highly technical” (1991, p. 183). Even Janos Kornai, who 
has advised the Hungarian government in complex reform initiatives can be found 
disparaging superficial reform programs, “It is naïve to imagine that the main features 
of the [socialist] system can be altered by applying a few ideas for reorganization” 
(1992, p. 376). 
 These individuals are major thinkers. They also range across the political 
spectrum, so political preferences are not driving their observations—and hesitance to 
assume outside pressure can engineer economic growth or improved state 
performance vis-à-vis policy prescriptions. Although they reflect on economic 
phenomenon, their fears are equally applicable to social welfare institutions and state 
performance vis-à-vis public service delivery. 
 The economist skeptics unfold their criticism from a fairly uncluttered 
theoretical environment.22 Among sociologists and social anthropologists soaking up 
the cross-currents of change on the ground, there is also skepticism regarding the 
plausibility of imposing reform models through foreign assistance especially among 
anthropologists and sociologists whose field work is in former socialist countries. The 
field orientation of research by, for example, Michael Burawoy (1999), David Stark 
(1996; Stark and Bruszt, 1998), Katherine Verdery (1997; Burawoy and Verdery, 
1999), and Janine Wedel (1998) leads them to highlight the ambiguous impact of 
models of change recommended from abroad. One of the few political scientists, 
early on, to anticipate the pernicious influence of the past on transition was Ken 
 
22 Kornai’s quotation comes from The Socialist System, which is certainly dense, but in none of these 
studies are there real people with colorful complaints. 
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Jowitt (1992) whose prior research on communist regimes had been sufficiently 
empirical that he predicted the tenacity of its hold. 
 Stark (1996, 1998) looks at post-communist patterns of property and 
ownership. He sees a blurring of lines between public and private property resulting 
in hybrid forms of capital. He posits this as a normal situation given the persistence of 
routines from the past and the profound uncertainty attendant with the transition. He 
writes, “Thus we examine how actors in the post-socialist context… redeploy 
available resources in response to their immediate practical dilemmas… It is through 
adjusting to new uncertainties, by improvising on practiced routines, that new 
organizational forms emerge” (Stark, 1996, p. 995). This is an excellent way to 
describe the gap between teleological policy prescriptions and the social world real 
actors live in. It is also a nonjudgmental way to view the difficulties in implementing 
reform: From the perspective of recipients, foreign aid augments assets which they 
take advantage of in the rational effort to survive. 
 Janine Wedel (1998) deals directly with foreign assistance programs and 
describes the mixture of “collusion and collision” between donors and aid recipients 
that results, especially in Russia. Like Stark, she explains that external and domestic 
actors are functioning within dramatically different circumstances, with constraints 
and expectations at odds. She rightly points out that in the foreign assistance puzzle, 
recipient responses—their agendas and interests—influence aid administration but 
have been overlooked. She also asserts that Western donors ignored the central role of 
the state which was a powerful legacy of communism as well as the way informal 
relations from the communist period survived into the transition and shaped how 
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recipients use foreign assistance: “If donors had treated the East less as if the 
blackboard of communism could be wiped clean, donor efforts might have achieved 
more of their stated goals” (Wedel, 1998, p. 185). This is a wonderful image, as 
colorful as much of her book. However, the book is, fundamentally, a journalistic 
account of aid’s foibles (with insightful observations), not an explanation of how the 
international and domestic actors interact or how the locals manipulate foreign assets, 
in a way that can be generalized. 
 The way in which foreign aid implementation, on the ground, can be co-opted 
by local agents with their own agendas or, ironically, can wind up supporting 
communist informal networks contrary to Western reform goals are negative accounts 
offered by a few analysts with field experience (Cooley, 2000; Wedel, 1998; Lubin 
and Ware, 1996). Most damaging to the foreign assistance project are assessments 
that demonstrate how foreign assistance often ignores the reality of informal norms 
and persistent institutional arrangements that structure experience (Carothers, 2002; 
Cooley, 2000; Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Verdery, 1997). Stark describes “neo-liberals” 
who are intent on a “project of social imitation.” He writes, “In contrast to the 
imitationists who see in the collapse of communism an institutional void waiting to be 
filled with their recipes, therapies, and formulas, we look to the variation in how 
communism fell apart and how these partial ruins provide institutional building 
blocks for political, economic, and social reconstruction” (Stark, 1998). Not 





Multilateral commitments and NIE theory have combined to surface new areas of 
research. The study of corruption emerged out of the growing conviction that 
corruption among public officials significantly inhibited economic growth and limited 
the impact of outside assistance. The NIE model offers an excellent framework for 
examining rent-seeking behavior within state institutions by considering how corrupt 
incentives arise in public programs (Ades and DiTella, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Hope, 1999). Corruption is widely considered to be the misuse of public power for 
private gain. Looking at how institutional incentives shape individual opportunism 
allows researchers to recommend reform strategies that eliminate these perverse 
incentive sets, thereby decreasing acts of corruption. 
 Most of the research to date has been fairly theoretical. Rose-Ackerman 
recommends more detailed sector-by-sector analyses of the problem because, “only if 
one looks at the fine structure of political and economic systems can one go beyond a 
showing that corruption is harmful to an understanding of the way it operates in 
different contexts” (1999, p. 4). In the case studies investigated in this dissertation, 
there is evidence of the misuse of public power for public (institutional) prestige at 
work in some policy sectors, meaning that some decision makers identify personal 
prestige and inter-personnel commitments with institutional authority; therefore, they 
foil attempts to limit, or reform, the institutions in which they work without receiving 
outright personal pay-offs. This practice is not an example of “corruption,” yet it 
promotes inefficiency as bad if not worse than the outright bribery schemes that 
donors are most concerned about. 
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 A study of the behavior of civil servants in Bulgaria (Verheijen and 
Dimitrova, 1996) comes close to the situation explored later: Out of a strong sense of 
loyalty, civil servants were more compelled to protect colleagues in a related agency 
from scrutiny regarding possible corruption, even though this defense brought them 
no monetary rewards and, in fact, contradicted official policy. In a highly uncertain, 
resource-scarce environment, actors are primarily concerned with securing streams of 
income and influence, organizationally and personally. This is rational behavior at its 
finest, but it means that local actors and international donors have significantly 
different preferences—preferences that create outcomes unanticipated by the donors. 
 
New Public Management 
A pragmatic application of insights gained, in part, from new institutional theory as 
well as organizational theory is found in the new public management literature. A 
number of books (Frederickson and Johnston, 1999; Boudney, O’Toole, and Rainey, 
2000; Kettle, 2000; Lane, 2000) review the core aspects of what is termed a new 
approach to the reform of public institutions. These include: focusing on ways to 
increase public productivity; focusing on results and outputs rather then political 
processes; replacing bureaucratic strategies in public service delivery with market 
strategies; emphasizing customer service in government’s orientation toward citizen; 
decentralizing responsibility to “frontline” local government units; and separating 
government’s role as a purchaser of services from its role as a service provider. Many 
of these ideas are drawn from private-sector strategies to gain efficiency even as firms 
downsize. Public-sector reforms based on these premises have been pursued around 
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the world—from New Zealand and Canada to the United States and South Africa—
since the 1980s. 
 In international recommendations for reform in transitional countries such as 
Romania, many elements from new public management thinking are discernable. Yet, 
as new as the economic and political institutions are, they have not easily been able to 
assume the goals of productivity and service orientation described above. What has 
stood in the way of applying international “best practices” in public management to 
countries such as Romania? What human (strategic) interventions or cultural 
inhibitions might be at work in foiling reform ideals? 
 According to Pradhan (1998), the problem turns on the fact that few 
developing countries have strong capacity for writing and enforcing contracts or 
monitoring performance in order to lower transaction costs in the delivery of public 
services. Weak central capacity is compounded by inability to formulate strategic 
plans, live within hard budgets, or cost-out competing policy options. Limited 
accountability for inputs and lack of performance-based results hobble reform efforts. 
He writes, “The so-called new public management reforms in the industrial countries 
have sought to improve delivery primarily by using market-type mechanisms and 
formal contracting. New Zealand provides the most dramatic example…But what is 
feasible in New Zealand may be beyond the realm of possibility in many developing 
countries… Greater use of market mechanisms requires an effective regulatory 
capacity, which is not always easy to achieve” (Pradhan, 1988). Certainly, that is true 
in Eastern Europe, where countries such as Romania have had a major problem 
coordinating policy between ministries, implementing new laws, maintaining hard-
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budget constraints, or executing fiscal impact analysis. This literature offers insight 
on reform goals, though, and is relevant for how it has guided the thinking of 
international donors. 
 
Social Welfare Reform Accounts 
There are some excellent studies that focus on the intense difficulty of reforming 
social welfare institutions in post-communist countries (Kornai, Haggard, and 
Kaufman, 2001; Iatridis, 2000; Boeri, 2000; Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998; Zamfir 
and Zamfir, 1996; Offe, 1993), and work that is sensitive to the balancing act between 
allocative mechanisms, efficiency, and fairness at the heart of any public welfare 
regime, in transition countries or close to home (Elster, 1992). But there are also 
studies that emphasize the many ingredients of Western social policy and are most 
concerned with stuffing those elements into the post-communist reform project 
(Deacon and Hulse, 1997; Fox and Gotestam, 2002)—an approach that is not 
particularly promising, as it ignores the real relationships and real inheritance that 
define living organizational and institutional interaction.  
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Chapter Three 
Electoral Politics and Political Bargaining 
 
When looking at post-communist Romania, political analysts frequently focus on the 
political tension between Ion Iliescu (who ruled for ten of the fourteen years under 
review) and the political parties he led (under four names) versus opposition parties 
and political formations including the National Peasant Party-Christian Democrat, 
National Liberal Party, Democratic Party, and the Civic Alliance,23 portraying the 
former as bad and the latter as good. A typical political cliché of this type can be seen 
in the contrasting headlines from a Radio Free Europe broadcaster: “Romania’s 
Torturous Road to Reform” (Shafir, 1992) versus “Romania’s Road to Normalcy” 
(Shafir, 1997) lauding the election of Emil Constantinescu as president. 
 The Democratic Convention, an alliance of opposition parties led by President 
Emil Constantinescu, was elected in 1996 largely as a function of popular frustration 
with the lack of palatable progress in living standards or economic opportunity after 
six years of Ion Iliescu’s presidency. But plummeting economic indicators and a 
ruling coalition that spent more time arguing than governing contributed to Iliescu’s 
return to power in 2000. The most recent political turnover—in December 2004, the 
mayor of Bucharest, Train Basescu, defeated Iliescu’s heir apparent and four-year 
Prime Minister, Adrian Nastase—was again marked by popular frustration regarding 
the ruling nomenclatura’s clannish inability to govern for the common good. Table 2 
summarizes the transfers of power in Romania between 1989 and 2004, and related 
information relevant to the case studies:        
 
23 Table 2 summarizes presidential terms of office, party identification, and information related to the 
case studies. 
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Table 2  
Presidential Terms of Office, Political Parties, and Authorities Governing Case 
Studies 
 
Presidential Terms Winner  Political Party Child Welfare 
Authority 
Health Ministers 





Feb 6, 1990-May 20, 
1992: President, 
Provisional National 
Unity Council  
Ion Iliescu National 
Salvation Front 
(FSN) 
1992 – Committee for 









May 20, 1992-Nov. 
17, 1996 








1993 – National 














coalition of  
opposition 
formations, led 




1997 – Department 
for Child Protection 
 










served as Minister 
of Health ) 
Dec. 20, 2000-Dec 
20, 2004 
 




renamed in June 
2001 Social 
Democratic 
Party (PSD)  
2001 – National 




Mircea Beuran  
Ionel Blanculescu 
(PNA – Control 
Authority) 
Ovidiu Branzan 
December 21, 2004 Train Basescu Truth and Justice 
Alliance (DA) 
(Basescu led the 
Democratic 
Party, one of two 
major coalition 
partners)  
2005 – National 
Authority for the 
Protection of 
Children’s Rights and 
Romanian Adoption 








 Many political analysts look at Romania’s post-communist political 
trajectory—from Iliescu to liberals back to Iliescu then to liberals again—as 
“exceptional” (Bunce, 2003; Ivanes, 2001) or quasi-democratic (Carothers, 2002) or 
ambiguous (Carey, 2004). Pegging Romania as an outlier regime gained credibility 
with the article “The Effects of Totalitarianism-cum-Sultanism on Democratic 
Transition: Romania” in Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation by 
renowned political scientists Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan (1996). However, the 
turnovers in power also qualify Romania as a consolidated democracy, following 
Samuel Huntington’s two turn-over test” (Huntington, 1991) How closely do the turn-
overs in power coincide with different attitudes toward reform and donor 
interventions? Is the best political explanation for the evolution of public policy in 
post-communist Romania the ongoing struggle between socialist forces tied to the 
communist regime (Tismaneanu, 2003) and democratic forces opposing the 
contemporary nomenclatura?
A hypothesis tied to electoral politics would anticipate that foreign assistance 
for social welfare reform progressed under the opposition parties and stagnated under 
the new-old guard. This is the question under investigation. Did child welfare (CW) 
and healthcare reform advance significantly between 1997 and 2000 while being held 
back or undermined during Ion Iliescu’s presidencies? In fact, important reform 
initiatives, recommended by foreign donors, were undertaken under both Iliescu and 
Constantinescu—backsliding, or dysfunctional effort, characterized both 
administrations as well. 
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1990-1996: Waking from the Nightmare 
Of the Central and Eastern European countries that shrugged off communist regimes 
in 1989, only the Romanian political transition was violent. The circumstances of this 
regime change are still cloaked in some mystery. What began as social resistance in 
the western of city of Timisoara on December 16, 1989, and spread to Bucharest on 
December 21, looked more like a coup d’etat when a clique of high-level 
apparatchiks used the army to overthrow and execute dictator Nicolae Ceausescu on 
Christmas Day. 
 An ad hoc ruling committee, the self-described National Salvation Front 
(FSN), appeared on live television and declared itself to be the nation’s governing 
council.24 Led by Ion Iliescu, a former communist party leader trained in Moscow—
who had had some obscure falling out with Ceausescu in the 1970s but who had 
never left party circles—the FSN’s ranks were sprinkled with enough dissidents and 
poets to give the public appearance of a broad-based ruling committee. Iliescu, 
heading up the Democratic National Salvation Front, was elected president with 
negligible opposition in May 1990 (Ratesh, 1991). 
 Much of the analysis of regime change in Romania emphasizes elite politics 
(Stefan, 2004; Tismaneanu, 2003; Tismaneanu and Kligman, 2001; Shafir, 1992; 
Codrescu, 1991). Among analysts who posit that leadership factions, competing for 
power, planned to overthrow Ceausescu long before mass demonstrations provided 
the perfect cover, there is less description of pacting and more evidence put forward 
of plotting. Undoubtedly, the demonstration effect of anti-communist momentum 
from the West—what Romanians witnessed in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary 
 
24 Table 3 summarizes presidential terms of office and related information. 
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in the summer and early fall of 1989—was profound, and it influenced the elite as 
well as the public in imagining a future without Nicolae Ceausescu. 
 A social movement analysis might see some of the Iliescu regimes’ first 
moves—for example, a quick endorsement of de-collectivization, even as rural 
citizens were spontaneously dividing land, and a complete change of policy on 
abortion, illegal under Ceausescu—as evidence that anti-Ceausescu popular opinion, 
expressed in the December demonstrations, was acknowledged by the new regime 
regardless of whether it was dominated by plotters or putschniks. Because Romania 
under communism was starved of means through which to articulate interests, it is 
hardly possible to frame an explanation based on interest groups, or interest-group 
pressure, in considering regime change. 
 Iliescu has to be considered a popular leader based on his electoral success, 
but he had ambivalent relations with the outside world, including international 
donors. In June 1990 and September 1991, incidents involving rampaging miners 
attacking citizens in Bucharest, stained the first post-communist administration’s 
reputation for years: Miners from the Jiu Valley, some six hours west of Bucharest 
took trains to the capital city where they attacked, in 1990, a student protest group 
occupying a prominent downtown square, and, in 1991, entered Parliament, bringing 
down the Prime Minister. Several people were killed and dozens injured in the 1991 
clash. Many believe, including Western analysts, that Iliescu and his party leaders 
were complicit in agitating the miners, even encouraging them to take the fatal action 
they did. As a result, Western governments and donors cooled toward the Romanian 
government, and donors oriented assistance in child welfare away from central 
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government, working directly with institutions in need, and local government 
(Coman, 2005). How did the first and second Iliescu presidencies handle reform in 
child welfare and healthcare?  
 
Reforming Child Welfare 
Three phases can be discerned in reform of the child welfare system: the provision of 
humanitarian assistance (1990-1996), decentralization (1997-2000), and institutional 
reorganization (2001-2004). Superficially, these appear to coincide with presidential 
electoral cycles. Yet a closer examination reveals that reform both gained and lost 
ground under each government, regardless of political identity. 
 
1990-1996 
Between 1990 and 1996, foreign assistance was hugely uncoordinated, and much 
came from private entities not coordinating through their own governments (Mica, 
2002; Petre, 2003; Coman, 2005). Gradually, donors began testing programs and 
services that served as family-oriented alternatives to the big, state-run institutions 
(Davis, 2005; Mica, 2002), but there was no consensus on what reform goals should 
be. Donors did pressure the government to sign international covenants such as the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990 and The Hague Convention 
governing inter-country adoption in 1993; the government was responsive. 
 The central government was extremely responsive in following donors’ 
guidance in rewriting the rules governing inter-country adoption, generally to 
facilitate it (Mica, 2002). In the early 1990s, thousands of children left the country 
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with new families. In 1995-1996, foreign donors with local support began to insist on 
decentralization of the child protection system (Zamfir, 1997). The Iliescu regime 
supported important elements of the decentralization strategy.25 An increase in the use 
of foster care as an alternative to state institutions began under Iliescu. 
 Although some partisans, including former president Emil Constantinescu 
(Constantinesu, 2003) insist that child reform only started in 1997 with Emergency 
Ordinances that drastically redefined the CW regime, neutral Romanian experts in the 
field credit the 1990-1996 period with including much, essential learning (Zamfir, 
1997; Petre, 2002; Mica, 2002; Coman, 2005), an adoption regime, and the 
introduction of international norms.  
 
1997-2000 
The decentralization trend accelerated during the Constantinescu regime. In June 
1997, the government approved an Emergency Ordinance (26/1997) to reconfigure 
the child welfare system. The main effect was to shift more responsibility, including 
financial responsibility, for managing child welfare to the county level. The major 
source of funding would no longer be the state budget but county council budgets and 
special (off-budget) funds.26 Decentralization is generally a highly laudable goal and 
is essential to break communist-style organization of the economy, public services, 
and public finance (Hicks and Kaminski, 1994). But the state is so involved in post-
 
25 See National Action Plan of 1995. 
26 Romania is divided into 41 counties (judet) plus Bucharest. The communist system utilized a county 
structure for most ministries in order to increase territorial control. As a result of public administration 
reforms in the mid-1990s, Romania has one of the most decentralized systems of public administration 
of the post-communist countries. But sub-national government units are perennially short of money in 
contrast to the list of mandates the central government has off-loaded over the years, beginning with 
the child welfare system. 
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communist reform that these simultaneous goals (decentralization and drastic reform 
of the state itself) are not always well reconciled. 
 Although the Constantinescu regime followed the recommendations of foreign 
donors (many extensively implicated in the child welfare institutions for years) 
between 1997 and 1999, a financial crisis emerged in 1999 when sub-national 
governments declared that they did not have enough money to feed children living in 
the state system (European Commission, 1999a). Western donors ponied up over $40 
million USD to provide emergency assistance. The United States contributed $14 
million. Most sources27 consider that county and local governments were unprepared 
to assume management of the sprawling network, especially considering that some 
five national ministries or authorities continued to manage child welfare institutions.28 
Several donor representatives involved in negotiations explained, on 
background, that local governments intentionally funded other services before 
attending to child welfare in 1999, knowing that international donors were far more 
likely to contribute to child welfare institutions in a pinch rather than to less 
emotionally compelling needs such as road work, garbage collection, or school 
maintenance. So although the Constantinescu government endorsed decentralization 
and child welfare reform goals supported by Western donors, it took little initiative to 
monitor and support local government in managing the serious, new fiscal 
responsibilities or to improve central-level policy coordination in order to improve 
governance of the high-profile sector. Willing to adopt reforms recommended from 
 
27 Interviews by the author with some eight people involved at the time. 
28 Ministries of Health, Education, Labor and Social Welfare; the State Secretariat for the 
Handicapped; and the National Committee for the Protection of Children, which was variously named 
a department, a committee, and an authority. 
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abroad, the Constantinescu government did little to anticipate the implications of 
change rippled through political and fiscal institutions—taking unexpected turns, such 
as the near financial collapse of the residential child centers in 1999. 
 In response to the local financial disaster, donors insisted on a reorganization 
of system financing and the reorganization of governing authority for the sector, 
which provided assurance that the national budget would compensate for any future 
sub-national shortfalls. In addition, donors, especially the European Union (EU) 
(Petre, 2003; Correll, 2002), insisted on the creation of a national agency to assume 
control of all children under state protection from the ministries of Education, Health, 
and the Secretariat for People with Handicaps. The multiple agencies controlling 
pieces of the child welfare problem meant an almost total lack of coordination. In a 




Improved central government coordination was an effort picked up almost seamlessly 
by the new, democratic socialist government elected in December 2000, dominated 
once again by Iliescu and his Romanian Party of Social Democracy (PDSR). Under 
the PDSR government, a few months after national elections, this essential 
reorganization continued, although the national entity governing child welfare was 
renamed the National Authority for Child Protection and Adoption (Autoritatea 
National pentru Protectia Copilului si Adoptii). The government also approved the 
Child Emergency Ordinance 123/2001, which unified powerful district-level 
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commissions: the Child Protection Commission, the Commission of Medical Experts 
on Handicapped Children, and the Commission of Experts on Special Education.  
With regard to decentralization and the consolidation of national-level 
authority over child protection, reform transcended electoral cycles. In the area of 
inter-country adoption, both Presidents Iliescu and Constantinescu strived to 
accommodate the many recommendations from Western governments that tended to 
alternate between leniency and control. Responsive to adoptive parents, Western 
governments lobbied for local laws that eased the rules—in some cases simply 
defined the rules—by which children could be approved for inter-country adoption. 
Then, when periodic media exposés revealed that poor Romanians were selling their 
children to foreigners, donors insisted on greater accountability from child protection 
institutions (Mica, 2002; Petre, 2003; Coman 2005). This vacillation continued 
between 1990 and 2001, until a particularly single-minded and influential Rapporteur 
for the European Parliament, Baroness Emma Nicholson, insisted that Romania put a 
moratorium on inter-country adoptions in 2001 as a virtual condition for EU 
membership. As had become typical, the Romanian government followed this outside 
advice, adopting a one-year moratorium that became permanent in 2004 (CNN, 2001; 
Bartos, 2002; Coman, 2005). 
 Electoral politics and domestic political rivalry regarding public policy do not 
satisfactorily explain the evolution of the child welfare or inter-country adoption 
regimes in Romania between 1990 and 2004. Four political administrations (1990-
1992, 1992-1996, 1996-2000, 2000-2004) supported reform. Each government 
exhibited weak follow-through in implementing change, but they were each 
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responsive to donor recommendations and concerns. Donors recommended 
legislation throughout the period under consideration. The governments that held 
power 1990-1996 and 2001-2004 versus 1997-2000 had different political outlooks, 
but each adopted some of the most important legislative recommendations promoted 
by donors. 
 Considering the two ideologically divergent regimes, President 
Constantinescu was more explicitly supportive of donors’ goals in child welfare and 
healthcare, but implementation was a problem. In sum, neither group was more 
receptive to outside recommendations and pressure than the other. Each government, 
regardless of ideology, was both responsive and indifferent to donor 
recommendations as a function of domestic pressures. Actually, the contrast between 
Iliescu’s first two administrations (1990-1996) and his third (2000-2004), is the most 
dramatic in terms of non-cooperation versus cooperation with outside actors in child 
welfare. The strategic decision to cooperate, explicitly and profoundly, can be 
explained as a function of the EU’s emphatic bargaining position that without deep, 
structural change to state-run institutions, Romania would lose its bid to join the EU. 
 
Reforming the Health System 
Before World War II, Romania had a limited, Bismarck-style system of insurance 
funds. In 1949, the communist-led government approved a State Law on Health 
Organization that started the country’s move toward a Soviet-style Semashko health 
system in which central planning, state financing, universal coverage, and free access 
to care were the defining features (Bara, van den Heuvel, and Maarse, 2002). Post-
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communist reform of the Romanian health sector got off to a later start than did child 
welfare reform and cannot yet demonstrate quantitative success, as judged by health 
outcomes, institutional efficiency, or public satisfaction. The reform phases can be 
divided into the following periods: overcoming status quo bias (1990-1997); 
implementing the social health insurance law and recentralizing (1998-2002); and 
digging a deeper hole (2003-2004). 
 A social health insurance proposal passed the Senate in September 1994 but 
did not gain full parliamentary approval until 1997, with full implementation on April 
1, 1999. It featured a compulsory insurance system that drew money from employers 
and employees as a payroll tax, based on the German or “Bismarck” model as 
opposed to the British “Beveridge” or National Health Service model. The ostensible 
magnitude of this reform effort can’t be understated; it represented dramatic changes, 
simultaneously in health financing, organization, and service delivery. It required the 
creation of a new National Health Insurance House (NHIH) and forty district health 
insurance houses (DHIHs), plus an HIH covering the city of Bucharest as well as 
separate health insurance systems devoted to the army and the transportation sector. It 
transferred significant power away from the Ministry of Health (MOH) and lodged it 
in the new HIH system. It also moved authority from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
to the NHIH, which was charged with negotiating an annual “framework contract” 
with the College of Physicians that would determine the parameters of services and 
payments. The MOH was supposed to concentrate on setting standards, regulating 
health facilities, and implementing national public health programs. These dramatic 
reforms were conceptualized during the 1992-1996 Iliescu presidency, initiated under 
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Constantinescu, and continued under Prime Minister Nastase after 2000 (Johnston, 
2002). 
 At first blush, the reform was a success: In 1999 it brought in more resources 
than expected—which was always the major selling point. But from the start, the 
central government, uncomfortable with losing access to much-needed new revenue 
and unconvinced that the new health insurance funds deserved autonomy, reasserted 
control over the health sector. The centralizing adjustments began in late 1999 and 
continued into 2003. Among the most egregious violations of the law’s original intent 
were: The Minister of Health conceded to the MOF’s decision to reintroduce the 
health insurance budget into the consolidated state budget (1999); the MOF redirected 
health insurance surplus revenue to the underfinanced pension system (2001); the 
MOH brought the NHIH under its authority, making the House’s president a ministry 
state secretary (2002); and the general expenditures of healthcare providers became 
part of the state budget law, which was redundant with the annual contracting of 
medical services between the NHIH and providers (2003). Thus, dramatic reforms 
spanned two political powers (Iliescu and Constantinescu), and the reform was 
undone under two political powers (Constantinescu and Iliescu). Politicians from both 
political formations promoted reform—and conspired to water it down during 
implementation. 
 The private sector was stifled except for in pharmacies and in dentistry. 
Hospitals were largely allowed to maintain budgets based on historical 
considerations, such as number of beds and past funding, which undermined 
accountability and destroyed incentives to improve performance. Meanwhile, the 
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population’s health status continued to decline in fundamental dimensions, including 
life expectancy. By late 2002, the health sector was widely considered to be in crisis 
(Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003; Chiritoiu, 2002, 2003; World Bank, 2002a; Radulescu, 
2002; Vladescu, 2002; Vladu, 2003; Ghergina, 2005).  
A strictly political or chronological narrative of the implementation of health 
sector reform 1990-2004 cannot make sense of whom to blame for the lack of 
progress in terms of health outcomes, efficiency, or public satisfaction. Nor were 
medical professionals or politicians from major political parties able to agree on the 
biggest problems (Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003). Under-financing, excessive state 
control, lack of financial discipline, low salaries, and poor management were just a 
few of the problems identified by doctors and decision makers. In an angry video 
conference with county prefects29 in March 2003, Prime Minister Nastase came close 
to getting the story right, blaming the “old mentality” (mentalitatilor invechite) and 
“inadequate organization” (organizarii necorespunzatoare) (Ziua, 2003) for 
dysfunction. 
 Although the World Bank was especially involved in efforts to help reform 
healthcare, beginning in 1991, international donors who were involved in numerous 
ways in the health reform program were not strong enough or assertive enough to 
force discipline on domestic actors. Outside actors were less assertive in comparison 
to the forceful recommendations from international donors in the child welfare field. 
There were no efforts to tie institutional reform goals to donor funding, and technical 
 
29 Central government representatives who are county-level leaders, similar to U.S. governors but 
appointed by the central government. 
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assistance was particularly inattentive to the political side of reform equations 
(Radulescu, 2002; Vladescu, 2002; Burduja, 2005). 
 Why? As reviewed in the introduction, there are at least three reasons: 1) 
absence of child welfare’s “800-pound gorilla,” the EU; 2) lack of a unified position 
regarding the “best” way to organize healthcare; and 3) inexistence of a coordinating 
mechanism to pool donor power. First, the Acquis Communitaire, which guides EU 
involvement in Romanian policy reform efforts, does not include a chapter devoted to 
health. Thus, healthcare was never an EU priority, despite some activities that 
tangentially involved the field. Second, within the EU there are a range of national 
solutions, with the British National Health Service and the German HIHs considered 
rival models with unique and respective pros and cons. 
 It appears there was a tacit assumption among donors that the politics of 
health would have to be worked out domestically. This hypothesis is intuitively 
plausible considering that there were bilateral health reform–related activities led by 
governments that had very different healthcare systems at home: For example, the 
Swiss (emergency medicine protocols), the Germans (healthcare contracting), the 
French (provision of public health), Americans (case costing in hospitals), and the 
British (networks of family doctors) assumed roles in the Romanian healthcare effort, 
although their national references were highly divergent. Finally, bilateral activities 
were only informally coordinated, so there was no mechanism for donors to pool their 
authority and exert a conditional bargaining position vis-à-vis healthcare reform 
requirements as they did post-1999 in child welfare. 
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Political Transfers of Power Did Not Drive Social Welfare Reform 
For the purpose of this analysis, tracing political turnovers and the consolidation of 
democratic institutions through elections has weak explanatory power when it comes 
to the evolution of policy regimes in child welfare and the health sector. 
 Reform in these sectors has a strong legislative component, but the heart of 
the matter is in how institutions themselves are reorganized to produce—or not 
produce—different outcomes. From the perspective of transfers in political power, 
one can see the chronological course of legal change; in this regard, each successive 
administration built on the work of the other. Political parties did not have well-
developed policy positions distinguishing one from the other, and parliamentary 
sessions did not typically witness opposing parties debating from core values that 
could be considered substantially divergent. Much public policy was approved as 
Emergency Ordinances designed by the government; this practice became 
increasingly common after 1996 and virtually routine during the Nastase government 
(Ionita, 2003a). However, there was ongoing bargaining between the central 
government and sub-national units regarding budgets and responsibilities. This 
domestic bargaining occurred while the central government was involved in 
bargaining with donors. The political balancing act that the central government has to 
attempt because it is simultaneously involved in these two bargaining settings can 
yield unanticipated results. 
 Romania’s political turn-overs, and well contested national elections, suggest 
that the rules of democratic competition are respected, thus, Romania can be 
considered a consolidated democracy. However, Romania’s mechanisms of 
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governance are not democratic (i.e. participatory) or particularly accountable or 
organized to protect the common good. So, for donors, democracy objectives and 
democratic governance objectives should not necessarily be considered two sides of 
the same coin. 
 
Political Bargaining in an Uncertain, Resource Poor Environment 
In a 1988 essay, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games.” Robert Putnam notes that existing theories do not adequately acknowledge 
the link between international and domestic politics. Although he is primarily 
interested in how bargaining to achieve international agreements is impacted by 
domestic ratification contests, a subject quite different from the one explored here, the 
concept of a two-level game is applicable to the problem of foreign assistance. 
This approach is useful in describing why reform outcomes sometimes 
diverge from what donors expect: Donors are typically concerned with the bargaining 
they are engaged in, not other dealings. Since reform often includes a legislative 
component, it is inevitable that donors will primarily negotiate with central political 
institutions. But the executive, in a democracy, must be concerned with how 
organized constituents are responding to government initiatives. Very often, domestic 
bargaining is of greater interest to post-communist executives than the donor 
exchange. 
 At the heart of the international interaction is the potential of mutually 
beneficial cooperation between a donor government or multilateral organization and 
the recipient government. The donor is motivated by an interest to influence the 
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policies of the recipient government. That motivation could be rooted in humanitarian 
concerns, economic goals, geo-political strategy, or a mixture of these, but 
fundamentally, there is an overriding motivation to “get inside the skin” of another 
nation-state.30 Western democracies were motivated to offer assistance to Romania in 
the first months following the revolution for many reasons: to relieve the poverty and 
misery of special populations such as children in institutions, to encourage political 
stability in the biggest country in southeastern Europe, to encourage a market 
transition that would invariably represent a new market for goods and services, and 
even to help right an historical wrong: allied acquiescence in conceding Romania to 
the Soviet Union in postwar negotiations.31 As Carol Lancaster (2000) has observed, 
foreign assistance’s objectives have significantly widened since the end of the Cold 
War, especially with regard to humanitarian objectives. 
 A recipient government will not agree to cooperate unless it has something to 
gain. In Romania, with the fall of communism, there was a strong popular desire to be 
accepted by the West for numerous reasons that can be summarized as “access”: 
access to travel and education opportunities, both long forbidden; access to 
information; access to Western goods and markets; access to the material wealth that 
the West enjoyed; and access to political institutions that embodied accountability 
and respect for individual rights. Political elites in Romania were motivated to 
 
30 The case of humanitarian assistance in times of natural disaster or post-conflict might appear to be 
different; it might seem that in cases of emergency humanitarian assistance, a donor government is not 
necessarily motivated by an interest in changing “policies.” However, even to distribute food, a donor 
has to bargain with a recipient for permission and regarding the terms of distribution. Further, the 
number of cases in which bilateral assistance is awarded on a purely humanitarian basis is rare; 
international non-government organizations such as the Red Cross are different. I am interested in 
donors that are governments or groups of governments. 
31 All these motives are reflected in Congressional debate over the Support Eastern European 
Democracy (SEED) Act in 1989. The SEED Act continues to be the legislative and funding vehicle for 
much of the U.S. assistance that flows into the region. 
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cooperate particularly to gain resources that would facilitate access: technical advice 
and assistance; material goods, especially technology; professional training in 
innumerable sectors; and grants to supplement a sorely depleted national treasury. 
 Donors often assume that reform initiatives are a straight shot from central 
government agreement to achievement. Donors sometimes forget  that the central 
government relies on its ministries, sub-national agencies, professional associations, 
and state-owned assets to implement reform. Central government must negotiate 
compliance with domestic entities for reform ideas to move off the blueprint. This is 
the domestic game that makes the process by which complex reform is executed more 
like a game of pinball than a straightforward game of horseshoes. 
 A review of the relationship between donors and domestic actors in post-
communist Romania, first in child welfare (CW) then in healthcare, demonstrates 
how the notion of two-levels of simultaneous bargaining helps explain domestic 
outcomes considered puzzling—or corrupt—by donors. 
 
Bargaining Between Donors, Central Government, and Local Interests in Child 
Welfare 
Immediately following the opening of Romania to the world, a flood of donations, 
advice, free labor, and cash was directed at Romania’s state-run residential 
institutions for abandoned children, their young residents, and employees. Little was 
required of the central government except endorsement of international protocols 
committing the country to a new paradigm of care for vulnerable abandoned 
children—commitments that cost nothing for the central government and hardly 
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involved local actors in the CW policy regime. This period lasted from approximately 
1990 through 1993. 
 One of the results of the influx in foreign assistance to CW institutions was 
that they became more attractive: With new roofs, plumbing, and heating systems and 
with more food, more toys, and better furniture, the large residential facilities were 
consistently depicted in the Romanian media in the early 1990s as being loci of 
foreign interest and investment (Plotnick, 2005; Mica, 2002). Because of the 
acceleration of poverty in the early 1990s, the lack of prevention polices to 
discourage families in distress from abandoning their children, and the impression 
that state-run facilities were well endowed, the rate of child abandonment began to 
climb again in 1994 (United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 1996; Booth et al., 
1999; Greenwell, 2001; Petre, 2003). 
 This was not an outcome that donors desired. They began pressuring the 
central government to take a variety of steps to limit the growth of state-run 
institutions including closing them and shifting populations to small, family-style 
residential units on the model being implemented by numerous privately funded, non-
government organizations (NGOs), often with support from foreign churches. Donors 
increasingly preferred to work with the NGO sector, advocating a shift in authority 
from the state to the NGO, or “third” sector, following the U.S. model32 (Coman, 
2005; Mica, 2002; Sauer, 2002). 
 
32 In the early 1990s, most observers consider that the United States was most deeply involved in CW 
reform initiatives; around 1997, the EU became the most powerful international actor, as its 
contributions to the sector increased and, especially, as the Acquis became the ultimate set of reform 
benchmarks. 
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 However, the government was not willing to significantly change the rules of 
the game governing the CW sector. As a result, donors scaled back assistance offered 
to the Romanian government between 1993 and 1996,33 although they continued 
programs directly engaged with local CW institutions, especially at the county level 
(Coman, 2005; Seltzer and Cromer, 1997; Cromer, 1996), and they continued 
significant work with NGOs implementing a variety of programs—all of which 
effectively took pressure off the state system. Between 1990 and 1996, the European 
Union (EU) expended approximately 70 million Euro on the CW problem (European 
Commission [EC], 1997). 
 From the perspective of donors, the Romanian government was a recalcitrant, 
stubborn interlocutor (Kessler, et. al. 1996; Cromer, 1996; Mica, 2002). However, 
donors gave little consideration to the related, second-level bargaining game that the 
central government was playing with sub-national players: county and local 
governments, ministry units at the county level that covered budgets for institutions 
and institutional staff (including sub-units from the powerful ministries of Health 
[MOH], Education, and Labor), and state-owned, or controlled, venders providing 
services to the residential institutions. From the perspective of these local actors, the 
influx of foreign assistance had improved the value of CW assets and strengthened 
the status quo. It had served to improve their employment status. It is difficult to 
determine CW employment totals between 1990 and 1999, but various donor reports 
suggest significant attention was paid to the training needs of institution staff, and 
there is no indication that employment declined during this period (Stephenson, 
 
33 In 1994, for example, numerous donors agreed to stop funding a UNICEF program begun in 1990 
that had worked closely with the central government. 
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Anghelescu, Stativa, and Pasti, 1997; Ministry of Health and UNICEF, 1992; Tobis 
and Vitillo, 1994). Under the influence of foreign donors, the government increased 
the number of professionals, including psychologists and physical therapists, 
associated with state-run institutions. Thus, it is no surprise that local stakeholders, 
especially through the ministries, pressured the central government to avoid 
significant institutional reform in the sector. 
 Between 1993 and 1996, the brilliance of the central government’s bargaining 
strategy became clear: Donor resources were pumped into the sector at the level 
where they were most needed, locally, and the central government expended little to 
no effort being tediously engaged with the donor community. The central government 
pursued a free-rider strategy, understood and approved by local constituencies but 
considered undesirable by donors. 
 In 1997, bargaining over foreign assistance goals changed with the addition of 
important new potential commitments offered by the donors. Both European and 
American donors offered a major “if” clause in their bargaining strategy: If the 
government cooperated in implementing reform, including more fundamental reform 
in the CW sector, then EU accession and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
membership would not be far behind. On April 11, 1997, EC President Jacques Santer 
visited Bucharest,34 addressing the Parliament and meeting with the Prime Minister 
and the President about Romania’s application for EU Membership (Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 1997). One of the subjects was the EC’s decision to include 
progress in CW as part of the political criteria for accession (EC, 1997). President Bill 
 
34 Both President Iliescu (3/10/95) and President Constantinescu (2/3/97) had already traveled to 
Brussels to meet with Santer to discuss accession, but Santer’s April 1997 speech before Parliament 
represented the public launch of EU-Romania accession commitment. 
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Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Bucharest in July 1997. 
Before a crowd of over 100,000, President Clinton said Romania would be the 
“strongest candidate” to join NATO if the country continued economic reforms and 
democratization (Clinton, 1997). In personal meetings with the president and political 
leaders, he included the importance of CW reform (Constantinescu, 2003; Albright, 
2003).35 
In response to donor pressure, the central government used Emergency 
Ordinances (ordonante de urgenta, EO) to pass two major pieces of legislation in 
1997: 1) Law 26/1997 abolished the framework for the old CW system (Law 3/1970), 
devolving much of the authority—and financial responsibility—for CW institutions 
to the county level. 2) Law 25/1997 facilitated adoption with increased local 
responsibility as well. Donors applauded the initiatives (Saur, 2002; Mica, 2002; 
European Commission, 1997, 1998; Pentru Copii Nostri, 1998). State-run residential 
institutions that had been controlled by the MOH and Ministry of Education were 
transferred to the county councils. At the second-level bargaining table, the central 
government kept its constituents satisfied by creating new county-level entities, 
Departments for Child Protection (Directia pentru Protecia Copilului, DPCs) and 
Specialized Pubic Services for Child Protection (Serviciul public specializat pentru 
protectia copilulu, SPSPPCi) that were empowered to coordinate much of the 
significant assistance flowing from abroad. Some specialized institutions, managed 
by the MOH, Ministry of Education, and the State Secretariat for Persons with 
Handicaps, were allowed to remain under central control. 
 
35 Most scholarly works on the future of NATO after communism emphasize the impact of expansion 
on the West, not the impact of membership on the new members. See for example, Asmus, 2002 and 
Barany, 2003. 
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 Therefore, the central government satisfied the donor community by accepting 
its vision of local control over CW institutions, while also satisfying local domestic 
constituents by maintaining, even increasing, the number of administrative units 
managing the sector, preserving the flow of international assistance to local actors, 
and maintaining the nexus of sub-national governing bodies that managed pieces of 
the sector. These concessions to local actors, but especially the persuasive promise of 
international acceptance into NATO and the EU, explain why the Romanian 
government became cooperative with international donors again in 1997. 
 Unfortunately, by most accounts, sub-national government was simply 
unprepared to shoulder technical or financial responsibility for the CW network in 
1998 and 1999. A detailed World Bank study (2001a) shows that county and local 
government failed to comply with many of the mandates they received from the 
national government in 1997. In spring 1999, the central government was forced to 
seek emergency funds from donors when it became clear that local CW institutions 
were so badly managed that there was not enough food to feed the children, as has 
been discussed. Newspapers sensationalized the situation through headlines such as, 
“After 10 years of reform, the Delegation of the European Commission warns 
Romania: Institutionalized children have arrived at cannibalism” (Adavarul, 1999a).  
 In 1999, the EU insisted that the multiple authorities managing parts of the 
CW system be united, and that the central government contribute more funding to 
local CW institutions.  By 2001, the EU, World Bank, and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development introduced strong conditionality into grants and loans to 
reform the CW system: The government was expected to close large residential 
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institutions in exchange for financial and technical assistance. This conditionality was 
considered essential in order to accomplish what the Romanians most resisted: 
closing institutions with large employment despite the fact that most child protection 
alternatives were less expensive than the big institutions (Petre, 2002; Wulczyn, et. al, 
2000). The funding at stake was sizable: The World Bank loan, supported by the 
Council of Europe Development Bank, represented $30 million USD in financing 
alone. Again, the promise of external, long-term rewards is a major reason why this 
reform was finally undertaken. Moreover, the government realized that it could 
convert some of the large residential institutions into smaller units without losing staff 
(Correll, 2005; Coman, 2005). 
 During this period, it was possible for the central government to make 
concession which risked offending sub-national units and public employees in the 
sector, because Romanian local actors had already come up with a remarkably 
effective scheme for bringing new discretionary money into the child protection 
network: the so-called point system. The local funding crisis in 1999 had revealed a 
serious lack of sub-national funds for CW programming and institutions. In response, 
the government in cooperation with its local agencies and CW stakeholders, agreed 
on a scheme for raising more money for local CW services through a point system. 
Based on contributions (cash and in-kind donations, but mostly cash) made to CW 
institutions, international adoption brokers received points. These points could 
eventually be redeemed for babies (Davis, 2005, Coburn, 2005, Coman, 2005, 
Ambrose and Coburn, 2001). 
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 The point system relied on coordination between the national-level Romanian 
Adoption Committee and the DPCs created in 1997; it proved to be remarkably 
effective in bringing hard currency into the CW system by making babies available to 
the adoption agencies that contributed the most money.36 Since the law required that 
international adoption agencies employ local partners, these local agents typically 
were the runners between international agencies and the Romanian public institutions, 
steering resources and identifying available children. Because families were willing 
to spend up to $30,000 per child, the international agencies were eager to buy 
advantage through contributions to local CW institutions. Unfortunately, procedures 
guiding the point system—from what contributions equaled how many points to how 
often points were converted into children—were not well specified, and there was no 
institutional accountability to verify that the scheme put the child’s interests at the 
heart of each transaction (Ambrose and Coburn, 2001). 
 While the point system held sway from 1999 into 2001, besides the move to 
consolidate CW authority, the central government was more engaged in strategy vis-
à-vis local actors than in strategy vis-à-vis international donors. The donors noticed. 
Concerned with what they termed rampant corruption in the sector, the donors 
rebelled. Led by representatives from the EU, the Romanian government was told that 
if it did not end inter-country adoption and accept aid conditionality regarding the 
closing of state-run institutions, then Romania could forget the dream of joining the 
EU. (Micklewright and Stewart, 2000; European Commission, 1999a)  Although it 
 
36 The issue of corruption in inter-country adoption is considered remarkably sensitive by donors and 
GOR authorities alike. There are few written accounts of how the point system functioned. The report 
that comes closest to specifying the mechanisms of exchange is Ambrose and Coburn (2001), a 
document paid for by the USG, but not widely circulated. My information was almost entirely derived 
through interviews. 
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felt less passionately, the U.S. Government conceded that the adoption system was 
characterized by irregularities that required putting an end to the point system 
(Correll, 2003; Ambrose, 2005; Guest, 2005). 
 Following a moratorium announced in June 2001, inter-country adoption 
never resumed. New legislation making it virtually impossible for a non-relative 
living abroad to adopt a Romanian baby was approved in 2004 (Wheeler, 2004). The 
U.S. Government protested strongly, since the Romanians had promised many times 
that inter-country adoption would eventually resume (Guest, 2005). But the EU was 
the dominant donor; by 2004, its contributions dwarfed those of any other bilateral 
donor (OECD, 2005b). Romania caved to the dominant donor: Inter-country adoption 
ended for good. However, other programs of assistance to the CW sector, conditioned 
on the closure of state-run institutions, continued, which kept local actors quiet if not 
happy. 
 In sum, at important junctures, when donors were promoting specific CW 
reform strategies, the central government’s response—in 1993 (institutional reform 
rejected), 1997 (decentralization accepted), 2000 (consolidation of authority 
accepted), and 2001 (moratorium on inter-country adoption accepted)—can be 
explained in terms of the strategic goals of domestic actors with whom the central 
government was also bargaining and in terms of the credible promises or threats 
asserted by international donors. 
 
Bargaining Between Donors, Central Government, and Local Pressure in Health 
Sector Reform 
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Less storming—but also less norming—characterizes the game played between 
international donors and Romanian actors in the health sector. Like the two-level 
game described in the CW sector, in healthcare, a game is played between donors and 
the central government, including the MOH. This is related to bargaining within a 
game played between central-level organizations (namely the central government, 
MOH, and Ministry of Finance [MOF]) and local-level players including doctors, 
hospitals, pharmacies, the health-seeking public, and the National Health Insurance 
House.37 The local game was largely characterized by cooperation between 1990 and 
1994 but became significantly more contentious regarding the implementation of a 
major law to reform health service delivery and financing. Local actors were 
consistently the strongest advocates for change, especially if it would yield more 
resources, both financial and capital, and more professional independence. 
 In the discussion of CW, we saw that the first post-communist government 
was supportive of reform in that it approved new international covenants related to 
the rights of the child and established rules to guide international adoption, but it did 
not confront the most important obstacle to deep reform: the way in which state-run 
institutions absorbed most of the resources in the sector while poorly serving the best 
interests of the vulnerable children it was supposed to serve. Simply put: Central 
government was allowed to ignore the profound inefficiency of the state-run 
residential system. 
 
37 Although technically a national level institution, the National Health Insurance House (NHIH, 
created by law in 1997 and in force in April 1999) consistently played on the side of local actors 
because it was originally designed as an autonomous entity, independent of central government 
control. Repeated attempts by central government to limit the NHIH and usurp its authorities pushed it 
to identify with players bargaining against the central government. 
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 In the health sector, in the early post-communist years, the central government 
barely acknowledged donors, although the Romanian healthcare system benefited 
from donor assistance in tangible ways. The government signed an agreement with 
the World Bank in 1991 for an ambitious $150 million USD loan to study reform, 
introduce computers, rehabilitate rural dispensaries (420 in all), establish schools of 
health management, and outline future options; however, this agreement required 
little of the Romanians in terms of deep, structural reform. The national government 
also allowed numerous donor-sponsored training programs paid for by the Swiss, 
Canadian, Japanese, German, Australian, Dutch, Swedish, and U.S. governments 
benefiting local actors, especially local doctors and nurses. The segments of the MOH 
responsible for managing facilities and care for abandoned children aged 0-3 years 
certainly benefited from the extensive humanitarian assistance provided by NGOs 
such as the French Medicin sans Frontier, the United Kingdom’s Children’s Trust,
and UNICEF. Yet little significant change was required on the part of the central 
government, much as little was required of the government in the CW policy regime. 
Donors were obviously not offended, since they kept coming back to Romania. In 
fact, the central government allowed direct donor access to local actors in ways that 
benefited those constituencies without significantly touching the institutional 
structure governing health. Between 1990 and about 1994, in terms of institutional 
reform, nothing serious was accomplished. 
 The central government used donor programming to help satisfy demands 
from local actors for more technical knowledge, training, and better equipment. Thus, 
the government was a free rider, benefiting from contributions from abroad, without 
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significantly participating, besides opening the door. In addition, the central 
government had quickly satisfied a significant preference asserted by local actors just 
after the revolution and, thus, was not under much pressure to introduce further 
reforms. Without input from donors, as a reaction to medical (and perhaps public) 
preference, one of the first laws enacted by the provisional government in December 
1989 was legalized abortion. The high rates of maternal mortality and child 
abandonment, both of which were linked to illegal abortion,38 were the rationale 
offered for legalization. But abortion also became an immediate source of income for 
doctors nationwide: Hardly regulated and in an environment where there was no 
supply of contraception (because it had been forbidden), the number of abortions shot 
up to approximately one million in 1990.39 In one donor document, the author 
observes, “Because the current generation of OB/GYNS depend on abortion for 
income, they may be a ‘lost cause’ as far as providing contraceptives and counseling 
are concerned.” (Cromer, 1996) 
 Other laws advocated by doctors were approved: The requirement that doctors 
had to spend at least three years in rural areas was dropped, and a new specialization, 
general practice, was approved in 1992. But these laws were passed in response to 
local constituents, not donor pressure. The Romanian central government was 
comfortable deflecting donors’ recommendations regarding reform because, at the 
same time, it allowed donor resources to be steered to local actors, thereby satisfying 
local preference for cooperation that was perceived as leading doctors and medical 
personnel out of their resource rut. 
 
38 About 10,000 women died between 1966 and 1989 due to illegal abortion, according to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Institute for Mother and Child Health Care (1995, p. 2). 
39 Ibid. 
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 In fact, central government was mainly preserving the status quo (i.e., 
maximum resource control at the center), although the MOH could see that the 
revenue available to health through the state budget was paltry and getting smaller. In 
1994, Dr. Iulian Mincu, former doctor to Nicolae Ceausescu and Minister of Health, 
gained Senate approval40 for a major overhaul of the Semashko system: He favored a 
Bismarck-style social health insurance system of mandatory contributions from 
employers and employees. 
 Two major influences on this preference were his daughter, a practicing 
doctor in Germany, and a team of German doctors advising the Ministry between 
1993 and 1995 (Mincu, 2003; Erhan, 2003; Gherghina, 2005). As well, he valued the 
system because he considered it to have the greatest potential to significantly increase 
the revenue available to the healthcare system. Doctors were the most supportive of 
this major overhaul because they were convinced it would generate more money.41 
Many agree the breakthrough agreement that paved the way for health system 
reform was a World Bank–sponsored pilot program initiated in 1994 that road-tested 
the Bismarck system: Eight counties (covering four million people) were selected for 
trial implementation of a system that gave citizens free choice to select a primary care 
doctor and paid health providers, especially general practitioners, on the basis of a 
combination of capitation (per head) and fee for service. The pilot required prior 
approval and financial commitment from the MOH,42 which, besides the Minister 
himself, was not enthusiastic. The ministry was forced to accept it by Parliament, 
responding to local constituents, especially doctors who were keen to test whether the 
 
40 It was an unusual case of Parliament, not the government, proposing a law. 
41 Dan Enachescu, 1998, p. 69. 
42 Approved by Government Decision 370/1994. The pilot continued to operate through 1996. 
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public would participate and whether the financial benefits would accrue under a 
health insurance financial scheme. Doctors and hospital directors lobbied the 
Parliament and Ministry (Enachescu, 1998; Erhan, 2003; Mincu, 2003). Minister 
Mincu was very supportive in order to demonstrate the intelligence of his 
endorsement of this plan already. Since he was also in Parliament, he was able to help 
engineer parliamentary approval for the pilot project. Parliament passed an unusual 
law approving the World Bank pilot project and directing the MOH to cooperate with 
the Bank in implementing the pilot (World Bank, 2002c). 
 The pilot project proved several important things: A mandatory insurance 
system raised new money, the public was eager to participate (84% of the eligible 
population registered in the first year), and competition led to increased 
productivity.43 Evaluation of the pilot project concluded that the output of family 
doctors improved: They provided more consultations and increased the number of 
home visits. Because the doctors in the pilot districts had established contracts with 
district health authorities, the doctors were no longer state employees; they clearly 
became more client-oriented. On average, the income of these doctors increased 15% 
(World Bank, 2002c). Pilot projects can contribute to essential learning, allowing 
players to recalculate their positions in negotiating change while reducing the 
uncertainty of change. 
 Outside the pilot districts, doctors continued to pressure central institutions to 
approve the social health insurance law. Doctors, the most active constituency in the 
health constellation, did achieve some victories in this period: For example, 
Parliament established the College of Physicians in 1995, with official recognition 
 
43 Institute for Health Sector Development, 1995, pp. 36-40. 
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and standing to negotiate with the state on behalf of doctors. However, between mid-
1994 and 1997, the central government remained ambivalent regarding the health 
insurance scheme largely due to two opponents: The MOF feared that the health tax, 
by increasing overall taxes on employers, would inhibit much needed economic 
growth. The Ministry of Labor feared that it would lose certain authorities, such as 
the authority to administer sick leave, to the new Health Insurance House (Radulescu, 
2002; Vladescu, 2003). 
 With the election of Emil Constantinescu in late 1996 came a new Minister of 
Health, Stefan Iosif Dragulescu, who had served in the Senate and was familiar with 
the reform debate. He became a champion of the health insurance law and says he 
first approached the Romanian Party of Social Democracy (Iliescu’s party) to support 
the reform, then went to his own coalition for support (Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003). 
Meanwhile, the MOH made a concession to the Ministry of Labor regarding control 
of sick leave administration, and the MOH made a concession to the MOF regarding 
the first-year employer tax rate. Despite the lack of any impact analysis of the law 
(Radulescu, 2003) or a strong strategy besides the raw facts of reorganization 
(Enachescu, 2003), the MOH got the central government on board and the new Social 
Health Insurance Law 145/1997 was approved by Parliament in August 1997. 
Notably, healthcare expenditures in 1997 had sunk to a level below that of 1994-
1996, putting significant pressure on the government to come up with a scheme that 
would bring new resources into the system (World Bank, 2002b). 
 Although some donors, especially the World Bank, had advocated for the 
health insurance reform as early as 1993, its passage was only secured when key 
94
central government actors were convinced that it would raise new money: in the 
midst of a deepening budget crisis, they concluded that it would raise money without 
disrupting existing institutional relations too much. Thus, approval in 1997 of the 
health insurance reform came when cooperation at the local bargaining game 
triggered cooperation in international bargaining. In health reform, local bargaining 
drove the issue, while in CW, international bargaining dominated. 
 Between 1997 and 2000, the central government and international donors 
were not engaged in strong bargaining over healthcare because the locus of power 
was much more contested on the domestic level. But donors opened a new reform 
front in 2000 with the idea of introducing Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs), or 
case-based financing, when it was clear that soaring hospital costs were preventing 
fundamental reform of Romania’s healthcare system. One approach to introducing 
greater transparency into hospital spending is by implementing reimbursements based 
on DRGs; this has the added benefit of putting more rationality into hospital decision 
making and, it is assumed, reducing costs. Basically, every service available at a 
hospital is coded and assigned a price. With DRGs, hospitals are like big stores. By 
tracking patients through DRGs, managers can compare levels of activity, hospital 
performance, and costs across hospitals. The three main problems with the DRG 
system are: 1) It is a technologically intensive system. 2) It is a tool that doesn’t in 
itself manage anything. 3) It takes time to implement (Bubenek, 2005; Fundatia Horia 
Rusu, 2003; Enachescu, 2003; Vladescu, 2003). 
 Nevertheless, health sector decision makers at the central level decided to 
endorse this reform solution as a way to get hospital costs under control (Bartos, 
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2002; Cocora, 2002). The U.S. government took the lead in working with the 
Romanian government to develop DRGs in 200044 with support from the World Bank 
and EU. By 2003, the Romanians had taken over the program itself. Thus, in order to 
push reform more deeply into hospitals, the government began a new round of 
cooperation with donors. In the domestic context, local doctors, convinced that 
hospitals were stealing money from the primary care level, pushed the central 
government (including the MOH) to agree to the DRG solution (Burduja, 2005; 
Lazarescu, 2003; Vladescu, 2002). 
 Since it began as a pilot, hospitals were curious but not threatened at the 
outset, especially since the initiative included a significant budget for information 
technology–related equipment and training, about which hospitals were enthusiastic. 
However, by 2003, there were complaints that it was taking too long to implement the 
DRG system; meanwhile, hospitals continued to dominate annual budget resources, 
pharmaceutical costs were skyrocketing, and the public was unhappy with both access 
and quality of care (Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003; Chiritoiu, 2003; Bubenek, 2005). 
 In sum, at important junctures, when donors were promoting specific 
healthcare reform strategies, the central government’s response—in 1995 (World 
Bank pilot program giving primacy to general physicians accepted), 1997 (social 
health insurance scheme recommended by Germans approved), and 2002 (DRG case-
based financing for hospitals, promoted by the U.S., used as pilot financing for 
twenty-three hospitals)—can be explained in terms of the strategic goals of domestic 
actors with whom the central government was also bargaining. What is critically 
 
44 The DRG project is another example of a program that began in one administration and was 
continued by the next. It was adopted by the Constantinescu government in spring 2000, but program 
implementation got under way in 2001. 
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different in healthcare as opposed to CW is that international donors offered few 
credible promises or threats related to the reform agenda. Donors offered concepts 
and technical assistance, but there was no “fear factor” to enforce compliance or 
cajole follow-through. 
 By 2001, as the CW sector finally began to adopt reforms that changed the 
way services were delivered, and even worked against the status quo, in healthcare 
there was a systematic trend away from reform toward recentralization, as well as an 
inability to maintain a clear vision of change in the face of skyrocketing 
pharmaceutical costs and hospitals chronically incapable of living within agreed-upon 
budget limits. Analyzed in terms of bargaining, in CW reform the donors used 
considerable bargaining power to force local organizations (with an interest in 
preserving partial reform) to produce outcomes the donors wanted. In the case of 
healthcare reform, key domestic organizations had veto power over moving forward, 
and no actor had the power—or the will—to coerce the outcome. 
 By tracing the government’s pattern of cooperation and defiance vis-à-vis 
foreign donors as a function of its relationship with domestic actors in the CW and 
health sectors, respectively, I am able to depict the fundamental rationality of the 
government’s positions. Other observers see central government ambivalence without 
considering the larger context of its choices. For example, Barbara Nunberg, an 
international financial institution analyst who studies administrative reform, wrote 
about the Romanian government: “Despite some promising initial efforts, 
this…transition has been more halting and ad hoc… than elsewhere in the region” 
(1999, p. 53). The World Bank’s Country Assistance Evaluation covering 1990-2004 
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leads with a description of the perceived unevenness in Romania’s reform 
commitments: “Vacillating government commitment became a major trait of 
Romania’s reform efforts,” characterizing the 1990s as witnessing “many half-hearted 
reform attempts” (2005b, p. v). Halting, half-hearted, vacillating, perhaps, in light of 
donors’ teleological drive toward certain reform ends, but it is logical in light of the 
central government’s primary concern to maximize resources, especially financial 
resources, available to public institutions without limiting its authority. 
 Viewing the reform trajectory through the bargaining lens is limited in that it 
does not link outcomes to the procedural rules governing interactions between 
institutional actors. In Chapters Four and Five, I attempt to penetrate the conditions 
for success and failure in social welfare reform promoted by foreign actors by tying 
performance outcomes back to institutional rules and procedures, especially 
procedures governing budget allocation—an approach that supplements the two-level 
bargaining explication without displacing its insights.  
 In Chapters Four through Six, the aim is to deepen the analysis of strategic 
interaction among donors, central government, and domestic stakeholders in order to 
explore how institutional change—and institutional continuity—can be explained 
through the RC and institutionalist paradigms. These chapters delve into the case 
studies in greater detail.  
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Chapter Four 
Interests and Institutions in Child Welfare Reform 
 
As earlier descriptions of the child welfare (CW) system and residential, state-run 
institutions suggest, this network of warehouses (large and small) for abandoned 
children, and the people working there and running them (all state employees), 
represent a set of political interests. Between 1990 and 1997, these interests became 
more powerful as facilities were physically improved through contributions from 
foreign donors and staffed up as a result of donor-driven initiatives to bring more 
professional staff into caregiving roles. 
 However, political interests are only powerful to the extent that there are 
institutional mechanisms through which they can express—and impress—their will. 
Between 1999 and 2001, the county and local-level CW organizations nearly overran 
central-level authority by creating decentralized methods of fund-raising based on 
new procedures for inter-country adoption. By 2001, foreign donors had exerted 
themselves, forcing the Romanian central government to make commitments that 
embraced reductions in institutionalized children in exchange for access to Western 
multilateral organizations—an agreement so strictly enforced that local and county 
interests lost their ability to participate in CW decision making, thereby losing their 
ability to steer outcomes. 
 In terms of the political institutions governing the sector, between 1990 and 
2001, there was a certain “everyone and no one” quality to governance. A series of 
national entities were contrived by the central government (typically recommended 
by donors) to serve as a steering committee/advisory board, but until the late 1990s, 
none of these had substantial authority. Once CW was decentralized in 1997, county 
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council secretaries, then county council presidents, had important authority. But this 
diffusion of political responsibility only made policy coordination less likely. 
 Under the Nastase government, in 2001, governance of the sector was 
recentralized in that the National Authority gained Cabinet-level status, reporting 
directly to the Secretary of the Cabinet. Considering that most CW legislation was 
approved by the Cabinet as Emergency Ordinances, the Cabinet was, in a real sense, 
the political authority most implicated in the governance of CW—which signifies the 
strategic importance this sector had vis-à-vis Romania’s post-communist political 
aspirations to be accepted by the West and is one of the reasons institutional reform 
was, ultimately, successful. 
 
1990-1996: Humanitarian Assistance 
A 1996 United Nations Children’s Fund assessment of six years’ worth of foreign 
assistance to Romania’s CW sector summarizes the sense among donors that 
hundreds of millions of dollars in aid45 had not had a deep impact on the CW regime: 
 
Systems changes are not evident yet. Adequate budget allocations for child 
welfare reforms are not widely available, and systemic family and community 
supports are not in place. In the past year, the number of children in state 
institutions has actually increased, presumably due to the declining economic 
conditions for large segments of the Romanian population. There is 
widespread frustration among many donors and NGOs [non-governmental 
organizations] that little progress is being made despite substantial inputs and 
local changes. A National Plan of Action (NPA) for child welfare and 
protection has been adopted, but mechanisms for its implementation and 
 
45 It is impossible to estimate the total expenditures from foreign entities, 1990-2004, because so much 
of the assistance flowed through private entities, especially church organizations. One U.S. document 
estimates that private contributions were twice as large as bilateral aid (Cromer, 1996). Guesstimates 
by EU and U.S. government officials regarding total amounts of foreign aid to Romanian child welfare 
entities during this period range from $800 million to1.5 billion USD, the later figure includes an 
estimated value of goods and services donated by private groups.  
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budgetary allocations have not been established. Lack of inter-ministerial 
collaboration remains a problem and responsibility for protection of children 
continues to be fragmented. (Kessler et. al., 1996. p. 3) 
 
As a result, the authors recommend, “In the present political climate, local-level 
actions appear to offer the greatest opportunity for achieving changes. The 
burgeoning civil society is highly receptive to technical assistance, practical 
demonstrations, and new ideas and methods” (Ibid). 
 Shifting attention to local and civil society–oriented development strategies 
when central government lacks “political will,” or commitment, is a common 
approach among both bilateral and multilateral donors all over the world. The 
obvious problem is that this reorientation takes the focus away from more profound 
institutional reform constraints identified just a few sentences before: the process of 
budget allocation, the existence of institutional interests that do not want to forgo 
assets, fragmented responsibility, and resistance to a new service mix—regardless of 
potential cost savings. 
 Without a doubt, unemployment and the loss of purchasing power as a result 
of the transition from a command to a market economy caused increased poverty in 
Romania. But poverty is not a sufficient cause for the increase in children abandoned 
to state-managed residential facilities in the mid-1990s. Strong financial incentives 
existed, spurring ministries to defend the status quo, especially between 1990 and 
1996 when ministry budgets were directly tied to the number of children receiving 
care under their authority (Davis, 2005; Sheele, 2002; Correll, 2002; Sauer, 2002; 
Mica, 2002). 
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 The Romanian CW regime between 1990 and 1996 benefited from an unusual 
parallelism: The state system existed alongside CW services paid for by private and 
public external donors. As a free rider, the central government had no reason to 
increase its own budget resources on CW. The strategic genius of the Romanian 
strategy was to create a flexible policy environment that accommodated, even 
welcomed, outside assistance while encouraging sub-national institutions to utilize 
the technical assistance being offered. Meanwhile, the government maintained a state 
system dependent on its existing base (abandoned children). This was an achievement 
in the rational self-interest of state employees, state institutions, and elected officials, 
if not in the long-term interest of abandoned children already cared for by the state or 
heading for that fate. 
 Therefore, it is not surprising that although eight leagane (state-run 
institutions caring for infants and children aged 0-3 years) were closed between 1990 
and 1996, approximately the same number of babies and toddlers entered the system 
each year (Greenwell, 2001) despite the fact that the birth rate declined during this 
period. Abandonment rates for children aged 0-3 years went from 600/100,000 in 
1990 to just over 800/100,000 in 1998. One important institutional explanation for 
this phenomenon has hardly been noted in the vast number of reports on the subject: 
Through 1996, it remained extremely easy to institutionalize a child. Local child 
protection commissions were charged, by law, with deciding the fate of an abandoned 
or at-risk child. Most members of these commissions were also directors of 
residential institutions. They had a clear financial incentive to keep institutions full 
since budgets were directly tied to the number of beds occupied. 
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According to one of the most comprehensive studies of the first ten years of 
reform in CW, foreign assistance simply did not impact the CW institution itself: 
“Despite much foreign assistance between 1990 and 1996, the complex institutional 
structure maintained in Romania continued to reflect the great handicap of a 
totalitarian, centrally coordinated system in which local structures played either no 
role, or merely a cosmetic one.”46 It is true that foreign assistance did not have a deep 
impact on the CW institution in this period, but I strongly disagree with the authors 
that local structures played no role; on the contrary, local players, especially the 
directors of child placement centers, and the staff of all units, played a significant role 
in stalling structural reform. For example, as a UNICEF-funded study highlights, 
local decision makers have no incentive to reorganize the CW regime. Their rational 
interest is in maintaining the multiple income streams that preserve their raison d’etre:  
“The institutional infrastructure for child protective services, as it exists today 
in Romania, is a self-sustaining system and will remain so as long as it is 
maintained. Putting the onus of responsibility for deinstitutionalization [be it 
family reunification, foster care, or adoptive placement] on the directors of 
institutions has not had a significant impact on the numbers of children in 
care. Doctors’ main concern is the everyday administration of the institution, 
and their jobs depend on keeping the census of the institution high enough to 
avoid budgetary and staffing cut backs. Likewise, tutelary authorities can do 
little to prevent children from going into institutions since they have few 
alternatives to offer families in trouble.” (Stephenson, Anghelescu, Stativa, 
and Pasti, 1997, p. 6) 
 
In CW, partial reform existed during this period as a function of heavy outside 
financing supporting service  alternatives and organizational maintenance, without 
significant impact on reorganizing and downsizing the CW institution (in the 
 
46 Booth et al., 1999, p. 11. The EU, for example, donated over $80 million USD to child welfare in 
1990-1999 between two programs alone: PHARE Child Protection and PHARE Bridging Facility for 
Children. 
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Northian sense) itself.  In this scenario, CW sub-national leadership and employees 
were the short-term winners who gained rents from distortions in the partially 
reformed system, namely, the donor funding that underwrote reform and the inter-
country adoptions that brought in cash. These CW bureaucrats had clear incentives to 
resist change—certainly, to resist reorienting the institution away from institutions.  
 
1997-2000: Decentralization 
With the 1997 CW decentralization reforms, the CW budget picture became more 
complex. In addition to the state budget, funds for CW were supposed to come from 
the budgets of the county councils and non-budgetary funds, also known as off-
budget “special funds” (Polishchuk, 2002). As discussed earlier, the county and local 
governments proved to be unprepared to assume significant responsibility for the 
vaguely defined local mandate, which led to a financial crisis in 1999.  However, with 
changes in financing (namely, a significant decrease in resources transmitted from the 
state budget to local coffers, although the state continued to pay approximately 50% 
of the cost of CW services) came the start of a decrease in abandoned children. 
 One significant aspect of the CW reform story is the absence of strong 
professional associations functioning as organized interests. Besides the interests that 
formed around inter-country adoption (1999-2001), the chief concern of Romanians 
associated with CW has been to protect their employment. By most accounts, 
employment in the CW sector was static or increased between 1990 and 1999 as a 
function of donor pressure to improve staff/child ratios (which averaged 1:1 by 1999) 
although a review of employment data maintained by the National Institute of 
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Statistics demonstrates that employment is not disaggravated in a way that makes it 
useful to see this trend. One newspaper account (Adevarul, 1999) clearly blames the 
organized interests of CW employees for the dismal conditions in certain residential 
institutions:  
“As a result of hunger, in Nicoresti-Galati, an infant bit and swallowed the 
flesh from the upper arm of his neighbor in bed. Ten days after the incident, 
other children at the Nicoresti-Galati special residential hospital for children 
(camin spital) were in the same situation: starving and unsupervised. Today, 
the only improvement brought to their lives is that they were moved to a 
children’s hospital in Galati. New patients were brought to Nicoresti-
Galati…adults. ‘It was more important to maintain (pastrarea) the staff than 
to change the situation,’ a community source told the paper recently.”47 
The most vocal associations in the sector were groups of social workers who worked 
with donors on various programs. This profession was banned under the Ceausescu 
regime; donor support in 1991 helped restore it to university curriculums nationwide. 
Donors insisted on the importance of involving social workers in every aspect of 
child protection, from counseling families at risk of abandoning children to training 
institutionalized teens in essential life skills. Perhaps because the profession evolved 
with strong donor support and because an ongoing shortage of trained professionals 
meant that members did not have to worry about job security, they consistently 
supported donor initiatives. 
 The most consistent, organized interests prodding the national government 
regarding CW reform were, and continue to be, associations of bilateral and private 
donors. In 1997, a directory of organizations active in the sector in Romania listed 
about 1,500 organizations, with between 350 and 400 active (Mica, 2002). At the 
official level, the so-called High-Level Donors meeting, which met roughly three 
 
47 Ziua, 2003. Translated by the author.  
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times a year between 1997 and 2003, brought together the major bilateral and 
multilateral players including the European Union (EU), United Nations 
Development Programme, and governments of Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States (with some annual variance). Among private, church-based, and independent 
activists in the sector, most non-Romanians, about 20 groups created the Pro-Child 
Federation in 1999. Pro-Child is an Internet-networked group of individuals and 
independent NGOs, most with funding from abroad, which lobbies vocally at the 
national and county levels, and at embassies in Bucharest, about policy issues and 
trends in the sector. Therefore, there were mechanisms to coordinate both official and 
non-governmental assistance in CW reform. 
 
2001-2004: Institutional Reorganization 
As discussed in Chapter Three, donors were deeply perturbed that inter-country 
adoption had devolved into a virtual baby auction by 2001. There is little doubt that 
the man who designed the point system, Cristian Tabacaru, who headed the National 
Authority for Child Protection and Adoption (Atoritatea National pentru Protectia 
Copii si Adoptia, ANPCA), sincerely believed that his was a creative solution to the 
chronic need for more financial resources at the local level (Ambrose, 2005; Coburn, 
2005; Coman, 2005; Correll, 2002, Petre, 2003). It was so creative that the local 
stakeholders cum financial beneficiariesincluding adoption agents, Department for 
Child Protection (Directia pentru Protecia Copilului, DPC) directors, directors of the 
residential institutions, directors of the special services for the protection of children, 
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and members of the Romanian Adoption Committee (RAC)had every incentive to 
maintain the scheme for as long as they could. 
 According to American analysts who spent several months in Romania 
interviewing stakeholders about the system, there was no domestic accountability 
mechanism that could or would undo the point system because it satisfied all parties: 
Foreign families received children, children went to the highest bidders, and local 
agents received tips at every transaction pointfrom the residential institution, to the 
DPC, to local courts, to the RAC (Ambrose, 2005; Coburn, 2005; Sauer, 2002). The 
system satisfied local players and took pressure off the central government by 
bringing new resources into a resource poor country. Only one factor upset this 
equilibrium: a powerful donor with a highly motivated champion, Baroness Emma 
Nicholson. 
 Hounded by Baroness Nicholson, a particularly vociferous Special Rapporteur 
for the European Parliament, Romania was explicitly threatened with the loss of EU 
accession if the country did not put a moratorium on inter-country adoption. Other 
conditions were soon added: The EU insisted on the deinstitutionalization of children 
still living in big state institutions as well as the closure of the institutions themselves. 
 Other donors let the EU take the lead in making foreign assistance 
conditional, but the EU was not just an agent of tough love; it provided significant 
direct resources to underwrite the CW budget. For example, in 2001, at the height of 
acrimony in EU pronouncements and reports regarding the adoption situation and 
CW compliance, the EU and multilateral donors provided over 20% of total 
expenditures on CW: 38% was transferred to the counties from the state (central) 
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budget; 35% came from county and local revenues; 6% from off-budget National 
Interest Programs; 17% from the EU’s PHARE (Pologne, Hongrie Assistance à la 
Reconstruction Economique) program; and 4% from the multilateral development 
banks (European Commission, 2001). 
 The effect of conditionality was felt immediately. The number of children 
living in state-run institutions decreased by 24% in the two years between January 
2001 and December 2002. At the same time, the number of institutions housing over 
100 children decreased from 205 to 131, a decrease of 36%.48 
By the end of 2004, the number was down to 32,67949 children protected in 
state or private institutions (out of a national population of some five million minors) 
and 50,239 children under age 18 protected in substitute families, of which 34,405 
where living with their extended family or other individuals/families and 15,834 were 
in foster care—a form of child protection that did not exist in 1990. Table 3 depicts 
the dramatic trends of decreasing numbers of children in institutions while more and 
more children were protected in families. 
 Significant evidence of the positive impact of donors and conditionality on the 
Romanian CW system can be seen in contrasting the mix of services utilized between 
2001 and 2004. In May 2001, of the total number of children residing in substitute 
families or in institutions, 63% were protected in institutions while 37% were 
protected in substitute families (professional foster care both public and private, 
subsidized families, or extended families). Just a little over two years later, the 
percentages were reversed: Of the total number of children residing in substitute 
 
48 Statistics are on the National Authority’s Web site at www.copii.ro including archived data. 
49 All statistics: National Authority for the Protection of Children’s Rights (ANPDC, 2004) confirmed 
by European Commission, 2004. 
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families or in institutions, 39% were protected in institutions while 61% were 
protected in substitute families. The number of domestic adoptions increased slightly 
during the period: From an average of 95 adoptions/month in 2001 to an average of 
106 per month in 2004, while inter-country adoption fell sharply, from 179/month in 
2001 to 30/month in 2004.  
One data set for the period 2000-2004 is not invoked by donors: sector 
employment trends. As Table 4 demonstrates, in exchange for closing the old-style 
institutions as donors insisted, central government, which engineered the overall CW 
reorganization, has been careful not to disturb sector employees. Many of the former 
state institution staff became service providers of another sort—in the day care 
centers or shelters) (Coman, 2005; Correll, 2005), and some became maternal 
assistants under the foster care program captured statistically in Table 3. Note in 
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 So, although the sector employment mix changed drastically in a short amount 
of time—with 76% of CW personnel working in institutions in 2000 but only 31% 
still there four years later—no one lost their jobs, since overall employment 
increased! By all accounts, in the context of uncertainty and poverty that 
characterized post-communist Romania, job security was a major concern; the 
socialist governments were particularly sensitive to the implications of lay-offs and 
job loss. The central government was willing to cooperate with international donors 
after 2000 not only because donors strong-armed change with threats that Romania 
would be excluded from Western alliances, but also because local constituencies, tied 
through employment to the CW network, could stay employed as a function of the 
type of reform being promoted—namely, more diversified services. 
 
Highly Complicated Financing 
Reform is also hard to disagree with when you’re getting so much to do it. The 
Romanian government only began to compile donor contributions in 2000 at the 
insistence of donors. Since 2000, data maintained by the Romanian government 
reflects approximately $70 million USD and 85 million Euro. Foreign aid is fungible, 
or interchangeable, meaning that the recipient government can spend its own-source 
dollars in other areas as a result of receiving assistance. It is a long standing critique 
of foreign aid that it actually causes governments to weaken their commitment to 
certain activities—public health, for example—by taking over the responsibility. 
Donors have become savvy to this problem and typically sign memos of 
understanding or make aid conditional on cooperative programming (Collier, 2002; 
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Gwin and Nelson, 1997; Nelson and Eglinton, 1993; Packenham, 1973). The central 
government demonstrates its commitment to CW reform through so-called Programs 
of National Interest (PIN) funded by the state budget. They supported goals upheld by 
the EU and Unites States: closing institutions, creating new services, and 
campaigning to prevent child abandonment. 
 But could Romania, on its own, support the comprehensive range of 
community-based options being developed by donors? Is this system of child 
protection sustainable in a post-donor world? It’s basically impossible to say, 
especially because sector financing is complex, with numerous income streams 
supporting CW: extra-budgetary funding from the state budget, funding from county 
budgets, funding from local budgets, and funding from international donors. Neither 
local nor county government could maintain these services on their own (Ghise, 
2003; Funar, 2002), despite the fact that the reform law is premised on 
decentralization. Romanian reform in CW appears dangerously donor dependent, 
unless the reform effort not only focuses on reorienting the system away from state-
run institutions, but also addresses the informal norms that rationalize abandoning 
children in the first place, and improves financial procedures in a way that allows 
county and local government to be able to prioritize services, and assume the burden 
of a manageable mix.  
 
Implications of Narrative and Data Analysis 
The political context is an institutional context. Foreign donors were intent on 
strongly influencing—in fact, transforming—the CW regime in Romania. But until 
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1997, when they became more deeply engaged in reforming the rules governing CW, 
donors had no impact on the performance of the sector despite a massive infusion of 
cash, goods and services, and technical assistance. Even after donors became savvy to 
the significance of the institutional configuration, they could not prevent the internal 
dynamic between central and local level actors from producing, in succession, a 
disastrous financial crisis in 1999, then a brilliant, but ethically dubious, financial 
boom between 1999 and 2001. Because of the necessary, two-level process by which 
externally recommended reform initiatives in social welfare are communicated and 
implemented, there is hardly any way for donors to determine the outcome at the 
second-level bargaining table, short of strong-arm techniques (i.e., credible threats 
tied to promises of long-term gain if conditionality is satisfied). 
 Between 2001 and 2004, donors were able to effectively influence the 
outcome of the domestic reform game in Romania for five significant reasons: 1) 
Major donors had credible leverage over the central government as a function of the 
link created between CW and larger geo-political goals, namely North Atlantic Treaty 
Oganisation membership and EU accession. 2) Despite decentralizing reforms in 
1997, the institutional configuration of CW was still dominated by a powerful center, 
maintaining control over money (directly contributing over 40% of the CW budget 
and indirectly controlling donor contributions totaling 21%) and employment much as 
it had under state socialism. 3) There were few organized domestic interests with 
access to CW decision making to capture assets or subvert change. 4) The nature of 
the reform reorganized the CW regime in a way that expanded it, thereby protecting 
employment and allowing the central government to satisfy its main constituency in 
114
the sector. 5) Donors put their money where their mouths were, investing heavily in 
the changes they required. 
 Ironically, although most donors point to the success of CW reform as being a 
function of its change to a paradigm oriented toward local service provision and the 
unique needs of each child, reform was only possible because the Romanian central 
government continues to be the strongest interest in the constellation of domestic 
actors. 
 A strong central government is the institutional “default” in post-communist 
Romania with regard to governance and finance. Political and budgetary procedures 
gave no veto power—and little voice—to sub-national interests, despite their 
purported stake as being central to reform objectives. This reality has been ignored by 
foreign donors who aggressively promote teleological reform plans dependent on 
existing Western norms and institutional relationships, especially decentralization and 
local public accountability. 
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Chapter Five 
Interests and Institutions in Healthcare Reform 
 
Associations of professionalsin the health sector, doctors are the example par
excellenceare important stakeholders with powerful potential to influence political 
outcomes. The extent to which interests do influence outcomes depends on 
institutional procedures that determine who gives input to decision making, whether 
veto points exist (and who gets to use them), and whether the central government 
implements deep institutional reform to match and secure sweeping legislative 
change. 
 As we saw in the child welfare case, after 2001, foreign donors were able to 
compel structural reform—and trump domestic stakeholders who were benefiting 
from partial reform—as a result of credible threats related to membership in the 
European Union (EU). Was there any compelling political interest, external or 
internal, able to enforce discipline on the health system reform program? The short 
answer is no. Were there domestic stakeholders, with access to the decision making 
process and/or veto points, who benefited from partial reform and were able to 
capture resources in a way that subverted the common good (i.e., subverted long-term 
healthcare reform goals that aimed at improving population health outcomes and 
efficiency of the system) in ways that were perfectly rational from the perspective of 
their interests, both organizational and financial? The short answer is yes. 
 This chapter elaborates on these short answers in order to describe the rational 
failure of healthcare reform in Romania. What we will see is this: Within the political 
framework, heavily controlled by the institutions of executive authority, the 
healthcare budget-making and allocation decision points allowed little access to 
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organized interests besides elite doctors associated with the hospital sector—who 
were often simultaneously political decision makers. The hospital-based constituency 
made strategic choices within the political economy of healthcare in the first years of 
reform implementation that maximized the freedom of doctors (to treat, to prescribe, 
to spend), then used the national budgetary system to confirm the legitimacy of 
hospital profligacy, a rational set of behaviors that directly contradicted the original 
goals of health reform. Once sanctified, the cycle of hospital overspending and 
pharmaceutical inflation was virtually impossible to break. Donor programs first 
emphasized humanitarian aid, which was seized by recipients but had negligible 
impact on the institutions governing healthcare, then offered well-considered, but 
highly technical, policy recommendations that tended to be out of sync with the 
politics of reform. 
 
Baseline – Misery 
In one of the earliest assessments of the post-communist Romanian healthcare 
system, on assignment from the World Health Organization to the Ministry of Health 
(MOH), Julia Plotnick described the “catastrophic state of the health sector” (1991) in 
terms of the health of the population—highlighting the fact that Romania had the 
highest maternal mortality rate in Europe, the highest mortality rate in Europe for 
children in the 1- to 4-year-old age group, one of the highest infant mortality rates, 
and one of the lowest average lifespans in Europe, 69.56 years—as well as the 
general inadequate condition of health facilities, equipment, and stocks of medicine. 
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 Plotnick (1991) described a highly centralized system, coordinated by the 
MOH and reaching deep into the countryside through a well-defined vertical structure 
organized to provide everyone free medical care—in theory. The network of health 
units had three levels: general practice through dispensaries at the primary level, 
hospitals and policlinics at the regional level, and specialized medical institutions on 
top. At the local level, four types of medical dispensaries (urban, enterprise, school, 
and rural) were on the frontline of care provision, manned by approximately 20,000 
of over 41,500 practicing doctors. They were supervised by a county-level 
department representing the MOH. In total,50 this far-flung health network 
represented over 9,290 health units, of which the most numerous were the most 
starved for resources: medical dispensaries (5,500), pharmacies (1,925), and 
orphanages/homes for abandoned infants (912). 
 Plotnick (1991) found “essentially no equipment in the dispensary.” 
Typically, dispensaries had a scale, an examining table, a metal tongue depressor, 
some old-fashioned syringes, and a small amount of emergency medicine. With no 
otoscopes to perform ear exams for children, speculums to perform vaginal exams, or 
slides or microscopes to do simple lab tests, the dispensaries could serve few 
functions. Patients were supposed to see doctors in the dispensaries where they would 
receive referrals to hospitals if necessary. But in reality, patients bypassed 
dispensaries (Plotnick, 1991; World Bank, 1992). Care in the policlinics was not 
always better. In 1980, specialized training for doctors was discontinued, which had a 
terrible impact on medical training and knowledge. Some specialties were declared 
 
50 Julia Plotnick has the most comprehensive breakdown, but her numbers are confirmed by other 
reports. 
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unnecessary, such as social work, occupational health, and physiotherapy. Formal 
education for nursing was terminated in 1978, although there were special nursing 
high schools. 
 Money, supplies, pharmaceuticals, and staff assignments were tightly 
controlled by the MOH at the center of the centralized system. Yet there was weak 
central enforcement of medical protocols, care norms, or professional standards. 
Instead, medical accountability to patients was almost nonexistent, and subjective 
decision making was common. For example, disabled infants and toddlers aged 0-3 
years were automatically placed in special institutions managed by the MOH. At age 
3, the children were tested to determine whether they should be transferred to 
institutions managed by the Ministry of Education or to so-called homes for the 
“irrecoverables” managed by the Ministry of Labor. There was no standard test used 
to make this life-changing determination. And there was no uniform age when 
children were retested. At any time, children could be transferred from one institution 
to another based on beds or staff whims. This often made it impossible for families to 
maintain ties with children, although the system was supposed to encourage ongoing 
familial relationships (Stephenson et al., 1997; MOH, 1991). 
 Besides the 41,500 doctors, there were many others employed by the health 
sector including medium-trained personnel (135,200), especially in hospitals; so-
called auxiliary personnel (61,100) covering abandoned children and the mentally and 
physically disabled; dentists (7,200); and pharmacists (6,500)—for a total of some 
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251,600 people tied to this impoverished sector.51 Between 1980 and 1988, in the 
MOF’s list of health expenditures by category, the only line item that increased was 
“Salaries” and “Salary Tax and Contributions” under Personnel. Salaries increased 
from 44.2% of total health sector expenditures in 1980 to 52.5% in 1990. Related 
expenditures for personnel “Tax and Contributions” increased from 13.6% to 16.9%. 
Thus, in 1990, almost 70% of healthcare expenditures went to salary-related 
expenses. During the same period, funding for “Drugs and Service Supply” 
plummeted from 18.1% of total expenditures in 1980 to 5.7% in 1990! “Other 
Expenditures” (where capital investments including technology were counted) fell 
from 4.6% to 0.6% in 1990. Finally, expenditures for all the normal supplies used by 
medical facilities, from tape and gauze to ammonia and oxygen, were held constant at 
a paltry 3.0% in 1980 and 3.4% in 1990 (Ministry of Finance [MOF], 1991). This 
detail provides a context for greater understanding of healthcare reform’s baseline in 
1990: resource poor but employment rich. 
 Compared to regional neighbors, Romania spent less on health. In 1989, 
Romanian health expenditures constituted 4.2% of total government expenditure and 
2.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—keeping in mind that Romania had one of 
the lowest GDPs in the region. Poland, in comparison, spent 11% of total government 
expenditures and 3.7% of GDP in 1988 (World Bank, 1992). Between 1980 and 
1988, Romania was one of the few countries in the region not to increase spending on 
healthcare. In comparison, healthcare expenditures as a percentage of GNP increased 
by 40% in Hungary during the same period. As reflected in the MOF data, the 
 
51 Semashko healthcare systems generally have more doctors, more medical staff, and more beds than 
Western health systems in order to compensate for the shortage of supplies and low quality of the 
facilities themselves (Marrée and Groenewegen, 1997). 
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Romanian central government controlled costs in three brute ways: not supplying 
drugs to the network of dispensaries, forgoing staff training, and not investing in new 
technology (World Bank, 1992). These policies bred massive dissatisfaction among 
doctors, medical staff, and the population. 
 Although Romania had thousands of medical dispensaries and doctors, the 
majority of health funding went to policlinics and hospitals. Of all funding spent on 
case-related healthcare in 1989, 64% went to policlinics and hospitals. And although 
45% of the population lived in rural areas of the country, where theoretically there 
was decent dispensary coverage, MOH finance data indicate that only 13% of 
healthcare expenditures was expended by rural healthcare units (World Bank, 1992). 
This service mix is worth highlighting because fourteen years later, hospitals 
continued to receive approximately the same percentage of health-sector funding. In 
terms of general practitioners (GPs) and primary care, this frontline of preventative 
care was so neglected and underfinanced that most primary care was provided by 
medical specialists in the policlinics or rural health centers. There were not many 
practicing GPs. In fact, patients under communism relied on ambulance service to 
provide primary care after normal business hours; over 90% of ambulance usage was 
for primary care (World Bank, 2002c). 
 Another aspect of the communist healthcare system that constituted a 
fundamental baseline weakness was the method of distributing medicines and 
supplies. The MOH managed the procurement and distribution of drugs nationwide. 
Under communism, a special trading company served as a procurement agent, 
obtaining drugs that the MOH ordered based on the amount of foreign exchange 
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made available by the MOF. Imported drugs were kept in a central warehouse in 
Bucharest. From Bucharest, they were sent monthly to seventeen regional distributors 
for further division between 450 hospital pharmacies and some 1,500 retail 
pharmacies owned by the MOH. Domestic drugs were brought to Bucharest or 
distributed directly to the pharmaceutical network. Hospital pharmacies generally got 
first dibs on medical supplies, further undermining the value of dispensaries, since 
often nothing was left after the hospital pharmacy network took its supplies. The 
practice of providing medications free of charge in hospitals, which encouraged 
overuse of hospitals, also meant that the hospitals represented a big demand for 
pharmaceuticals when they were distributed by the central warehouse. Because the 
overall amount allocated for pharmaceuticals by the central government was so low, 
and because medicines were ostensibly free to patients in hospitals, the hospitals 
tended to run through pharmaceutical supplies quickly, well before the end of the 
month, so shortage characterized the pharmaceutical distribution network at every 
level. 
 
1990-1997: Overcoming the Status Quo 
The politics of healthcare reform involved, from the start, two major interests: the 
central government power structure dominated by the MOF and MOH52 and, on the 
other side, doctors. This is a classic tension: For over 150 years, redefining national 
 
52 Although the MOF and MOH were occasionally, even publicly, at odds with regard to annual 
budgets for health, with the MOH consistently petitioning for more central resources and higher 
allocations in certain functional budget categories (e.g., for capital equipment), the two institutions 
consistently sided with each other in matters of health system governance, financial norms, and, 
eventually, a shared distrust of decentralization. Therefore, while there was episodic conflict between 
the ministries, their interests were typically in sync, which represents a shared central government 
perspective—generally adverse to significant or deep institutional reform. 
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healthcare programs pits the state (concerned to regulate providers) against doctors 
(concerned to protect professional autonomy) (Marreé and Groenewegen, 1997; 
Immergut, 1992). There was virtually no pressure from the public for significant 
health reform (Enachescu, 1998). 
 
Doctors 
From the first days of post-communist Romania, doctors pressured the Romanian 
government for changes that would increase their independence, reassert their 
professional autonomy, and allow them to make more money. In Chapter Three, I 
discussed the legalization of abortion in response to medical and, possibly, public 
pressure. This liberalization generated immediate income and new clients for doctors 
practicing in hospitals and those who had been performing illegal abortions at home 
for years. Another concession made by central authorities was awarding greater self-
determination to new doctors: Before the revolution, doctors and other healthcare 
personnel were assigned places to work by the MOH. For the first three years after 
medical school, doctors were required to practice in rural areas. These compulsory 
assignments were dropped at the behest of doctors beginning in 1990. The change 
amounted to granting more professional freedom to doctors, but it increased the 
disparity in medical care between urban and rural areas. To encourage rural doctors to 
stay put, the MOH declared that they no longer had to work weekends, a rule that 
placed pressure on hospital emergency facilities.53 Liberal leasing arrangements to 
allow doctors to take possession of their offices was another government response to 
 
53 It should be noted that this was part of an initiative taken by the Romanian government that 
benefited all public servants who had worked six-day weeks under communism. 
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GPs’ demands for more autonomy. But since doctors still did not own their offices, 
there was no incentive to invest in facilities or make extensive improvements (Bara, 
van den Heuvel, and Maarse, 2002). 
 Besides these “one-shot” reforms, medical personnel were eager to endorse 
more comprehensive reform. As the country’s first Minister of Health, Dan 
Enachescu, writes: 
 
The first reaction generated by the violent political change of December 1989 
was to reject the structures of a totalitarian state and, with respect to the health 
system, the principals and organization of a socialist, Semashko-type health 
system. Doctors were the strongest pressure force, fighting for the adoption of 
a Bismarck-type model and the development of private practice or private 
practice within public services. (1998, p. 69; confirmed by Bara, van den 
Heuvel, and Maarse, 2002) 
 
Enachescu describes “near total consensus” regarding the need to radically change the 
healthcare system. Most doctors favored transition to a Bismarck-type model because 
they considered it to offer a combination of freedom and financial reward.54 He 
summarizes, simply, “The system of health insurance was seen as bringing wealth” 
(Enachescu, 1998, p. 67). This was the model being adopted across the region 
including in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Poland, and 
Bulgaria. 
 In the 1970s through late 1980s, the trend in Europe was to adopt the so-called 
“Beveridge” system, or National Health Service system, based on the British model, 
as did Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain. The social-insurance health system—the 
“Bismarck” system used in Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium—was not making new converts. But aversion to state-centralized 
 
54 However, Enachescu himself favored a national health service funded from general taxes, as in the 
British healthcare model (2002). 
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systems encouraged post-communist Central and Eastern European countries to adopt 
the Bismarck system, although they generally combined it with a new emphasis on 
the GP as the “gatekeeper” for care, which is central to the Beveridge model (Marrée 
and Groenewegen, 1997). 
 In 1994, a doctor (playing many roles) led passage by the Romanian Senate of 
a mandatory health insurance law. Dr. Iulian Mincu, a high-profile medical specialist 
in nutrition who had served as Nicolae Ceausescu’s personal physician, was Minister 
of Health. He was also a Romanian Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) member of 
the Senate and Chair of the Senate’s Committee on Health. Mincu was convinced that 
the Bismarck system of healthcare financing held the key to increasing resources 
available to the health system. He worked with the German medical team and his own 
staff (Erhan, 2003) to develop a draft law to implement national health insurance. But 
Mincu claimed that the effort pitted him against his political party’s leadership, which 
cautioned a go-slow approach to health reform. He was not able to convince the 
Parliament’s lower chamber, the House of Deputies, to follow his lead and buck the 
Cabinet. As a result, health reform died in Parliament during the 1992-1996 session; 
when the PDSR put together its parliamentary lists for the 1996 elections, Mincu was 
dropped. 
 So, despite enthusiasm for the Bismarck social health insurance by virtually 
all doctors—from rural generalists to surgeons in the elite teaching hospitals, 
represented by the College of Physicians (COP)—it wasn’t adopted as law until 1997. 
Why? There is one major explanation: Political decision making was dominated by 
the central government, which didn’t yield on health reform until 1997. 
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 The medical profession did achieve official professional recognition and a 
governing role in 1995 with parliamentary approval in July of a law creating the 
COP.55 The law empowered the COP to draw up rules for accrediting medical schools 
and licensing doctors together with the MOH, as well as the authority to define and 
enforce rules for medical ethics. Arguments between existing medical associations 
and the new COP prevented the organization from becoming viable for several years. 
 
Central Government 
Transforming social welfare systems—including health, pensions, and unemployment 
policy—is a complicated set of reforms involving complex administrative changes, 
politically charged questions of resource distribution, and a high degree of inter-
agency coordination. It takes time to design and implement these reform programs. In 
the transition literature, this is sometimes termed “second generation reform” (Kornai, 
Haggard, and Kaufman, 2001; Nelson, 2001; Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998; Diamond 
and Plattner, 1995). The Romanian government was more preoccupied with “first 
generation” macro-economic stabilization goals—including opening the economy to 
the world, liberalizing prices, and, hesitantly, privatization—and consolidating 
authority than anything politically or administratively demanding. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, central government managed to placate most doctors by allowing 
donor programs a wide berth, which offered medical personnel the kinds of access 
they so strongly desired. 
 The Romanian government was a particularly strong executive system 
between 1990 and 1996. Although there was some churning at the level of the Prime 
 
55 Law 74/1995. 
126
Minister, with three men serving this capacity during the period,56 President Ion 
Iliescu was an assertive character who dominated the political landscape. Parliament 
was not disposed to serve as a counterweight to executive power. Decision making 
flowed through the Cabinet with the vast majority of new laws starting as drafts 
emanating from the Cabinet, sent to Parliament for approval, or after being issued as 
Emergency Ordinances (EOs). The Cabinet’s style of adjudicating policy options was 
chaotic, with few policy choices presented as a function of cost/benefit or efficiency 
gains, and the status quo typically persevered since there was little consultation with 
stakeholders and few opportunities for public input (Ionita, 2004, 2003b). As 
Romanian analyst Sorin Ionita explains in Governing By Default: Failures of Policy 
Process in Romania (2004), Romania maintained a large number of Cabinet-level 
portfolios (twenty-four to twenty-five between 1990 and 2003 as opposed to 
seventeen at most for all other EU members or candidate countries), which functions 
to inhibit change. Ionita writes: 
 
Romania continued with an expanded Soviet-style arrangement [in terms of 
central government structure] that tends to preserve the status quo, where 
narrow issues are assigned to a series of central agencies expected to execute 
diligently pre-defined budgetary items, while effectiveness is measured in 
terms of inputs. Reallocations are difficult to operate, both because of the 
opposition of administrative staff and the lack of information about actual 
performance, while the policy agenda is strongly influenced by the pressures 
to continue existing programs. (Ionita, 2004, p. 7) 
 
This is an apt description of the state of central government decision making through 
1997—and beyond. 
 Coordinating closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the MOF 
was considered the most powerful ministry and, thus, the most powerful Cabinet-
 
56 Petre Roman (1990); Teodor Stolojan (1991-1992); Nicolae Vacaroiu, (1992-1996). 
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level player in the central government. The MOF was unconvinced that Romania was 
ready for mandatory health insurance until 1997 (Gherghina, 2005). The MOH and 
MOF were often at odds, with the MOH assuming that its major problems stemmed 
from lack of funding (World Bank, 1993), but in the course of healthcare reform, the 
MOH and MOF eventually became allies—against change. 
 Romania’s strong executive model of decision making did not facilitate access 
to decision making for doctors or other stakeholders. Although a reading of the 1991 
constitution suggests that Parliament should have had a more active role to play, it 
was dominated by the PDSR, the governing political party; party discipline was 
strong enough that Parliament was extremely deferential to party leaders, especially 
President Iliescu. However, Minister Mincu’s incomplete victory in the Senate 
foreshadows the future role that Parliament’s health committees would play in 1997 
and after, acting as a kind of veto point for legislation and budgets that might have 
inhibited the autonomy of Romania’s powerful hospitals. 
 
Donors 
Foreign donors were a weaker factor in health reform in the first post-communist 
years than in child welfare reform.57 There were numerous donors (including United 
Nations Children’s Fund, bilateral development organizations, and private groups) 
contributing equipment, supplies, and medicines as an emergency response to the 
health aspect of the child welfare crisis. To address the weak system of maternal, 
prenatal, and infant care, donor interventions (including programs implemented by 
 
57 In child welfare, donors count as a disorganized but vocal interest from 1990 on, even though I argue 
that they did not gain a strong voice until after 1997. 
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the World Bank, French, Dutch, Canadians, and Americans) addressed reproductive 
health issues including the provision of contraceptives, which had been illegal under 
Ceausescu. The Swiss government took on the problem of emergency medical 
response as a special concern and provided equipment, training, and technical 
assistance to emergency personnel. But the major player in terms of critiquing the 
overall healthcare scheme—including organization and service delivery, finance, 
human resources, technology, and accountability—was the World Bank. 
 In 1991, the World Bank and the Romanian government signed an ambitious 
“mega-project”: the Health Services Rehabilitation Project worth $150 million. In 
terms of size and complexity, it was one of the Bank’s first such loans—and one of its 
last.58 The objectives were numerous and diffuse: developing an overarching health 
reform strategy ($2.8 million) including a health management information system 
($2.8 million); upgrading dispensaries in rural areas to improve provision of general 
practice medicine ($16.7 million); improving reproductive health services ($32.1 
million); improving the emergency medical system ($3.6 million); providing training 
programs to doctor and nurses ($0.9 million); developing a health services 
management institute ($2.9 million); buying consumables, drugs, blood, and vaccines, 
as well as preparing a restructuring plan for the pharmaceutical industry ($83.2 
million); and promoting public health through preventative medicine ($4.5 million). 
Although the program was supposed to be completed in four years, by mid-1994, the 
 
58 The Bank’s first health loans in Eastern Europe went to Poland ($130 million) and Romania ($150 
million) in 1991. There was another mega loan, in 1993, to Hungary for $91 million. After that, 
between 1994 and 2004, most health sector loans were much smaller, $10-60 million, except one 
mega-loan for $270 million for medical equipment to Russia in 1996. The need to have more focused 
objectives in healthcare was the stated reason. 
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Bank had only dispersed $34 million, mostly to import drugs and buy contraceptives 
(World Bank, 2002a). 
 In a mid-term review in January 1994, the project was rated as 
“unsatisfactory.” In 1997, the World Bank came close to canceling two major 
procurement packages, for ambulances and the management information system, 
based on evidence that the Romanian MOH had not followed Bank procurement rules 
(World Bank, 2000). By its own admission, the Bank had trouble achieving its 
objectives between 1990 and 1997. Although most country-specific assessments of 
the World Bank project do not single out an entity or institution to blame for the 
disappointing results during this period, a regional assessment completed in 2002 is 
more candid: Analyst Timothy Johnston from the Bank’s Operations Evaluation 
Department writes: 
 
Until the change of government in 1996, the [Romanian] Ministry of Health 
demonstrated either indifference or resistance to reform activities, but 
persistent pressure from the Bank, together with support from stakeholders 
outside the MOH, permitted some progress in reform components including a 
1993 sector study, district decentralization pilots, and the successful 
establishment of a health management institute. (World Bank, 2002c, p. 7)  
 
Deconstructing One Donor Document as a Trope for Others 
In fact, based on my research, only the county-level pilot project strongly influenced 
the course of reform between 1990 and 1997. The 400+ page study (World 
Bank/Government of Romania, 1993) hardly represents “progress” in reform 
components since the government never responded to the study; furthermore, most 
health sector participants claim that the extensive research that went into it, carried 
out with little Romanian participation, wasn’t used by stakeholders. The massive set 
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of studies makes at least three core recommendations that were eventually 
incorporated into the Romanian reform plan: It calls for a national health insurance 
fund, a stronger system of GPs, and greater hospital autonomy. But the fact that these 
three core suggestions were eventually adopted in the 1997 law just demonstrates that 
the value of these ideas was apparent in 1993, not that this report in particular was 
instrumental in shaping reform. The health management institute that the World Bank 
helped support has been influential because it has trained some of the best health 
policy analysts in the country. But its impact is indirect and long-term. The county 
pilot project, however, was indeed a major contribution to reform, as discussed in 
Chapter Three and confirmed through participant interviews (Burduja, 2005; 
Vladescu, 2002; Enachescu, 2002; Mincu, 2003; Erhan, 2003). 
 One of the overall conclusions of the World Bank’s 2002 regional health 
sector assessment is a refrain often heard in development assessments: Local politics 
is blamed for the mixed results in achieving program objectives. Johnston writes, 
“Experience in Estonia, Hungary, and Romania also shows… [the] Bank’s ability to 
influence the development of national health insurance has been limited, largely 
because the decision to implement social insurance has usually been driven by 
domestic political considerations.”59 A related cautionary reminder is that “The Bank 
has only a peripheral role in domestic political bargaining and coalition building 
around health reforms.”60 What is somewhat humorous about these caveats is that 
they are typically a function of retrospective accounts of assistance efforts. When it 
comes to planning ahead, evaluation documents often assume an expansive, virtually 
 
59 Ibid., p. vi. 
60 Ibid., p. v. 
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omnipotent, political role for the donor. Johnston’s assessment is no different from so 
many others. Having modestly circumscribed the World Bank’s empirical role in 
health reform to “catalyzing wider reforms”61 in the future-oriented chapter on 
“Determinants of Successful Support for Reform,” the author wishes for a more 
schematic approach in technical assistance. He observes: 
 
The Hungary and Romania projects were both complex but lacked coherence, 
and taxed the implementation and coordination capacity of the borrower. The 
projects therefore often seemed to be a series of disparate, uncoordinated 
activities, and proved difficult to supervise and implement. Similarly, some 
structural reforms—such as establishing national health insurance—place 
significant demands on government implementation and regulatory capacity. 
The design and sequencing of reforms should be adapted to the 
institutional context, together with sustained efforts to build capacity.62 
The problem is, it is simply never possible to “design and sequence” reform in a 
meta-historical way—not because politics is inaccessible but because politics is lived, 
institutions function in real places, nothing ever stands still, and people and 
institutions with stakes in reform programs will rationally maximize their utility in 
ways that typically disturb pre-planned, optimal “sequencing.” 
 Without burdening this single short document with too much analysis, in 
reviewing the specific aspects of the World Bank’s $150 million Romania program as 
the assessment does, it is ironic to see how thoroughly involved the Bank was in 
enabling the MOH to avoid exactly the kind of reform decisions that the Bank 
ostensibly wanted the central government to make, especially regarding mandatory 
health insurance in order to increase resources available to the health system and to 
improve system performance and efficiency. Johnston’s assessment explicitly reveals 
 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 21, emphasis added. 
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what is also suggested in other World Bank reports—namely, that most of the money 
expended between 1990 and 1997 was wasted (in terms of achieving macro-system 
reform goals) because the MOH, ambivalent about transforming the system itself, 
drove decision making on the Bank loan and steered expenditures to facility 
improvements, commodity purchases, and high-tech capital investments. These loan 
expenditures amounted to over $80 million, or over half of the loan. For example, 
over $60 million was expended on pharmaceutical purchases, but there was no 
progress at all in adopting a cost-efficient pharmaceutical procurement or distribution 
plan. Almost $17 million was spent on upgrading rural facilities, yet much of the 
investment was underutilized because of the weak incentives for GPs to practice in 
rural areas. Furthermore, there was extensive confusion regarding the ownership of 
these upgraded facilities, and GPs were unwilling to spend money maintaining the 
new equipment while the MOH insisted that it remained the owner/manager of all 
health facilities. One final example of a loan expenditure that did not advance reform: 
In light of the extensive needs in the health sector, was it really necessary to equip an 
in-vitro fertilization laboratory in Romania at the Giulesti Maternity Hospital? The 
MOH wanted it, elite doctors, including a former PDSR Minister of Health Bogdan 
Marinescu, wanted it (who practices at Giulesti), and the World Bank went along 
with it; one could argue that this was irresponsible, as it neither advanced health 
outcomes for the population nor improved the efficiency of the Romanian healthcare 
system overall. 
 These World Bank–approved loan expenditures allowed the central 
government to appease local stakeholders including doctors. And they allowed the 
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MOH to act as a free rider at a time when own-source revenue was unsatisfactory. 
Yet these line items did not touch the need for institutional reform, let alone improve 
health financing, hospital efficiency, public participation, professional standards, or 
performance accountability. Not only that, but by the World Bank’s own admission, 
several of these big-ticket expenditures were boondoggles. Although almost $36 
million was spent to establish 230 family planning local centers, provide equipment, 
and supplies including a “wide range of contraceptive supplies in sufficient quantities 
and at affordable prices” (World Bank, 2000), many of these family planning centers 
shut down in 1999 and 2000 because, under contracting rules developed by the COP 
and the National Health Insurance House (NHIH), GPs could not be reimbursed for 
contraception services. Worse, one of the original loan components was for $3.1 
million to design, implement, and procure a health information system. Although the 
line item ballooned to nearly $20 million, it was never fully implemented because, 
according to Johnston, the software and systems selected were inappropriate for 
Romanian health units, consultants rushed the project component with little input 
from end-users, and, ultimately, the system didn’t work. One factor that is extremely 
valuable in any reform effort (more specifically, any effort to improve system 
performance) is improved information. The opportunity to introduce a healthcare 
information system was, simply, squandered. The MOH was not keen to improve 
sector transparency through greater information tracking, and the World Bank pushed 
through the capital acquisitions and software development phases with little attention 
to the implementation stage, particularly with regard to changes in corporate culture 
required for any computer-based tool to succeed. The absence of improved 
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information capability made it harder to track the impact of healthcare legislative 
changes after 1997 (Burduja, 2005). 
 These small reform tragedies underscore that, considering how discrete 
project components can go badly awry, it is foolish to imagine that improved 
“sequencing” is the holy grail of reform implementation. These examples 
demonstrate that all donor projects—the good, the bad, and the ugly—interact with 
the domestic politics of reform and are eventually irrelevant (1993 study), beneficial 
(eight-county pilot), or destructive (health information system), which is largely 
dependent on how well they coincide with and advance the dispositions of local 
stakeholders and whether they manage to be relevant to living political decision 
making processes. 
 
The Budget Process and Resource Allocation 
In the section above on the central government, we reviewed how the central 
government, acting through a Cabinet strongly influenced by presidential preferences 
and the MOF, drove political and policy decision making. In Chapter Three, we 
discussed how Romanian institutional players and medical personnel were motivated 
in large part by concerns with scarce resources. In assessing options regarding when 
and how to cooperate with foreign donors, the central government rationally allowed 
donors to contribute to the healthcare system but hesitated from initiating changes 
that would significantly upend the status quo. Doctors and medical staff, eager for 
access to training, equipment, and more autonomy, were generally willing to 
participate in donor-funded activities. What about the financing of healthcare during 
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the period under consideration? What do the budgeting process and methods of 
allocating resources tell us about the relative power of various stakeholders? Which 
stakeholders, if any, had particular access to financial decision making for the 
healthcare system? This examination will help, looking back, to determine what did 
and did not change after the major institutional reform of 1997 and beyond. 
 Funding for healthcare between 1990 and 1997 was drawn from general taxes, 
specifically, taxes on profits, turnover (i.e., sales), and a payroll tax. Over 70% of 
health expenditures came from these taxes in 1991 (World Bank/Government of 
Romania, 1993). That year, to supplement these funding sources, a special fund was 
created for health, drawn from wages and transferred from the Ministry of Labor 
directly to the MOH. It was approved by the government especially to cope with 
inflation in the price of drugs. In the first year alone, this special fund contributed 
almost 10% to the overall financing of the health system. So the major source of post-
communist health finance was a combination of profit and wage taxes. Some user 
fees were charged especially at the policlinics. In addition, under-the-table payments 
made by health consumers directly to doctors and medical personnel were ubiquitous 
throughout the system (Lewis, 2000). Public expenditure on health increased from 
1989 to 1990 by approximately 20%, even before the special fund was added in. With 
the special fund and accounting for inflation, the 1991 increase was approximately 
15% over the previous year. As a proportion of GDP, healthcare spending also rose 
significantly between 1989 and 1991: from 4.2% to 11% (World Bank/Government 
of Romania, 1993). These increases help explain the lack of strong dissatisfaction 
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regarding the health system, especially among doctors and medical personnel, in the 
first post-communist years. 
 The method of budgeting for healthcare expenses between 1991 and 1997, 
although premised on a new law governing public finance,63 included important 
aspects of budgeting inherited from the communist period. Health units assembled 
annual budgets into three functional classifications: personnel, materials, and capital. 
Materials included food and utilities as well as medical supplies, while capital 
included both equipment and buildings. The unit budgets were submitted to the 
MOH’s county-level divisions and forwarded to the MOH. These budget requests 
were based on historical inputs: prior-year expenditures on staff, average number of 
patients, and, for hospitals, the number of beds. The MOH assembled district-level 
budgets plus funding for national institutes and its own expenses, submitting the 
package to the MOF. The MOF assigned funding to the MOH via a consolidated state 
budget that was sent to the Cabinet for approval, than submitted to Parliament by the 
end of each year. Parliament, as was typical, rubber-stamped the state budget. The 
MOF assigned funding to the three input categories, and funding was distributed to 
the ministries every quarter. Ministries were allowed to shift money between counties 
and between health units, but by the end of each year funding totals had to conform to 
the amounts assigned to each functional category. Neither county offices of the 
ministry nor health units were allowed to shift funding between these categories 
 
63 Law 10/1991. 
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without permission from the ministry.64 In fact, ministry approval was required even 
to replace a low-level member of a medical staff. 
 Therefore, since health budgets were built on the basis of existing conditions, 
and since health funding in the late communist period largely went to personnel, this 
budget mix was quickly locked in for the post-communist period as a function of 
unchanged budgeting norms. Indeed, in 1991, 64% of funding went to personnel, 
much as the majority of communist-era healthcare financing was absorbed by 
personnel expenses. However, the functional spending categories were so broad that 
there was little transparency in the allocation of resources and little opportunity to 
improve performance from one year to another (World Bank, 1992). 
 The annual budget assigned by the MOF to the MOH was not adjusted in 
1990 or 1991, much as annual budgets were technically set just once a year during the 
communist period. Following passage of a new finance law of 1991, the budget 
process allowed a second annual opportunity to examine the budget: Mid-summer 
budget “rectification” introduced a new opportunity to revisit healthcare funding and 
became a veto point exploited in the late 1990s and early 2000s as a way to cover 
chronic hospital debt. 
 With regard to the way resources were allocated, hospitals were particularly 
well positioned. Funding for health was distributed from the MOF through the MOH 
to the county divisions and on to the hospitals. Then each hospital was allowed to 
decide what resources would be passed on to the policlinics and dispensaries, 
including control over the assignment of resources for capital expenditures! It is no 
 
64 Monthly reporting to a county finance ministry division was required in order to enforce this 
regulation. 
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wonder that a disproportionate share of resources was designated for inpatient care in 
hospitals as opposed to primary care in dispensaries or ambulatory care in 
policlinics—58% of the MOH’s 1991 funding went to hospitals as opposed to 23% 
for dispensaries and policlinics.65 This mix was largely maintained five years later: In 
1996, dispensaries (i.e., primary care) received 17.9% of recurrent healthcare 
spending, while policlinics received 4.2% of spending for a total of 22.1% for first-
line healthcare (Australian Health Insurance Commission, 1998). The methodology 
for distributing healthcare dollars was largely the way funding was distributed in the 
communist period—leaving the dispensaries at the end of the line with few resources, 
and leaving much funding discretion to county representatives of the ministry and to 
hospitals. Since healthcare financing was driven by historic norms and current 
capacity, there was little incentive to adjust treatment protocols so that healthcare was 
delivered more efficiently or in a cost-effective way; there was also no incentive to 
shift the healthcare service delivery away from hospitals to primary care. To reform 
the communist healthcare system, which overemphasized inpatient care, it would be 
essential to reduce the average patient length of stay (LOS) and, therefore, the 
number of beds. But with funding tied to number of staff, patients, and beds (LOS), 
there was no incentive to reduce beds, as that would mean a reduction in overall 
resources. Input budgeting enabled ongoing incentives to defend the status quo in 
terms of the overall service mix, locus of care, and (high) personnel expenditures. 
Therefore, the institutional reality of healthcare budgeting, combined with low overall 
 
65 Health data for the early 1990s didn’t break out funding for dispensaries versus policlinics, so it is 
not possible to distinguish. 
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spending in this sector, has strong explanatory power regarding the difficulty of 
overcoming the status quo in healthcare reform in 1990-1997. 
 An essential, separate topic under the heading of resource allocation is 
pharmaceuticals. Resources for pharmaceuticals were counted under “materials,” a 
particularly pinched category. In 1991, 25% of drug products were imported. Under 
communism, the procurement of all drugs was made by an autonomous state agency 
called UNIFARM, but in 1990, medical units were allowed to purchase from private 
importers or directly from foreign suppliers in addition to state-owned entities. This 
new freedom, in the name of competition, introduced both confusion and inflation 
into the drug picture early on in the post-communist period (World Bank/Government 
of Romania, 1993). International drug companies were excellent marketers and 
appealed to doctors on many levels, including offering all-expense-paid trips for 
conferences in exchange for promotion of their products. Considering the wide 
discretion doctors had to prescribe whatever drug they wanted, international drug 
marketing paid off—for the doctors and the importers!  
 The cost of drugs provided to patients in hospitals was 100% compensated by 
the MOH. This was an important incentive for patients to bypass lower levels of care 
and seek hospital admission straight away. The lack of equipment or supplies at the 
dispensary level—a situation the hospitals themselves were able to maintain—further 
undermined the attractiveness of primary care in the eyes of patients. 
 Overall, the medical profession did not have particular influence over the 
healthcare budget process per se, except insofar as hospitals, dominated by medical 
doctors cum decision makers, had significant authority in the distribution of resources 
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at the local level. One institution where one might expect doctors to have influence 
was the MOH. Indeed, medical doctors occupied senior decision-making positions in 
the MOH, but they were a small minority next to MOH bureaucrats who had 
occupied positions virtually for life. In the budget office, for example, there were no 
medical doctors involved in the compilation or processing of budget documents 
between 1990 and 1997 (Erhan, 2003). 
 
Passage of the Social Health Insurance Law of 1997 
We saw in Chapter Three how central government acquiescence (specifically, the 
acquiescence of the Ministry of Labor and MOF) was essential to secure approval of 
the Social Health Insurance Law of 1997 (145/1997) and how a notable drop in 
national resources available for the health system was a further impetus for the central 
government to finally agree to a reform long championed by most in the medical 
field. Although there were other alternatives available for funding healthcare besides 
social insurance, especially the option of funding health out of general taxes—a 
method that has the advantage of being relatively inexpensive to administer—
Romanian decision makers spent little time considering this possibility. 
 In the analysis of the rational motivations of political actors, I did not discuss 
what the 1997 reform entailed. The Law on Social Health Insurance represented a 
huge undertaking, a radical redirection. The law adopted by the Romanian Parliament 
was consistent with major elements in health sector reform schemes adopted in 
neighboring countries, including Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, the Czech 
Republic, and Bulgaria, often with help from the World Bank (International Labour 
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Organization, 2002). The new scheme initiated change in the financing, organization, 
and delivery of heath care. Financing would largely shift from the state to NHIH and 
district-level entities, the district health insurance houses (HIHs) being fed by 
mandatory contributions from employees and their employers (5% payroll tax from 
each in 1998, raised to 7% from each in 1999); general practitioners and primary care 
medicine would assume a more pivotal role; and hospitals, resource-sucking 
monoliths that they were, were supposed to shrink as a result of care shifting to the 
primary care level. 
 Most important, the state’s role was supposed to transform from being both 
the payer and provider of healthcare services to being the policy-setter, regulator, and 
guardian of public health. The payer role would be assumed by an entirely new actor: 
the NHIH and district HIHs. The providers would be doctors and hospitals, 
negotiating with the HIHs based on a government-approved framework contract 
worked out by the NHIH, the COP, and the MOH at the beginning of each year—
until 2004 when the COP was demoted to a consultative role, contrary to Law 145. 
 Law 145 describes a generous system. Under Chapter III, “The Health 
Insurance Holders’ Rights,” Article 12, participants are assured that coverage 
includes medical services, “from the first day of sickness or the date of accident, until 
they are fully recovered” including: 
 
a) preventive health care services, early diagnosis included 
b) ambulatory health care services 
c) hospital health care services 
d) dentistry services 
e) medical emergency services 
f) complimentary medical rehabilitation services 
g) pre-, intra-, and post-birth medical assistance 
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h) home-care nursing 
i) medicine, health care materials, prosthesis and orthesis 
 
Exactly what package of services within these broad parameters would be included, 
the terms for healthcare services, payment criteria and procedures, as well as 
allowable costs and justification and length of hospital stay—these were all put off on 
the annual framework contract described in Article 11. While the status of primary 
care doctors is described in some detail—the insured are entitled to chose their family 
doctor, can switch after three months, and GPs are paid on the basis of a combination 
of tariff per insured person (capitation) and fee-for-service—the payment method for 
hospitals is more vague: Hospital service providers are paid on the basis of the annual 
framework contract and “by tariff per hospitalized person, by tariff per hospitalization 
day, tariff per medical service, and negotiated tariffs for certain services” (Article 45, 
para. b). This is quite wide open and supposedly regulated in more detail every year 
in the Application Norms issued by MOH and NHIH together. 
 The law describes non-contributors eligible for insurance including the 
unemployed, the imprisoned, children and youth under age 26 if they attend school, 
the handicapped, those persecuted for political reasons under the communists, those 
wounded during the events of 1989, and family members of the insured. According to 
participants who were at the MOH and World Bank at the time of the bill’s passage 
(Vladescu, 2003; Radulescu, 2002; Erhan, 2003), there was no strong sense of how 
much income would be raised by the new system, nor was there a good accounting of 
what carrying the non-insured would cost the state. The World Bank had helped 
arrange a financial assessment of the law’s impact by a group of Australian 
consultants, intended to be completed before the law was considered in order to 
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inform its final form, but Law 145/1997 was approved before the assessment was 
completed.66 
Other aspects of note in Law 145 are its infrequent references to a private 
sector in health, its designation of a special role for the COP, and an acknowledgment 
that drug cost control would have to be part of the reform program. In 1997, only 
dentistry and pharmacies could be described as including an active private sector. 
Besides a handful of small private clinics in major cities, there was no active private 
sector in the provision of medical services. In 1999, there were only three hospitals in 
the country with private majority ownership (Bara, van den Heuvel, and Maarse, 
2002). The role described for the COP pertains to negotiating the annual framework 
contract with the MOH, monitoring emergency medical services, and establishing 
special commissions endorsed by the MOH to monitor service quality, including one 
designated to oversee “fertility rehabilitation in couples” (Article 32). Regarding 
pharmaceuticals, Law 145 refers to a drug list of compensated pharmaceuticals to be 
included in a Drug Catalogue to be drawn up by the MOH and NHIH as a function of 
the framework contract also published yearly as Application Norms, MOH and NHIH 
Common Order. 
 One thing is clear from contemporary accounts of debate around the law and a 
reading of the law itself: Far more attention was paid to creating new institutions for 
managing funds and describing services to be provided than to the (more contentious) 
question of defining and allocating resources. The hard decisions were largely 
 
66 The Australian Health Insurance Commission’s 1998 report on the Romania Health Financing 
Project did provide a positive contribution that wound up being approved as an amendment to Law 
145: The report concluded that due to inequities in country-level wealth, the NHIH would need to 
redistribute up to 25% of national health contributions. The original law set the percentage allowed for 
redistribution at 7%. This percentage was increased to 25% following the Australian recommendation. 
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postponed. One of Law 145’s eight chapters is devoted to a detailed description of 
HIH organization, including extensive autonomy for the district houses governed by 
managerial boards of elected members. These boards were never created; before the 
law was even implemented, it was concluded that the elections would be too 
expensive, and the district houses should be less autonomous than originally 
envisioned (Burduja, 2005; Gherghina, 2005).67 It is worth remembering that, as the 
product of politics, institutions can also bring about confusion and upend the public 
good (Soltan, 1998). But even subversive outcomes are shaped by intentional actors. 
However, during this period, the major hope for the new insurance scheme—that it 
would raise new and more revenue for health—proved to be a legitimate expectation. 
And this was the aspect of the law that all stakeholders were most keenly anticipating. 
 
1998-2002: Recentralization 
In choosing to look at this period, the aim is to examine the implications of the 
healthcare reform of 1997,68 especially to note if change unfolded according to 
plan—or if, instead, I can detect (to use Joel Hellman’s terminology) short-term 
winners who achieve benefits from partial reform and are thus positioned to work 
against full implementation of the law as it was supposed to evolve. In the five years 
following passage of Law 145, most of the reform elements that decentralized 
 
67 The health sector was the only area of social services in which local government had less 
responsibility upon adoption of the major reform initiative: With establishment of the new health 
insurance funds, local political entities were left managing healthcare units owned by local councils, as 
well as funding health services through crèches for abandoned infants, but were no longer obligated to 
contribute much money. 
68 In the health sector, the health insurance law was the foundation for all other change, but other 
important legislation was passed after 1997; such as a new law on Public Health (Law 100/1998); an 
Emergency Ordinance on pharmaceutical products used by humans (EO 152/1999); and a law 
clarifying the status and financing of hospitals (Law 146/1999). 
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decision making away from central government and envisioned autonomy for the 
HIHs were undone. Why? Two major goals for reform were: 1) increasing overall net 
sources available to healthcare, and 2) shifting medical care away from expensive, 
inpatient care toward preventative care at the primary level. Both of these goals aimed 
to achieve the overarching reform objective: improving the health status of the 
population. To judge the success of the 1997 healthcare reform legislation, one must 
consider outcomes in terms of increased financial resources, the relative 
strengthening of primary care as opposed to hospital care, and improved health status. 
 Based on Law 145, starting in 1998, revenue for public health finance came 
from two main sources: mandatory contributions to the new health insurance funds 
(approximately 70% of financing) and the state budget. State budget funds covered 
investments for healthcare facilities; spending on high-tech medical equipment; and 
costs associated with national programs of disease prevention, public health, and 
“curative and rehabilitation activities of national importance” (Article 57, para. C). 
The MOH was charged with managing public health and programs of national 
importance, but the clear intention of Law 145 was to vest the HIHs with the task of 
collecting funds, managing money destined for healthcare expenditures, and carrying 
over surplus funds from year to year. This is such an important point that it is worth 
quoting a few articles from the legislation itself: 
 
Article 43 – The health insurance houses and medical service providers 
conclude annual contracts for medical services and their payment, in order 
that financial balance is reached. 
 
Article 51 – NHIH funds, county and Bucharest health insurance house funds 
are built up by: a) equal shares of the natural persons’ and legal entities 
contributions; b) state and local budget subsidies; c) other income sources. 
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Article 60 – The health insurance funds are used: 
a) To pay for granted medicine and medical services 
b) For HIHs (national and locals) administrative and 
operations/capital expenses up to a maximum of 5% 
c) For redistribution – 7%69 
d) For the reserve fund – 5% 
 
Article 61 – The sums that were not spent at the end of the year are carried 
forward to the following year, with the destination stipulated in art. 60. 
 
Article 62 – Health insurance houses are public, autonomous,70 non-lucrative 
entities occupied with health care activities 
 
Article 82 – The financial oversight of NHIH and county health insurance 
houses shall be conducted by the Romanian National Audit Office on an 
annual basis. 
 
The scheme envisions an autonomous HIH system that is: 1) raising and 
managing healthcare funds; 2) paying out healthcare providers as a function of a 
framework contract elaborated through negotiation with the COP; and 3) accountable 
to the National Audit Office. No ongoing role was ascribed to the MOF, although 
during the transition year of 1998, the MOH and MOF performed revenue collection 
functions that would eventually be assumed by the NHIH and district HIHs. 
 
Increased Revenue 
The new health insurance law went into full effect on April 1, 1999, but contributions 
from employers and employees were collected during the transition year of 1998 by 
the MOH and MOF. Table 5 compares resources and the resource mix between 1996 
 
69 The percentage of funds set aside for redistribution among districts was amended to 25% by 
Emergency Ordinance 125/1998 as a result of the recommendation from the Australian Health 
Insurance Commission in a study funded by the World Bank. 
70 Emphasis added. 
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and 199971 demonstrating  that health funding had dropped in 1997, one of the 
motives for passing the Social Health Insurance Law, and that it increased 
immediately in 1998 as a function of the new financing scheme.72 Keep in mind that 
between 1993 and 1997, local government was responsible for funding utilities, 
maintenance, and some non-drug medical supplies for dispensaries from local 
budgets. Service providers were especially dissatisfied with contributions from local 
government, which were considered to be inadequate and haphazard World Bank, 
2001a. 
As Table 5 demonstrates, by 1999, national spending on healthcare had 
increased 29.6% over 1997. Healthcare expenditures in 1999 (1.309 billion lei) were 
higher than in any year since the fall of communism, suggesting that doctors, 
especially, had been right on the money in championing the health insurance law. As 
well, healthcare expenditures in 1999 amounted to 3.9% of GDP, the equivalent of 
$60 USD per person—still lower than neighboring countries but at least trending 
upward, especially considering that GDP had decreased during this period. 
Table 5 
Health Spending Summary Data, 1996-1999 
 
Health Spending in Real Terms 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total Health Spending 
(1996=100%) 
100 87.5 100.6 113.4 










Health Spending as %  
Total Health Spending as % 
GDP 
3.0 2.8 3.2 3.9 
71 Adapted from a chart in World Bank, 2001a, p. 68. 
72 As part of the phase in plan, in 1998, 5% of wages was collected from employers and employees, a 
percentage that increased to 7% in 1999. 
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Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2001a 
 
Calculated in terms of USD, despite overall weak economic indicators on 
every dimension between 1995 and 2000, the budget assigned to healthcare increased 
from $985 million in 1997 to $1.34 billion in 2000 (Bara, van den Heuvel, and 
Maarse, 2002). The budget increased by 36% in just four years. Thus, in terms of 
finance, more was available, as hoped. This was the rational objective of doctors, 
medical personnel at lower levels of the healthcare system, and healthcare decision 
makers in public institutions. However, as we shall see, although Law 145 
represented a significant paradigm shift in theory, describing a new financing 
mechanism and a new set of institutions charged with managing the relationship 
between payers and healthcare providers, in practice, established institutional norms 
in the management of money undermined this new system. Despite increased 
revenue, resource allocation did not become more efficient, primary healthcare did 
not become the locus of most treatment, population health outcomes did not improve, 
and public disgust with Romania’s healthcare system only increased. 
 
Service Mix and the New Political Division of Doctor: General Practitioners versus 
Hospital Staff 
With implementation of Law 145, doctors were suddenly divided into two groups 
with interests at some variance: GPs providing primary care around the country 
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versus doctors based in hospitals—traditionally the doctors with more status. Before 
1997, hospitals administered and funded primary care facilities. This important 
element of control was removed under Law 145, which assigned responsibility for 
overseeing primary healthcare to the District Public Health Directorates and gave GPs 
autonomy to manage their own practices. GPs were no longer considered civil 
servants but independent practitioners, or “budget holders,” who contracted with 
district HIHs but operated offices privately. GP salaries were determined mainly on 
the number of clients they signed up to their lists (weighted capitation, about 70% of 
total reimbursement) and fee-for-service payments. GPs now had to compete for the 
allegiance of patients who, under the law, were awarded free choice in the selection 
of family doctors. Hospital-based doctors, on the other hand, were salaried civil 
servants still, with few incentives to increase productivity since they weren’t 
compensated as a function of any new type of competition, nor were there any new 
incentives for increased productivity, especially in 1998 and 1999. Although GPs 
were supposed to serve as “gatekeepers,” granting referrals for specialized services at 
higher levels, these referrals were rarely enforced, as hospitals routinely allowed 
patients to bypass GPs. 
 The power of hospitals—dominated by the country’s most elite doctors, 
including surgeons and other specialists—is apparent in Law 145/1997 in that the 
legislation is quite vague on the basis for reimbursement: 
 
Article 45 – (1) Medical service providers shall be paid by health insurance 
houses in terms of the framework insurance contract, which can be:… 
b) In hospitals and other inpatient medical units – by tariff per 
hospitalized person, by tariff per hospitalization day, tariff per medical 
service, and negotiated tariffs for certain services. 
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According to staff active at the MOH in 1997 (Vladescu, 2002; Erhan, 2003), 
the World Bank (Radulescu, 2002), and an early leader of the NHIH (Bubenek, 
2005), hospital financing was intentionally vague in order to maintain commitment 
from influential doctors associated with hospitals, including most of the members of 
Parliament active on the health committees in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. 
Although there was agreement in principle that the role of primary GPs should 
increase in order to improve preventative healthcare strategies and to decrease the 
flow of patients into hospitals, Law 145 does not specifically indicate any new limits 
on hospital practice. These decisions were postponed. As already discussed, doctors 
are normally keen to protect their autonomy in decision making; to maintain their 
support for the reform legislation, the MOH minimized any language that could be 
interpreted as reining in the doctors—although the explicit strategy for gaining 
efficiency was to squeeze hospital expenditures down from 50% to about 35% of total 
funding while increasing primary healthcare from approximately 20% of resources to 
35%. The remaining 30% was to be secured for secondary, ambulatory care 
(Chiritoiu, 2003; World Health Organization, 2000; World Bank, 1999). 
 A law specifically devoted to hospitals did not bring much more clarity to the 
issue of hospital financing in 1999.73 Law 146/1999, Law on Hospital Organization, 
Functioning, and Financing, reasserts that both public and private hospital financing 
is based on contracts concluded with district HIHs and that contract terms for services 
and tariffs are given in the framework contract negotiated between the NHIH and the 
 
73 Almost half of the language of the law pertains to organization of hospital staff for emergency 
services, demonstrating that the central government still considered it to be a government prerogative 
to get deeply involved in the details of service provision, despite the vague treatment of hospital 
management and financing issues. 
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COP. The law explains that the system of salary payment for public hospital staff is 
set by government ordinance. In fact, Law 146 reasserts the vague treatment of 
hospitals that began in Law 145. There are no incentives in the law that would inspire 
hospital management to improve performance in service delivery or to take 
responsibility for cost savings. Not only are hospital salaries fixed, but hiring and 
firing of medical staff is subject to MOH approval, as is the ratio between number of 
staff and the number of beds—a situation that was still true in late 2004. 
 Hospitals and district HIHs negotiated hospital budgets for the first time in 
1999. Between 1999 and 2003, hospitals were allowed to continue receiving input-
oriented budgets—first, a tariff for each hospitalization day by type of hospitals 
(1999-2000), then by type of department (2001), then by type of department capped 
with a maximum LOS by specialty (2002-2003)—but all of these tariffs were 
calculated based on previous-year spending, so the methodology locked in prior-year 
“bads.” Patient admission was the main indicator for service contracts, although by 
2000, per diem tariffs were increasingly differentiated by department and type of 
hospital,74 with a cut-off in per diem tariffs (i.e., reimbursable days) beyond the 
average LOS for the most common medical treatments. However, the cap on LOS 
simply reinforced the strong incentive for hospitals to freely admit new patients—an 
old habit that secured income for hospitals but also served to lock in the service mix 
that prioritized expensive inpatient care over primary care. A review of the income 
and expenses of the NHIH between 1999 and 2002 clearly underscores that although 
 
74 Romanian hospitals are categorized into four types: rural hospitals with at least 120 beds; town and 
municipal hospitals (250 and 400 beds, respectively) providing surgery, OB-GYN services, and 
pediatrics; district hospitals in cities with a range of specialties from intensive care to orthopedics; and 
specialized units such as the Institute of Oncology and the Neuro-surgery Hospital. 
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new revenue came into the healthcare system as a result of financing reform, and 
despite new institutions to collect and disburse healthcare funding, overall resource 
allocation was unaffected by reform. Not only did hospitals continue to absorb most 
revenue, but they also increased their take over pre-reform years! 
 With the first negotiated budgets, hospitals seized the day and captured the 
vast majority of available healthcare dollars. At first glance, it appears that hospitals 
gained a very significant share in 1999 (63.9%), which was somewhat restrained in 
2000 and 2001 when its portion of total funding fell to 57.1%, subsequently inching 
up in 2002 to 58.5%. In fact, by doing a more comprehensive analysis of inpatient 
dollars, as seen in Table 6, it is evident that hospitals captured almost two-thirds of all 
healthcare dollars in 1999, then maintained and even increased this exorbitant level 
between 2000 and 2002: 
Table 6 
Percentage of Health Spending: Hospital-Based, In-Patient Care 
 






















Free of charge and 














Medical devises   0.3%     0.3%   0.5% 0.5% 
TOTAL: 73.5% 74.3% 74.0% 75.5%
Source: Personal calculation based on National Health Insurance House data tables. 
In considering how much money flowed to inpatient care, besides the obvious 
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category “hospital healthcare services,” over 90% of the money described as “drugs 
and medical supplies (National Programs)” went to hospitals (Burduja, 2005), as did 
funding for “medical devices.” Moreover, the “free-of-charge” drugs part of the 
category “Free of charge and compensated drugs in ambulatory care” and much of the 
“ambulatory care” portion were distributed at hospitals. Therefore, the percentage of 
national healthcare funding supporting inpatient care is more accurately described as 
absorbing approximately three-fourths of healthcare funding—an overwhelming 
amount of national health dollars, as summarized in Table 6. 
 During this same four-year period, funding decreased in every category of 
healthcare spending outside of hospitals, from primary care and dental care to pre-
hospital emergency treatment and rehabilitation services.75 Hospitals secured an 
exceptional level of funding upon the introduction of the health insurance scheme; 
this prevented the anticipated shift, let alone increase, in resources to primary 
healthcare or to other non-hospital, ambulatory service providers. This result is 
especially astonishing considering the pre-reform strategy summarized in Table 7.  
Table 7 
1997 Reform Objectives in Reallocating Healthcare Services 
 
Type of medical 
assistance 
1997 Allocation of funds Estimated allocation of 
resources 










Source: European Union, 2002 
 
75 Para-clinical specialties are a difficult category to classify because there were no constant year-to-
year criteria for what specialists were funded—some based in hospitals, some in institutes—but the 
category is too inconsistently defined to be assigned as hospital- or non-hospital–related funding. 
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The resource allocation tables do not explain the politics of the hospital 
sector’s success. What combination of stakeholder rational interest and political 
procedures allowed this outcome? In terms of stakeholders, the most important 
development that emerged with the implementation of Law 145 was the political 
division of physicians between doctors associated with hospitals and family doctors, 
or GPs, now functioning as independent agents. Although they lobbied together for 
adoption of the social insurance system, this alliance fractured after 1997. At every 
level of political decision making regarding healthcare—from the governing boards 
of the COP and NHIH to the Prime Minister’s advisors and the Members of 
Parliament sitting on the health committees (see Table 8) in the respective 
chambers—senior hospital doctors dominated the process (Burduja, 2005; Rebeleanu, 
2004; EU and OECD, 2002).  
Table 8 
Medical Doctors who were Members of Key Parliamentary Committees 
 
Senate  Chamber of Deputies  
1996-2000 
1. Avram  Gheorghe  
2. Ion Circiumaru  
3. Ioan  Cretu  
4. Iosif Stefan Dragulescu  
5. Bogdan Marinescu  
6. Alexandru Ioan Mortun  
7. Nicolai Marin  
8. Alexandru Pop Stelian  
9. Elena Preda  
[Out of 13] 
 
1. Ion Berciu  
2. Daniela Bartos  
3. Liviu Iuliu Dragos  
4. Barany Francisc 
5. Vasile Cindea (from 9//97) 
6. Florian Udrea  (through 9/ 1/97) 
7. Bazil Dumitrean  
8. Nicu Ionita  
9. Constantin Remus Opris 
10. Cristian Radulescu 
[Out of 25] 
2000-2004 
1 Serban Alexandru Bradisteanu  
2. Ion Circiumaru  
3. Ion Iliescu 
1. Mircea Ifrim  
2. Daniela Bartos  
3. Liviu Iuliu Dragos  
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4. Constantin Gaucan  
5. Sorin Mircea Oprescu  
6. Ioan Pop de Popa  
7. Mircea Laurentiu Popescu  
8. Corin Penciuc  
[Out of 13] 
 
4. Ion Burnei  
5. Ana Florea  
6. Ludovic Abitei  
7. Ovidiu Branzan  
8. Ion Luchian  
9. Constantin Florentin Moraru  
10. Ioan Mihai Nastase  
[Out of 25] 
Without a framework for the development of a private sector in healthcare, all 
of the elite medical specialties—from cardiology and neurology to plastic surgery and 
orthopedics—were still hospital based. These doctors used their positions of influence 
to assure maximum resources for hospitals and to protect maximum autonomy for 
hospitals. Since the vast majority of medical staff was associated with hospitals, this 
group was an indomitable force. 
 One might imagine that the most powerful, authoritative organization of 
doctors, the COP, would be neutral regarding preferences of hospital doctors versus 
GPs. By law, through 2003, the COP strongly influenced: what is included in the 
healthcare benefits package, what drugs are compensated, the kind of reimbursement 
mechanisms to be utilized, what training is required for medical staff, which hospitals 
are accredited, and so on. It is comprised of district-level branches, a domineering 
Bucharest branch, and a national governing body. All doctors are required to be 
members, but the COP has been dominated by specialists affiliated with hospitals. 
Thus, the COP was unwilling to serve as an enforcer of the reform strategy vis-à-vis 
shifting resources away from inpatient care to more cost-effective preventive care at 
the primary level when the COP and the NHIH determined the initial framework 
contracts. Another organization of GPs had to emerge before their interests were 
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fairly represented in the media or in political settings. The Federative Chamber of 
Physicians is a sort of trade union that represents GP interests; a GP professional 
association also exists. Yet by the time these smaller, new groups made themselves 
known, the hospital sector had already laid claim to the national healthcare budget 
and worked the political system to its advantage. The next section explores the legal 
and normative environment that locked primary care out of the budget picture. 
 
Central Government, the Budget Process, and Resource Allocation 
Despite the picture painted in Law 145 of an autonomous HIH system, a series of 
decisions and legislative modifications made between 1998 and 2001 effectively 
undermined the independence of the health insurance regime. Before the law was 
even fully in effect, the central government issued EO 125/1998, amending Law 145. 
Among the articles added to the law, one was designed to clarify the chain of 
command between the NHIH, district HIHs, and Parliament: “the centralized Health 
Insurance budget shall be approved by Parliament, following proposition by the 
NHIH. The county health insurance budgets shall be approved by NHIH.” In the 
original law, there were few suggestions that the health insurance system would be 
embedded in political institutions. Further limiting the autonomy of district HIHs, in 
the same amendment the amount of local funding that had to be sent to the national 
HIH for reallocation was increased from 7% to 25%. As well, governance of the 
HIHs was assigned to appointed boards of administration rather than to elected 
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managerial bodies, as described in some detail in Law 145, in order assure local 
stakeholder participation.76 
As explained by Gheorghe Gherghina, the most influential MOF policymaker 
covering health budgeting between 1991 and 2004, Romania intended to transplant 
the German health insurance, including the principle of autonomy for NHIH and 
local-level HIHs, but on the verge of implementation, the government saw the need to 
make two “big changes” that, admittedly, moved the Romanian scheme away from 
the German model. First, explained Gherghina, “we”77 realized that the ideal of 
holding elections for the district HIHs was too expensive, “so we could not do that.” 
This initiative might have been a cost savings, but it also short-circuited the prospect 
of greater public participation in district HIH accountability. 
 The second “big change” discussed by Gherghina had even more profound 
implications for the management—and outcomes—of healthcare reform. According 
to Gherghina and confirmed by others (Monaghan, 2003; Burduja, 2005), the IMF 
strongly recommended that the money raised by the HIHs be considered part of the 
general consolidated budget. The Romanian constitution supports the fact that 
preparing the consolidated budget is the prerogative of the government, said 
Gherghina. Therefore, “Since we had to follow the IMF’s advice and bring the HIH 
budget into the consolidated budget, the de facto decision was made to give the 
government responsibility for overseeing the HIH budget implementation despite 
trying to give larger autonomy to the house” (Gherghina, 2005). Although he seemed 
almost apologetic about this result, acknowledging that this budgetary arrangement 
 
76 Codified in Law 145, Chapter VI. Section 2. 
77 Ghergina used the plural pronoun in this interview. I assumed he was speaking for the MOF, but 
when I reviewed my notes, I realized that his “we” included the Cabinet. 
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was not the original vision, he also rationalized the inevitability of embracing the 
healthcare financial system within a larger process of financial control. He said, “We 
thought it was necessary to fortify the discipline and control of the funds, to manage 
closely the way they were spent and dispersed” (Gherghina, 2005). 
 Thus, the MOF quickly asserted control over the financial parameters of 
healthcare. Rather than being maintained as a separate, autonomous fund with the 
launch of the new insurance house system in 1999, health revenue was declared a 
“special fund” annexed to the national consolidated budget. At first, the district HIHs 
were allowed to collect the money from employers. The NHIH oversaw collection 
and managed the reallocation of funds. By 2002, the central government used an EO 
to formalize MOF control over healthcare revenue collection and management, 
awarding collection responsibility to an agency of the MOF. EO 150/2002 is 
considered by many doctors and analysts (Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003) to represent 
the legislative death of the health insurance reform enshrined in Law 145/1997. 
 Through the state budget process, the MOF sets limits on how much of the 
collections can be expended on health. According to the one of the earliest presidents 
of the NHIH, Serban Bubenek, his team was able to cajole the MOF into approving 
basically all of the money collected in 1999, besides the required reserve fund, for 
healthcare expenditures. But it was very clear that the MOF held all the cards in their 
negotiations, remembers Bubenek (2005). The MOH was enthusiastic about pulling 
the HIH revenues within the state budget framework for two reasons: 1) Each 
Ministry has strong influence in elaborating elements of the state budget, and as 
happened, the MOH was assured a more determinative role in shaping health 
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allocations if health revenues were managed as a “special fund” ultimately overseen 
by the MOF. 2) Law 145 attributes to the MOH responsibility for national health 
programs that are funded in the state budget. Certainly, the MOH had a rational, 
institutional motive for wanting to see the maximum amount of revenue transmitted 
to medical service providers—it was the very purpose of adopting the social health 
insurance system. Yet, from the beginning, the MOH budget office was leery about 
losing so much financial authority to the NHIH and the district HIHs, so the decision 
to locate health revenue within the state budget offered an opportunity for the MOH 
to restore some of the clout it lost in Law 145. 
 To understand how political actors, or stakeholders, could influence 
healthcare resource allocation once the decision was made to govern healthcare 
revenue within the state budget process, it is necessary to review Romania’s national 
budget process, especially the decision points for budget design and execution. The 
Romanian budget is prepared annually by the MOF. It includes detailed annexes 
broken down by Ministry as well as numerous off-budget items organized as so-
called “special funds” including health insurance. During the period 1998-2002, 
budget requests were “narrow-based” requests for the coming year with no references 
to the previous or upcoming year and no reference to programmatic impact. 
Following the Public Finance Law, the MOF and Prime Minister are supposed to 
meet in mid-summer to establish expenditure ceilings for the next budget year. By 
September 25, the Cabinet is supposed to consider the MOF’s draft; by October 10, 
the draft is supposed to move to the Parliament for consideration. In fact, that 
calendar is rarely met. In 1999, for example, Parliament received the state budget for 
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consideration on December 31—the earliest in five years.78 The layers of the 
Romanian Parliament, consisting of the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies (341 
members), and the Senate (143 members), are functionally but not highly 
differentiated. Both chambers have responsibility for reviewing the budget. The 
standing committees divide the consolidated budget by subject area and distribute it 
to the standing committees for review. The budget is ultimately approved in a joint 
session. The Romanian Parliament has the authority, by law, to increase or decrease 
the government’s proposals and when done; the standing committees tend to 
influence these decisions. 
 During this period, the MOF was motivated by the IMF to pursue an austerity 
program keeping the deficit at or below 2% of GDP in order to qualify for debt 
financing. (Guess, 1999). So the MOF was more obsessed with maintaining overall 
expenditure ceilings than in how money was exactly spent within sectors. In the case 
of healthcare funding, the most important time in the budget process has been July, 
when the budget is reconciled against actual revenues and expenditures, giving both 
government and Parliament a second chance to adjust the funding figures. Despite the 
fact that by that month Parliament would have already approved a framework contract 
for medical services, including spending targets for every service sector, the July 
budget rectification process was used as an opportunity to endorse increased funding 
for hospitals or reimbursed drugs and decreased funding for primary care. 
 The World Bank staff (2002b) adapted NHIH data to derive Table 9 
comparing: 1) framework contract targets, 2) revised budget, and 3) actual 
 
78 If the budget has not been approved at the start of a fiscal (calendar) year, the law provides that 
public institutions spend under the previous year’s spending limits, or 8% of the last year’s 
expenditure/month. 
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expenditures between 1998 and 2000. Although these numbers are slightly different 
than figures I obtained from the NHIH (see Table 7), the data demonstrate that 
hospital services consistently spent more money than was allocated in the framework 
contract and the revised budget. For example, in 1999, the framework contract 
assigned 40% of revenue to hospitals, which was revised to 61.2% by the summer 
budget rectification and wound up as 64.2% of actual 1999 expenditures. In 2000, 
hospital services absorbed 65.5% of all health insurance fund expenditures. 
Table 9 






























9.0% 15.5% 9.5% 9.1% 14.5-
15.0% 





5.9% 11.8% 6.6% 6.1% 8.8% 7.9% 7.2% 8.5% 
Hospitals 67.3% 40.0% 61.2% 64.2% 59-61% 64.0% 65.5% 50-53% 
Subsidized 
drugs 
6.8% 20% 9.3% 8.0% 10-11% 12.8% 12.4% 10% 
Source: World Bank, 2002b. 
 
1999 was the critical first year of health insurance fund implementation on the 
basis of a framework contract and through the HIH system. The lessons learned 
during this year had a strong influence on strategies pursued by relevant institutional 
actors.79 Having asserted its intention to manage the process through the consolidated 
state budget, the MOF changed the rules of the game in an important way: suddenly, 
 
79 Douglass North terms this phenomenon “path dependence” and contends that it is difficult to change 
institutions once this state has been achieved.  
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the framework contract represented, in a sense, policy targets that could be overridden 
by aggressive spending by the hospital sector. As already discussed, Law 145 allowed 
hospitals to maintain global budgets that were not transparent; there were few 
administrative mechanisms—let alone incentives—for hospital directors to maintain 
strict control on spending. 
 Although the framework contract was devised by stakeholders largely 
committed to the strategy of shifting healthcare to the primary care level, especially 
principals at the NHIH, the central government’s preference for financial control, and 
specifically the mid-year budget rectification opportunity, allowed the budget process 
to trump the HIH process described in Law 145. It also gave a different group of 
stakeholders access to decision making about health financing: members of 
Parliament serving on the health committees, most of whom were medical doctors 
with positions at the elite hospitals. This parliamentary veto point allowed hospital 
doctors to reward profligate hospitals, which served to stall the shift in resources from 
hospitals to primary care; it represents the effective defeat of one of the major reform 
objectives: reorienting health delivery to GPs. One can read how fast institutional 
actors learned from the 1999 experience (and how fast the hospital spending strategy 
became dominant) in the difference between the 1999 and 2000 framework contract 
targets for hospital spending: The 2000 framework contract target is 20% higher than 
the year before! By 2000, hospital overspending and drug costs had undercut reform 
objectives and had become the norm around which politics adjusted. 
 One might expect the MOF to have tried to prevent hospital spending from 
skyrocketing, but again, its primary objective was to hold healthcare to expenditure 
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ceilings, which it did. Budget norms allowed the mid-year adjustments that were 
beneficial to hospitals, even if what the MOF and Parliament were doing was giving a 
political “seal of approval” to hospitals that ignored limits set out in a framework 
contract the hospitals were supposed to respect. As already suggested, elite doctors, 
thoroughly sympathetic to hospitals and their “desperate need for more funding” 
(Bubenek, 2005), dominated the policy discussion at every level, tacitly or overtly; in 
their view, the end (increased revenue for hospitals) justified the means (increasing 
funding assigned to hospitals through the budget rectification process and, later, by 
covering hospital arrears). One example of a prototypical doctor at the heart of 
decision making helps exemplify how advocates for hospitals functioned at every 
decision point. Senator Sorin Oprescu, a member of Iliescu’s PSD sat on the Senate’s 
health committee between 2000 and 2004; he was deputy chair of the committee. His 
primary cause was maintaining the independence of hospitals, and he had numerous 
positions through which to work to achieve this goal. He served as President of the 
Bucharest branch of the COP and as President of one of Bucharest’s biggest hospitals, 
University Hospital. He was appointed general manager of the elite hospital of the 
Romanian Academy, which had been the hospital of the communist elite, “Elias.” He 
also practiced at another major hospital, Emergency Hospital. Through his various 
functions, Senator Oprescu was associated with every stage of healthcare decision 
making: establishing the medical terms of service (COP), approving the framework 
contract (Senator), providing service (doctor), overseeing service performance 
(hospital manager), and approving healthcare funding (Senator). While there were 
few medical doctors as multi-faceted as Senator Oprescu, there were many others 
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who played several stakeholder roles at once. Ministers of Health, for example, were 
typically associated with specific hospitals. In the view of the MOF, allowing 
powerful doctors in Parliament access to health financing decisions was just a trade-
off related to the overall gain of being able to manage health funding through the state 
budget. 
 The MOF had no incentive to speak out against hospital spending trends 
because it had no real institutional prerogative to do so. The public institutions 
immediately overseeing hospital spending were the district HIHs. One might expect 
the district HIHs, representing the interests of healthcare payers, to exert some 
expenditure control over local hospitals. But as one of the best analysts of the 
Romanian hospital sector points out (Chiritoiu, 2002, 2003),80 the district HIHs 
function as regional monopolies—no competitions exists as, for example, in Germany 
where the population can chose from several houses in every region—so in the end, 
“The lack of competition between health funds… creates an institutional set-up where 
there is no incentive for the health fund to take on these powerful interest groups 
[hospital doctors]… The dominant strategy is an alliance of the purchaser and 
provider to pass the costs to the [state] budget.”81 As well, something Chiritoiu does 
not flag, managers of district HIHs were also powerful doctors from the 
county/university hospitals! Their financial and social ties were strongly skewed 
toward the hospitals. 
 On the national level, within the expenditures approved by the MOF and 
Parliament, the NHIH sends “recommended budgets” to district HIH for the units it 
 
80 Although in these two papers, he mistakenly uncouples escalating hospital costs and drug costs in 
my view. 
81 Chiritoiu, 2002, p. 5. 
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pays, including hospitals. In theory, the NHIH could have narrowed the funding 
“allowed” to hospitals—to the dissatisfaction of healthcare decision makers (Blight, 
2003). But the NHIH had little incentive to flaunt the politics of the situation. For one 
thing, the reform position that the HIH should have been championing (as described 
in reform documents and even the law)—that of reducing hospital spending and 
limiting coverage of services and drugs in order to live within budget limits—wasn’t 
popular. Newspapers were quick to report the fact that hospitals were under-funded,
not that they were sucking up all the cash in the system. Populated by doctors, 
technocrats, and bureaucrats, it was not possible for the NHIH or district HIHs to 
become the reform champions at this point. 
 Did the MOH have a role to play in terms of constraining the hospitals? Not 
according to Law 145. Contemporary observers agree that the MOH never 
acculturated itself to the HIH system, and rivalry was apparent between the NHIH 
and the MOH. Not only did the MOH do little to encourage financial efficiency 
where it could, but it also allowed the vast majority of its discretionary programs, the 
so-called National Program, to be used for hospital supplies and medicine, giving 
slight attention to public health programs, preventative medicine, or social messaging 
on healthy lifestyles described as essential in several reform planning documents 
(World Bank/Government of Romania, 1993). 
 The HIH system proved to be an efficient revenue collector, showing surplus 
between 1999 and 2002. But in the words of the first NHIH General Director, Iulian 
Popescu, “The fact that the HIH was successful made it the prey” (2005) of resource-




In a severely resource-poor environment, it was a rational response for medical 
doctors based in hospitals to exceed spending limits. It is important to keep in mind 
the daily, crisis-oriented decision making faced by hospital doctors. Their treatment 
decisions can be aggregated as trends in service costs, but these decisions are 
experienced day-to-day as demand from patients for hospital services and the 
professionally requisite response to patients’ needs—not just patients with injuries or 
illnesses but patients with no place else to go. As one well-known Bucharest medical 
specialist explained, “If I’m treating an old person, with no money for drugs, with no 
one to care for him, with no heat or hot water, sure I’ll write him up so he can stay in 
the hospital as long as possible. It’s my ethical duty. It’s not my fault that there is no 
other place for social cases, so I’ll do what I need to do to help him” (Florescu, 2005). 
By some estimates, at least 20% of the cases in Romanian hospitals are so-called 
social cases (the old, the destitute, the depressed). (EU and OECD, 2002). 
 Increasingly, in talking to doctors throughout this period, it was clear that the 
medical elite became less, not more, committed to the idea that hospitals needed to 
live within certain hard-budget limits. Not only was the practice of ignoring spending 
limits not penalized, it was actually sanctified and enshrined in the annual state 
budget at the mid-year mark, then in the practice of covering arrears out of the state 
budget. Further, increasing evidence of the MOF’s exploitation of healthcare revenue 
bred a certain distain for all the rules. The MOF boldly exploited its authority over 
health finance when, in 2001, it began using surplus revenue from the health fund to 
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satisfy deficits generated by the under-financed pension fund (Constantinescu, 2003; 
World Bank, 2002b). This practice was obviously considered expedient by the 
government at the time, but it is the kind of interference typical of chronically weak 
public administration, paradoxically, and invites actors within public institutions to 
cannibalize the national budget since restraint has no reward. As Polishchuk (2002) 
writes in a study of the excessive use of special funds in post-communist Romania, 
“While special funds were often established in response to the poor state of public 
finance, they in turn contributed to chronic fiscal crises by eroding overall fiscal 
management” (Polishchuk, 2002, p. 9). At the time Polishchuk completed his study, 
Romania had over twenty national special funds. 
 In interviewing doctors, I am most struck by the fact that they perceive the 
problem in a very pragmatic way: immense demand for treatment and no protocols 
for deciding when, and when not, to respond. So they generally provide services, 
leaving it to others to worry about payment. Isn’t this an idealistic response? 
Ironically, even elite doctors involved in conceptualizing reform, including the 
expanded GP role, did not make the connection between hospital overspending and 
the inability for reform to succeed in reorienting the service mix. Angry at the MOF’s 
cynical treatment of healthcare surplus, convinced that the sector was under-funded, 
not penalized for overspending, medical professionals based in hospitals made daily 
decisions that optimized their professional autonomy but jeopardized the financial 
stability of the entire national health system. 
 There are specific factors that contributed to hospital financial overruns: 1) 
failure to define a limited package of benefits, especially considering limited 
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available funds per person; 2) failure to control hospital admissions, for example, by 
insisting on GP references and by ending hospital-based incentives that attract 
patients, such as providing free medicines in hospitals; and 3) failure to give hospital 
management significant incentive to cut costs, for example, by allowing them to 
invest savings in high-tech equipment or to invest in the facilities. All of these factors 
contribute to the rational behavior of individual doctors who chose to offer treatment, 
with few controls on their discretionary decision making—thereby driving up 
spending. 
 
Robbing Peter to Pay Paul and Hospital Arrears 
Escalating hospital costs (due to the unlimited benefits package, weak controls on 
hospital admissions, few incentives for hospital management to control costs, and 
soaring drug costs) contributed to debts being accumulated at most hospitals in 2002. 
By the end of 2002, hospitals had racked up debt of approximately 200 million Euros. 
 Ironically, although the NHIH data table reflects an overall revenue surplus in 
2002 of $176 million USD, this is deceptive. In 2001, the MOF had begun using 
healthcare’s so-called surplus funds to cover deficits in other sectors of the state 
budget, especially the pension fund. This practice made sense from the perspective of 
the MOF since all funds over which it had control were fungible, and the greatest 
fiscal urgency was in the pension fund deficit. As well, the IMF allegedly encouraged 
the MOF to commingle health and pension funds because the IMF was 
philosophically opposed to extra-budgetary funds such as the health fund (Monaghan, 
2003; Radulescu, 2002). However, it was well known in the medical profession—and 
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deeply resented—that the central government was robbing Peter to pay Paul. 
Considering the way hospital unit budgets were compiled, there was never strong 
transparency in the sector. But the problem of weak financial management became 
ubiquitous as soon as the MOF was allowed to collect health insurance revenue, move 
money between state accounts, set overall expenditure ceilings for health, and then, as 
a perverse mea culpa, agree to cover hospital deficits from the state budget. We see 
this massive deficit reflected in the NHIH figures, amounting to some $247,391,000 
USD in arrears in 2003. Keep in mind that Romania’s per capita allocation to 
healthcare was, and is, low: In 2004, the country’s per capita spending on health 
services was under $200. 
 
Run-Away Pharmaceutical Spending 
Alongside, and related to, the explosion of costs tied to hospitals was a dramatic 
increase in spending on drugs. It is hard to know exactly how much of overall 
healthcare funding is spent on drugs each year because pharmaceuticals are counted 
in several NHIH funding categories. Consider expenditures under the two main 
funding categories shown in Table 7: Under “Drugs and medical supplies,” managed 
by the MOH, and “Free of charge and compensated drugs in ambulatory care,” the 
majority of which flows through hospital settings, funding increased by 81% and 
74%, respectively. The economics of pharmaceuticals is a fairly complex subject, but 
the politics of pharmaceuticals in Romania between 1998 and 2002 can be 
summarized with a few key observations: The fact that drugs were provided free-of-
charge to hospital patients created a strong incentive for people to seek hospital 
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admission; with negligible cost-control incentives in hospitals, drug costs were 
simply allowed to escalate. Although Law 145 called on the MOH and NHIH to draw 
up a Drug Catalogue of subsidized and free-of-charge drugs in order to guide doctors, 
the Catalogue was extremely long, with few controls on which drugs were allowed on 
the list. Further, the mark-up allowed to imported drugs was significant, totaling 
about 30%, while cheaper, domestic drug production shrank throughout this period. 
Big international drug companies moved aggressively to place their products, offering 
doctors incentives to prescribe their (more expensive) products. Since doctors had 
wide discretion to prescribe medicines, the enticements offered by foreign producers 
were converted into prescriptions according to observers. According to Petre 
Panculescu, President of the Romanian Pharmaceuticals Producers Association, “The 
period 1998-2002 was Heaven for drug importers. There was a long list of foreign 
drugs on the subsidized list, doctors had discretion to prescribe, and foreign 
companies were better at marketing than us” (Panculescu, 2005).Thus, there were 
weak controls on commodities susceptible to excess demand due to subsidization. 
 
Emergency Ordinance 150/2002 
The factors driving up medical costs cannot be analyzed apart from the politics of 
decision making and budgeting for healthcare. The politics and procedures of 
budgeting drove decision making in a critical way. Because the MOF, with central 
government support, asserted its right to manage the health insurance revenue as a 
special fund in the national budget, health monies became interchangeable with 
money raised from any other source. The NHIH’s fiduciary responsibility for 
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managing health revenue on behalf of health consumers (in constructive tension with 
the COP, charged with negotiating on behalf of doctors) was entirely undercut. Every 
institution and individual in the system experienced under-funding so each did what 
he, she, or it could to maximize resources. This strategy was rational within a 
paternalistic system in which there was little “local” accountability, or even 
information regarding how much services cost, how much units were spending 
overall, and how to control costs in order to prioritize services. Hospitals, which had 
long been privileged, exerted their preferences through a network of well-connected 
doctors who were simultaneously political decision makers. Although these decision 
makers opposed the controlling role assumed by the MOF, they found ways to use the 
budget process to influence spending on behalf of hospitals—at the expense of 
general practitioners. The politics of healthcare decision making was captured by the 
state through central institutions: first by the MOF, then through the MOH, which 
took over the HIH system in 2002, upon approval of Emergency Ordinance 150. 
The coup de grace against Law 145, EO 150/2002, introduced a fatal 
confusion regarding the roles and responsibilities of institutional actors in healthcare. 
It made the president of the NHIH a new state secretary of the MOH, reporting to the 
Minister. Health insurance collections were to be made by an agency subordinated to 
the MOF. The NHIH was dependent on the Ministry, yet it still had attributes 
assigned in Law 145, including negotiating a framework contract with the COP. But 
while the existence of the framework contract was preserved, it was approved by a 
government ordinance while the budget for medical services was provided within the 
national budget—so the framework contract wasn’t a contract between independent 
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parties at all. As one Senator, a National Liberal Party (PNL) member, said at a 2003 
PNL-sponsored roundtable discussion (among doctors for the most part) on the health 
crisis: 
 
By putting the Houses [HIHs] under the command of the Ministry of Health 
as was done in Ordinance 150, any element that makes a health insurance 
house system disappeared. It is a classic budget system through which 
financial norms are flagrantly violated by government entities, especially the 
Ministry of Finance which uses its discretion to decide how to use the [health] 
money. (Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003, Translated by the author) 
 
Most doctors expressed anger with the central government for undermining the HIHs 
through EO 150. Dan Peretianu, president of an association associated with GPs said, 
“We no longer have Law 145, we have Ordinance 150. Who brings this Ordinance? 
An old idiot and a child as idiotic” (Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003, Translated by the 
author). Peretianu was referring to President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Adrian 
Nastase in this insult. The president of the Chamber of Deputies’ health committee, 
Mircea Ifrim, explained, “Ordinance 150 was rejected by the Health Committee and 
the Labor Committee in the Senate, as an ordinance making the biggest 
nationalization from June 11, 1948 until today” (Fundatia Horia Rusu, 2003). 
 EO 150 reduced contributions from employees (from 7% to 6.5%) while 
stipulating that a wide range of services be available to large categories of people not 
paying in: veterans, students up to age 26, refugees, political prisoners under the old 
regime, children, pregnant women, and pensioners. In a move to take pressure off the 
state budget, pensioners were removed from the list of contributors; the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Solidarity no longer made contributions to the Health Fund on 
behalf of pensioners beginning in December 2002 as a result of EO 150. This meant a 
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loss of approximately 13 billion ROL per year (almost $4 million  USD). With the 
decision to remove pensioners from the list of contributors, there remained only 6.5 
million Romanians—in a country of 23 million people—contributing to the mainline 
Romanian health insurance system (Jitea, 2005). Under Law 145, services for non-
contributors went to several important categories such as veterans and students, but 
the intention was not to provide essentially free service to more than two-thirds of the 
country. And still there were few protocols or criteria by which doctors could 
determine which patients to serve or what treatments should be given priority. 
 
Donors 
Despite the profound nature of this sector’s reform, and despite the extent of learning 
needed to get the new HIH system up and running, develop contract protocols, and 
design accountability systems, donors were largely marginalized between 1998 and 
2000 in terms of structural reform. Donors were welcome to tinker at the edges—
delivering training and technical assistance, spending out loans—around the country. 
Evidence of the World Bank’s frustration with its inability to help steer the major 
reform initiative can be read in a document published in 1999 Romania Health Sector 
Support Strategy. According to participants (Farcasanu, 2003;Vladescu, 2002; 
Radulescu, 2002), the purpose of compiling the document was to put on paper the 
advice Bank advisors had been trying to convey to the government since the push for 
decentralization in 1997. The report does not mince words. It announces, “Current 
conditions imply serious risks of failure in several parts of the reform” emphasizing 
that neither the MOH nor the NHIH was prepared for its new role. In terms of 
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regulating, monitoring, and evaluating the health system, “The Ministry is not 
prepared to carry out these functions effectively” and the HIH “is charged with far 
more organizational and management responsibilities than it can handle in the near 
term” (World Bank, 2002a, pp. v-xi). But the central government was not eager to 
hear the technical advice coming from the World Bank between 1998 and 2000 
except for the advice on increasing the percentage of funds to be used for 
redistribution (Burduja, 2005). 
 By 2001, Romanian decision makers and donors were aware of the toll that 
run-away hospital spending was taking on the sustainability of reform as well as the 
solvency of the healthcare system. Despite the fact that plenty of specific factors 
established or allowed to continue by the central government and the HIH network 
contributed to the hospital spending profile—factors pointed out by donor documents 
such as the 1999 strategic report quoted above—the decision makers were shopping 
for a new fix in 2000. With encouragement from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and support from the World Bank staff, the Ministry of 
Health began to consider introducing a case-based methodology for hospital 
payments, termed DRG (Diagnostic Related Groups) in the United States where it is 
the standard way to assign prices to services delivered in hospitals. As mentioned in 
Chapter Three, there were influential voices (generally outside the political and 
medical elite circles) supporting this approach as a way to fulfill the reform promise 
that more resources would shift to the primary care level. Since the program was 
begun as a pilot, it was not immediately threatening to hospital discretion. To achieve 
wide buy-in from hospital directors as well as politicians, USAID sponsored a three-
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day summit in the Czech Republic in 2000. The purpose was to get all of the primary 
decision makers away from their institutions and into a setting where they could focus 
on their shared need to control spending (Monaghan, 2003). As a result of the 
summit, all of the principles endorsed the technique, and a team of young Romanian 
doctors was established to introduce the system. An inspiring but cautionary aspect of 
the plan to introduce DRGs was the fact that neighboring Hungary had introduced 
DRGs with World Bank support in the early 1990s and, ten years later, was still 
struggling to make the system work. In 2002, DRGs were introduced in the first 
twenty-three Romanian hospitals. 
 
2003-2004: Digging a Deeper Hole 
In 2003-2004, the healthcare regime dug itself into a deeper hole, a hole first dug in 
1998-1999 when the hospital sector took advantage of loopholes and vagaries in Law 
145 to spend, treat, and prescribe with little attention to budget restraints. The MOF’s 
decision to exert budgetary control over the sector in 1999 could be seen as a smart 
response to the risk of profligate spending by hospitals and in subsidized 
prescriptions. But this heavy hand, unanticipated by legislatively mandated healthcare 
reform, helped rationalize a free-for-all in institutional opportunism on the part of the 
NHIH, district HIHs, MOH, hospital sector, and the panoply of drug companies and 
medical materials suppliers who used confusion over rules as an excuse to abandon 
reform objectives. 
 What is most remarkable about the period 2002-2004 is the inability of the 
healthcare system to reform itself, which proves the thesis animating Chapters Four 
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and Five: Short-term winners of partial reform have no incentive to let go of their 
gains—unless a compelling threat exists, such as the potential loss of EU membership 
if certain institutionally self-serving behaviors are allowed to persist. In the healthcare 
sector, there were no such threats to compel movement off the equilibrium of run-
away hospital and pharmaceutical spending on one hand, and complicity from the 
Ministries of Finance and Health. 
 This wasn’t supposed to happen: As Gheorghe Gherghina, former State 
Secretary of the MOF (2001-2004) and director of the division managing health 
finance (1991-2001) throughout the adoption of the reform remembers: 
 
When we conceived this in 1996-7, we thought that the insurance house 
would succeed in elaborating medical contracts according to the population’s 
needs, and that suppliers of medical services, including doctors, hospitals, and 
the ancillary service providers, would reorganize and function following the 
principles of competition. In this way, services would improve, costs would 
decrease, and health would improve. Unfortunately, this did not happen. 
(Gherghina, 2005) 
 
The assumptions Gherghina alludes to were especially mistaken because: 1) There 
were no mechanisms to generate competition in the health insurance scheme 
described in Law 145, so, not surprisingly, competition did not develop organically.82 
2) There were few opportunities to register the “population’s needs” besides the 
population’s ability to select GPs as family doctors. 3) He ignores the politics of 
reform that gave greater weight to the voice of elite hospital officials who succeeded 
in enshrining hospital overspending in budget decisions. 
 
82 Although national procurement rules governing acquisition of supplies and services in hospitals, as 
in other public facilities, should have introduced an element of true competition to the system (thereby 
driving costs down), these came into force in 2002. There were numerous accusations that favoritism 
tainted hospital procurements between 1998 and 2002. Since these reports were generally newspaper 




The frustration of most GPs and hospital-based doctors increased throughout 2003-
2004 as they experienced the tension between professional judgment about treatment 
and the resources available to them. Newspapers were full of accounts of nearly 
bankrupt hospital facilities with twenty-year bed linen and drug supplies that would 
last, at best, a few more months. Meanwhile, so many hospitals were behind in 
payments to medical suppliers that these vendors refused to sell to hospitals without 
immediate payment. The paradox was confounding: On paper, hospitals were soaking 
up all the money in the sector, while practically, hospital to hospital, the experience 
was one of shortage. A 2003 detailed account of a symposium of doctors (Fundatia 
Horia Rusu, 2003) reveals the general confusion regarding the causes of healthcare’s 
instability—and the conviction shared by most doctors that more money was the 
solution. 
 Average salaries did not increase significantly between 1997 and 2004. I 
talked to nearly fifty doctors at every level of the system: In 1997, they received an 
average of 150 Euros/month USD, which had increased to 200 Euros by 2004 USD. 
The average national salary was between 100 and 150 Euros for the same period. To 
supplement these unimpressive salaries, doctors take under-the-table payments from 
patients. These side payments can be considered a form of co-payment, although they 
become particularly steep for surgeries and major injuries and illnesses. A senior 
surgeon reportedly makes about 1,500 Euros/month USD through under-the-table 
payments. Most everyone in the Romanian healthcare system, including well-
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connected doctors, agrees that one of the most important explanations for resistance 
to reform, or, put more accurately, a reason to maintain the atmosphere of confusion 
and fluidity that characterizes the sector, is that this environment allows the 
continuation of tips and side payments, although, as explored in the next chapter, 




Like Nero fiddling while Rome burned, the central government allowed the 
detrimental pattern to continue—namely, using health fund surplus to cover pension 
shortfalls, then covering health sector arrears with current-year funding, thereby 
depleting the money available for health overall. The 2003 NHIH deficit was almost 
$250 million USD. In 2004 it was officially 175 million Euros. 
 When criticism became particularly intense regarding the healthcare crisis in 
spring 2003, the Prime Minister fired the Minister of Health, Daniela Bartos, who 
was, by most accounts, a dedicated, committed professional. Her successors, Mircea 
Beuran and Ovidiu Branzan, were criticized as hacks or worse in an accelerating 
media campaign regarding the state of crisis and confusion in health. By summer 
2003, there was some evidence that public dissatisfaction with health might impact 
the standing of the ruling party (Open Society Foundation, 2003). Any casual 
observer of the Romanian healthcare system could see that the lack of competition, 
and the very limited private sector, constrained efficiency. In 2004, the Parliament 
responded to this much-perceived problem by passing Law 212/2004 allowing private 
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health insurance. However, one year later, implementation norms were still not 
promulgated by the MOH, thereby freezing implementation of the law. One reason 
the MOH was ignoring the law was the perception that they would have to describe, 
by law, a minimum package of services (MPS) to be provided under the standard 
Romanian health insurance in order to assign a role for the private insurance market. 
(Popescu, 2005; Burduja, 2005), Yet it was considered politically risky to demarcate 
an MPS when, almost any service was free to anyone in the healthcare free-for-all 
that continued into 2005. 
 
Donors 
A variety of health-related donor programs continued in 2003-2004, but the 
fundamental capture and subversion of reform by the hospital sector skewed the 
contributions that could be offered by donors. EU programs emphasized public 
health, and a second World Bank loan of $40 M was approved in 2004 to continue 
reform objectives. A World Bank–funded hospital rationalization strategy (Blight, 
2003) was completed in 2003, but its recommendations—including an elaborate new 
scheme of regional health networks and a National Hospital Rationalization Council 
of Cabinet—were basically ignored by the central government and were not 
incorporated into short- or medium-term agendas by the new government inaugurated 
in early 2005 (Burduja, 2005). 
 One of the few quiet successes was the transfer of the USAID DRG effort to 
the Romanian government, with 185 hospitals financed on the DRG system in 2004 
and 276 (all acute care) in 2005. But considering the confusion governing hospital 
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budgets—namely, the simultaneous application of the framework contract and the 
national consolidated budget—the overall problems at work in the sector undermined 
the contributions that technical improvements such as DRGs offered. 
 A weird conflict arose in June 2004 between the U.S. Ambassador and the 
MOH, which symbolizes the distrust that had developed between donors and 
government with regard to healthcare reform. Ambassador Michael Guest offered 
$400,000 on behalf of the U.S. Government to the MOH—as long as the money went 
to corruption-related programs. According to the Ambassador (Guest, 2005), despite 
numerous attempts to contact and discuss grant options with the MOH, no one ever 
responded to describe how the money would be spent. After giving the MOH an 
ultimatum, which, in Guest’s view MOH officials ignored, the Ambassador let the 
press know that the funding would be retracted. In his view, this attitude proved that 
the MOH was clueless regarding the deep problems besetting healthcare. In my view, 
and in light of the material reviewed since Chapter Two, the MOH was well aware 
that the U.S. Embassy expected a response, but it was unwilling to accept conditional 
grants. In a press release issued at the time and in news accounts (Sava, 2004), the 
MOH explained that it intended to spend the U.S. funding on psychiatric hospitals, 
which had been severely criticized in spring 2004 by Amnesty International. In the 
MOH’s view, donor funding should be allocated to a sector of indisputable need, not 
to an impossibly vague target such as corruption. The dispute resulted in real 
casualties. Iulian Popescu, the first General Director of the NHIH, who was also the 
first Secretary of State at the MOH when the NHIH was brought under the MOH, was 
blamed for not responding fast enough to Ambassador Guest’s proposal. Popescu 
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remembers, “I had nothing to do with this project. I was out of the country and got a 
call that I would have to resign when I got back. After all the congratulations I 
received from Americans on my work, to be blamed for not responding to 
Ambassador Guest really hurt. I was just a scapegoat” (Popescu, 2005). 
 But donors were marginal to the primary, domestic game in healthcare, which 
centered, as it had for several years, on the tension between central government 
authority and the inability to enforce fiscal discipline on major healthcare actors. 
James Q. Wilson, in his masterful classic Bureaucracy (1989) makes the point that 
administrative confusion contributes to increased powers for the State. The example 
of healthcare reform in Romania reminds us that administrative confusion allows rent 
seekers to carry on, with little reason to worry that their actions will be 
reprimanded—in fact, in this example, considering the pose taken by most hospital 
doctors, they don’t seem to realize that individual choices have critically undermined 
healthcare reform, especially the introduction of a viable primary healthcare sector! 
In August 2005, Prime Minister Tariceanu replaced the Minister of Health, 
Dr. Mircea Cinteza. For the first time since 1990, a non-doctor was appointed: 
economist and Liberal Party activist Eugen Nicolaescu. His status as coming from 
outside the health sector was offered as an advantage, but The Economist’s 
Intelligence Unit called his assignment a “poisoned chalice,” noting “the system is in 
acute crisis” (Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Viewswire, August 24, 2005). 
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Chapter Six 
The Legacy of State Socialism and Soft Budget Constraints 
 
The reform programs in child welfare and healthcare unfolded differently after 2001 
and had radically different outcomes: A strong executive, together with assertive 
donor involvement, ultimately facilitated reform in child welfare, while a 
disinterested executive combined with strong self-interested central government 
ministries and weak donor input confused and upended reform in healthcare. 
Nevertheless, there are some notable similarities in the two cases: 1) Despite reforms 
that envisioned transferring significant authority and financial decision making away 
from the central government to the local level, there was a centripetal tendency to 
recentralize power. 2) There was an ongoing problem in maintaining budget 
agreements or targets—although in child welfare, there was so much money floating 
around in the sector that the lack of financial discipline did not become evident until 
the 1999 financial crisis. 3) Numerous reorganizations and a confusing array of policy 
directives created an ongoing atmosphere of uncertainty that worked against reform 
goals. Central-level decision making was notably ad hoc, with Emergency 
Ordinances utilized by the Cabinet in order to bypass Parliament, laws promulgated 
with minimal impact analysis, and changes announced without consultation with 
important stakeholders. 
 Is there a satisfying theoretical framework that can help explain these trends? 
Political economist Janos Kornai, one of the most astute analysts of state socialism,83 
83 Kornai uses the term “socialist system” to refer to the political economy of twenty-six countries run 
by the communist party. As he explains (1992, pp. 9-11), adherents of the communist party never 
referred to their own system as communist, but as socialist, reserving “communist” for an unattained 
utopia. Since Kornai’s goal is to describe the system from “the inside,” he prefers to use the term that 
the system used for itself. Following Kornai, I refer to state socialism to describe the political economy 
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provides several valuable keys to help understand the centripetal trend in power 
relations in post-communist Romania as well as the detrimental habits of ignoring 
spending limits and constantly revising policy as it is implemented. 
 
Shortage and Soft-Budget Constraints 
In his 1980 classic, Economics of Shortage, Kornai highlights institutional 
relationships that explain why the socialist system is characterized by chronic 
shortage and how this shortage drives so many other behaviors in the socialist system. 
He elaborates a theory of the shortage phenomenon that can be used to help 
understand the nature of post-communist power and development. 
 Kornai describes hospitals, schools, and research institutes as nonprofit 
institutions much like units of the central government and local administration with a 
separate budget and financial accounting. In certain important ways, these nonprofits 
behave much like firms within the socialist system: They function as “claimants” 
competing to gain investment from the central “allocator.” All of these claimants 
exhibit a permanent “investment hunger”84 because prestige, power, and loyalty are 
tied to constantly growing operations. Once gained, investment is automatically 
justified because budget constraints are soft: The claimants don’t experience financial 
risk, so there is no “internal power of restraint.”85 For nonprofits such as hospitals, 
decision makers are motivated to attract as many patients as possible, a “quantity 
 
of communist party-dominated states, but I also find the term “post-communist” useful, as it refers to 
the period following communist party rule. 
84 Kornai, 1980, p. 191. In fact, all of Chapter 9 is relevant to this summary. 
85 Ibid., p. 210. 
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drive,” as well as to demand financial resources, the “expansion drive.”86 Since 
services are provided free of charge or at highly subsidized rates, it is not difficult for 
nonprofits to stimulate the client demand that is transmitted as investment hunger to 
the central allocator. 
 To try to adjudicate between simultaneous demands, the central government 
develops a convenient rule: Each claimant should get the same amount as was 
received the year before. But this practice helps enshrine the constant demand for 
investment. Kornai summarizes: “Irresistibility of growth is a permanent feature of 
the socialist economy but momentum that makes growth unending leads to permanent 
reproduction of shortage,”87 a process he also describes as having a “suction effect”88 
on a nation’s wealth. 
 Describing every decision maker in the system as having a pump, Kornai 
graphically describes why it is insufficient to simply admonish directors to use self-
restraint in pumping out resources from the general pool. He draws a scenario in 
which a “foolish decision maker” reduces the amount of siphoning he engages in with 
his unit’s pump. The foolish director watches as other nonprofits, firms, and 
government units absorb everything he renounced. There is no reward for his 
modesty. Next time, he will pump with vengeance on behalf of the unit he controls.89 
The result of all these independent decision makers making similar calculations is 
general and chronic shortage—general because no sector is free of the tendency; 
chronic because the system continually reverts to this position. Kornai concludes that 
 
86 Ibid., p. 550. 
87 Ibid., p. 202. 
88 Ibid., p. 209. 
89 Ibid., p. 552. 
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chronic shortage can be explained by the institutions of state socialism and the 
behavior these institutions provoke among lower-level decision makers.90 He writes: 
 
The explanation of chronic shortage, of suction, and of the functioning of a 
resource-constrained system is to be found not in the financial sphere, or in 
special features of price information, but at a deeper level, in institutional 
relationships and in behavioral regularities which these institutional 
regularities foster in decision makers.91 
Returning in the final chapter to the concept he is arguably best known for, the 
concept of soft-budget constraints (SBCs), Kornai draws out the link between 
institutional relations and the presence of chronic shortage. He describes relations 
between the state and micro-organizations (firms as well as nonprofit organizations) 
as being marked by degrees of paternalism in both capitalist and socialist states. 
Where there is a Degree 0 of paternalism, the budget constraint is hard: The state does 
not intervene if a firm goes bankrupt; it collects taxes and leaves the firm to largely 
manage its affairs. Degrees 1-3 of paternalism can be found in socialist systems. In 
Degree 3, for example, central authorities allocate inputs among firms through 
rationing schemes without much role for money, but bargaining can occur between 
the central authorities and unit decision makers regarding specific allocations. Kornai 
posits that excessive paternalism, embedded in relations between the central authority 
and lower-level subordinates, generates SBCs and thereby engenders the related 
phenomenon of chronic shortage.92 
90 Ibid., p. 556. More specifically, he gives primacy to the following four institutional relationships: a 
high degree of centralization, multi-level control by the central allocator, administrative rationing, and 
the subordinate role of money and prices; for my purposes, I keep the focus on his larger conclusion 
here. 
91 Ibid., p. 559. 
92 Ibid., pp. 561-569. 
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 Finally, in a section titled, “The possibilities for and limits on conscious 
action,” Kornai explains that since the institutional conditions he describes were not 
initiated by edict or plan, “no government decision or state plan can eliminate them as 
long as the conditions exist that maintain these phenomena.”93 Although he puts the 
accent on paternalism in his final chapter, Kornai is in fact describing the risk of 
relaxing financial constraints—a risk that has truly plagued the Romanian healthcare 
system at least since 2001. 
 We find persistent conditions of paternalism, SBCs, and chronic shortage in 
both the child welfare and healthcare systems of post-communist Romania. In fact, 
SBCs and inter-enterprise arrears take numerous forms in Romania. As noted by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in a report that reviewed policy developments 
between 1990 and 2000, financial “indiscipline” characterized sectors ranging from 
agriculture to utilities. Inter-enterprise arrears amounted to a full 42% of Gross 
Domestic Product by the end of 1999 (IMF, 2001, p. 14). Therefore, soft-credit 
constraints and SBCs were the norm in public financial relationships more than ten 
years after the defeat of state socialism, just as they characterized exchange before. 
 Kornai’s more recent insights contribute as well to a deeper understanding of 
the legacies that constrain social welfare reform in post-communist Romania—
despite the naïve faith of Western donors that change can be organized through 
“decisions of the state.”94 Building on his path-breaking research in 1980, Kornai in 
1992 produced an “anatomy” of the socialist system designed to describe 
characteristics of the system that are system specific and causally related to each 
 
93 Ibid., p. 569. 
94 Ibid. 
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other. He said the key to understanding the socialist system is to understand its 
political structure, especially the fact that the one-party system dominates the state 
through the mechanism of bureaucratic coordination. 
 
The Institutional Legacy of Socialism 
Kornai argues that specific features of the socialist system are intrinsically related to 
each other such that the undivided power of the party and influence of the communist 
ideology of control caused, or required, the dominance of central-state institutions, 
which required the emergence of bureaucratic coordination, which leads to the 
chronic shortage economy characterized by SBCs, among other adverse economic 
effects.95 As Kornai demonstrates in the diagram, entitled the “Main Line of 
Causality”96, there is neither opportunity for feedback nor learning in this system. The 
notion of a coordinating mechanism is important here. To Kornai, a coordinating 
mechanism not only coordinates people and organizations through both written and 
unwritten rules, but it also includes the idea of allocation.97 The essential factors of 
bureaucratic coordination are: 1) centralization of information and decision making, 
2) elimination of competition or autonomous actors, 3) dominance of hierarchical 
dependence, and 4) vertical power relations over horizontal ones.98 The elite 
dominating bureaucratic coordination tend to be suspicious of those below them and 
 
95 Ibid., p. 361. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Besides the bureaucratic coordinating mechanism, Kornai discusses four others: market, self-
governing, ethical, and family CMs. Although there is no room to unfold the argument here, I believe 
the only effective countervailing CM under communism was the family coordinating mechanism, 
which proved to be most resistant to ideology and even created zones of liberty during that highly 
repressive period. 
98 Kornai, 1992, p. 363. 
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of their peers, so there is a “multiplicity of regulation and control which seems 
dysfunctional,” Kornai explains.99 
This overregulation is also a function of paternalism. As we reviewed in his 
earlier work, Kornai sees the concept of SBC as a manifestation of paternalism that is 
particularly pernicious: “The softness of the budget constraint does not simply arise 
because the higher organizations of control fail to keep tight financial discipline, or 
the tax authority, banking sector, or price office are overly tolerant. Its appearance is 
a strong regularity, deeply rooted in the basic traits of classical socialism.”100 In other 
words, it would be particularly difficult to prevent SBCs from characterizing relations 
between post-communist institutions, especially where the bureaucratic coordination 
mechanism was still in place—for example, in child welfare and healthcare. 
 Hierarchical relations under state socialism, stretching from the center to the 
periphery, involved everything from shoe or textbook production to theatres and 
warehouses for abandoned children. In all these hierarchical relations, there was a 
terrific problem with regard to information. The central bureaucracy required a lot of 
it for planning purposes and to monitor sub-units, yet the only power lower-level 
entities often had was information; so it was manipulated, hoarded, and hidden.101 
Implications for Romanian Reform in Healthcare and Child Welfare 
Kornai’s ideas and concepts provide a theoretical framework for the case studies 
analyzed in this paper: Although political structures and the ideology of state 
 
99 Ibid., p. 91. 
100 Ibid., p. 144. 
101 The essential problem of information circulation in a planned economy was highlighted early on by 
Frederich Hayek.  
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socialism were defeated in Romania in 1989, post-communist reforms left 
bureaucratic coordination in place,102 especially with regard to the provision of public 
services by the state, including healthcare and child welfare services. The 
bureaucratic method of coordination and other socialist norms, such as relying on the 
SBCs, ultimately subverted mere attempts to reorganize services, as was tried in both 
healthcare and child welfare reform between 1990 and 2000. Although the dominant 
ideology of communism was clearly repudiated in December 1989, the mechanism of 
bureaucratic coordination was left in place as an enduring legacy of the communist 
period—a legacy with implications for the traction reform can gain, especially in 
sectors involving numerous administrative entities. 
 Much of Kornai’s description of political economic relations under state 
socialism characterize the political and administrative relations in Romania today in 
ways that function to undo reform programs promoted by donors. Looking at 
healthcare first, the centripetal tendency that undermined the autonomy of national 
health insurance, creating a divergence between stated legislative goals of reform and 
the operational reality of central control, can be explained as a manifestation of the 
bureaucratic coordination mechanism that was still in place. So too, the thorough 
elimination of competition from the healthcare scheme is a manifestation of the 
bureaucratic coordination mechanism. Although a role for competing regional 
insurance houses was alluded to in Law 145, no implementing norms ever allowed 
such a development. Similarly, although planning documents mention the importance 
of allowing a private sector to grow in ambulatory care as well as in hospitals, the 
 
102 Besides the continuation of the bureaucratic mechanism, the people managing post-communist 
ministry finances and budgets were often the same people who had performed these tasks under state 
socialism. 
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private sector remained anemic because there were no procedures for establishing 
such facilities as legal entities that could bargain for contracts. 
 Between 1998 and 2004, there was a power struggle between the insurance-
financing regime envisioned by Law 145 (by which the NHIH and the College of 
Physicians negotiate a framework contract, which the houses then use to negotiate 
with health service providers) and the use of the national budget to finance healthcare. 
Fundamentally, the tension is between a system with strong elements of horizontal 
bargaining and a hierarchically dependent method of financing services. In light of 
the insights gained from Kornai, it is not surprising that the vertical approach trumped 
the method with more horizontal elements. Similarly, the way the Ministries of 
Finance and Health gradually reasserted themselves over the Health Insurance House 
(HIH) system represented the assertion of a vertical power relation over horizontal 
ones: The HIH system is less strictly vertical since the district HIHs establish 
relations and contracts with service providers in their area, and the National HIH was 
supposed to have significant autonomy, certainly in power relations with the central 
government. 
 A particularly satisfying aspect of applying Kornai’s work to the Romanian 
scene is the power of the shortage economy and SBCs to explain the reoccurring 
problem of hospital arrears since 2002. Not only was there no stigma attached to 
exceeding budget limits among hospital administrators, but those who respected 
limits in 2002 soon saw themselves as “foolish decision makers” and began 
overspending (Burduja, 2005). Individual doctors and management staff make 
discrete treatment decisions driven by a conviction that other institutions are pumping 
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more out of hospital funding than they have a right to, so they pump harder. The 
paternalist central government eventually rewards the unruly children,103 the naughty 
hospitals, with debt repayment since the central government appreciates that it has, in 
fact, been robbing the health fund in order to cover pension shortfalls. In addition, in 
a system such as healthcare, in which the state’s bureaucratic coordination 
mechanism continues to dominate and order decision making, the state can’t escape 
responsibility when sub-units appeal that they can’t function within hard-budget 
constraints—the central government officials are tolerant because it is a common, 
accepted practice that has been in place for decades. 
 In the child welfare sector, decision making was centralized—even after it 
was ostensibly decentralized. Although we noted that this reality allowed the 
Romanian government to impose reform at the behest of international donors, it is 
certainly symptomatic of both paternalism and bureaucratic coordination. The 
multitude of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) devoted to working in 
Romania, often supported by donors, made it impossible to eliminate autonomous 
actors in this sector—which benefited the reform effort. But the structure of power in 
the sector was emphatically vertical and strictly hierarchical: Between 2001 and 2004, 
for example, the General Secretary of the Cabinet directed a Cabinet-level authority 
devoted to child welfare, the National Authority for Child Protection and Adoption 
(Autoritatea National pentru Protectia Copilului si Adoptii), that dictated to county 
council presidents who controlled the residential facilities and county services. This 
was a structure of power that allowed little room for local determination of services or 
service mix. Finally, Kornai’s observation that bureaucratic coordination tends to 
 
103 Kornai himself uses the parental analogy in explaining the psychology of socialist paternalism. 
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overproduce regulations, often with dysfunctional outcomes, is certainly true in the 
field of child welfare. Every year produced a flurry of legislative edits, especially 
Emergency Ordinances, pertaining to child welfare. This created extensive confusion, 
especially at the local and county levels where real services were struggling to 
establish themselves (Petre, 2003). 
 With regard to information in both healthcare and child welfare, donors were 
consistently puzzled to note that a variety of information tracking systems 
consistently failed. The World Bank underwrote management information systems in 
both healthcare and child welfare that either weren’t implemented (healthcare) or 
were implemented partially and differently in different counties (child welfare) 
(Correll, 2002). From the perspective of Kornai’s characterization of the 
unwillingness of local actors to introduce transparency to information flows between 
local and county entities and the central government, it becomes more clear why the 
donor programs for information management failed or had trouble achieving full 
implementation: Claimants in a shortage economy are loath to provide information 
that will create opportunities for accountability or greater control. 
 Although The Socialist Economy was largely completed before the 
transformative events of 1989, Kornai writes about the reform agenda in the closing 
pages of the book. Not surprisingly, he considers the institutional legacy of state 
socialism to be a significant constraint. He writes, “A change of government is not a 
change of system, merely one of the political preconditions for it. The change of 
system is a historical process that seems likely to require a long period of time. Its 
point of departure is the legacy received by the new system from the old… The old 
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institutions may hamper the development of the new system for a long time.”104 This 
is what we witness in the evolution of Romanian reform. 
 
Mental Models, Ideology, and the Power of Informal Constraints 
But in what way does the old hamper the new? And where do external 
recommendations, formal constraints like the ones implemented through donor 
technical assistance, fit in? Let’s call on Douglass North. After publishing his seminal 
1990 work on institutional change and economic performance, North turned more and 
more toward the function of informal norms—belief systems and cognitive 
processes—that constrain the human psyche and strengthen this aspect of his theory 
of institutional change (North, 1996, 1994b, 1993b; Denzau and North, 1993). 
 Remember that North calls the process of change “overwhelmingly 
incremental” (1994b, p. 6) because the institutional matrix of formal rules, informal 
constraints, and enforcement attributes bias change in favor of: 1) existing 
organizations (such as hospital doctors), especially those with existing bargaining 
strength; and 2) the subjective perceptions (also called mental models) of agents who 
assess costs and benefits in favor of choices consistent with the existing framework. 
North terms this bias “path dependence.” 
 For actors making choices in post-communist Romania, the existing 
framework had more attributes of the socialist political economy described by Kornai 
than of a competitive market governed by strong rule enforcement and negative 
consequences for discretionary behavior, especially because the so-called transition 
period was characterized by pervasive uncertainty. 
 
104 Ibid., pp. 577-578. 
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 In “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions” (Denzau and North, 
1993), the authors explain how, in conditions of uncertainty, individuals are 
especially likely to act on the basis of “the learning they have undergone,” even if 
these perceptions are based on “myths, dogmas, ideologies, or ‘half-baked’ theories” 
(p. 1). In the authors’ scheme, mental models are internal representations created by 
individual cognitive systems that, when shared by a community, become 
“ideologies,” while institutions are the external (i.e., outside cognitive systems) 
mechanisms created by individuals to structure the environment. Ideologies and 
institutions are, essentially, two kinds of mental models. Shared mental models, or 
ideologies, guide choices made by individuals and organizations, thereby shaping the 
evolution of politics and economics in a society. 
 In a sense, North and his colleague are widening the lens on institutions in 
order to give a more significant role to belief systems in this essay and related work. 
Institutions are now more firmly embedded in history. In the paper’s concluding 
paragraph, they write: 
The performance of economies is a consequence of the incentive structures 
put into place; that is, the institutional framework of the polity and economy. 
These are in turn a function of the shared mental models and ideologies of the 
actors…[S]ystems of mental models exhibit path-dependence such that history 
matters, and…suboptimal performance can persist for substantial amounts of 
time. (Denzau and North, 1993, p. 15)  
 
The mental models that evolved in the forty-year course of state socialism in 
Romania included behavior that rationalized, even required, persistent 
aggrandizement of one’s own organization or institutional sub-unit; disregard for 
budget limits; hoarding of information and goods; a tendency to revise and rework 
rules in a way that increases uncertainty; the use of public and work-related networks 
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to increase personal/family “stability” (or “gain,” in the view of analysts not 
experiencing profound shortage); and a complicated attitude toward the state of both 
dependence and rejection: A deep expectation that the state should provide 
employment and services for free, such as health and child care, coexists with a 
distain for ubiquitous state property, such that hospitals or state-run institutions for 
children are fair targets for rent seeking. This belief system informed how 
organizations and individuals adapted to, and adapted, formal post-communist reform 
initiatives. 
 In light of this thinking, it’s not a surprise that North is skeptical about the 
prospect of recipient countries absorbing formal rules qua institutional models from 
Western donors. In “The New Institutional Economics and Development,” he writes, 
“[S]ocieties that adopt the formal rules of another society…will have very different 
performance characteristics than the original country because both the informal norms 
and the enforcement characteristics will be different” (North, 1993b, p. 7). Too true. 
 
Implications of the Socialist Legacy 
 
Corruption 
In light of this discussion on legacies and institutional change, let’s look at an issue 
area that is virtually synonymous with contemporary Romania: corruption. By the late 
1990s and into the next century, the most common explanation for Romania’s slow 
economic growth, judicial sluggishness, unexpected results in development programs, 
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lack of foreign direct investment, and various political machinations105 was 
corruption. Just about everything in politics or economics that could not be readily 
explained by donors was vaguely categorized as a function of corruption.   
 A variety of well-respected international surveys confirmed negative 
assessments regarding corruption in Romania. Berlin-based NGO Transparency 
International (TI)106 added Romania to its annual, global Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) in 1997. TI defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private 
gain,” a common definition in donor circles. The CPI is a composite index drawn 
from eighteen surveys conducted by twelve independent groups. Scores range from 
zero (very corrupt: Bangladesh and Haiti tied in 2004 with 1.5) to 10 (most clean: 
Finland scored highest in 2004 with a 9.7). Romania’s scores are anemic for the 
period 1997-2004: Debuting with a 3.44 in 1997, it was down to 2.9 in 2000 and sank 
to 2.6 in 2002 (placing the country at #77 of 102 countries listed). By 2004, Romania 
had edged up slightly to 2.9, tied with Gambia and India. 
 The European Commission’s (EC) annual reports on progress toward 
accession107 offer a narrative critique of the corruption complaint. The first 
overarching report, “Opinion on Romania’s Application for Membership,” compiled 
in 1997, notes, “Much still needs to be done in rooting out corruption” (EC, 1997, p. 
 
105 For example, so-called political tourism, whereby many local mayors elected as opposition party 
candidates in the 2000 local elections, converted to the PSD between 2000 and 2003 was often deemed 
proof of political corruption, rather than simply rational opportunism. Local government remained 
highly dependent on a variety of resources from the national budget, and mayors saw it as being in 
their localities interest to be in the good graces of central PSD party leaders who controlled 
government (Ghise, 2003). 
106 Founded in 1993 by Peter Eigen, a former World Bank official with Africa and Latin America 
experience, TI was the first transnational NGO devoted to fighting corruption. It is organized through 
highly autonomous country chapters around the world. 
107 Romania submitted its application for EU membership in 1995. A response took two years to 
prepare. Regular EC reports on progress toward implementation of the Acquis were initiated in 1998. 
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18). A year later, analysts point to corruption and suggest a legal reform: “The fight 
against corruption needs to be further strengthened. Without the adoption of the Law 
on the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption, unclear institutional responsibilities 
and the lack of specialized bodies dealing with the problem will continue to affect any 
efforts in this field” (EC, 1998, p. 10). Two years later, the 2000 Regular Report 
observes, “Corruption continues to be a widespread and systematic problem. It 
undermines not only the functioning of the legal system but also has detrimental 
effects on the economy…” (EC, 2000, p. 18), although it notes that a new anti-
corruption law had taken effect in May 2000. 
 In 2001 we learn, “Despite a general recognition of this problem by the 
government, there has been no noticeable reduction in levels of corruption and 
measures taken to tackle corruption have been limited” (EC, 2001, p. 21). The report 
recommends to the central government a set of actions including approving secondary 
legislation to support the 2000 anti-corruption law; granting more resources to the 
anti-corruption unit of the General Prosecutor’s office; finalizing and adopting a 
national anti-corruption strategy; introducing the concept of criminal liability to legal 
persons in the criminal code; and revising rules governing political party financing.108 
But the 2002 Regular Report remains dissatisfied: 
 
Surveys indicate that corruption remains a widespread and systematic problem 
that is largely unresolved. Despite a legal framework that is reasonably 
comprehensive, and which has been expanded over the last year, law 
enforcement remains weak. New institutional structures have been created but 
are not fully operational… Corruption remains a common aspect of 
commercial operations, but is also widely reported in dealings with public 
bodies as well as at the political level. Such high levels of corruption 
 
108 Most of these recommendations were accepted by the GOR within the next two years, as the 2003 
report acknowledges. 
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undermine economic development and erode popular trust in state institutions. 
(EC, 2002, p. 26)  
 
Similarly, the 2003 report acknowledges a “relatively well developed” legal 
framework after bemoaning, “[C]orruption in Romania continues to be widespread 
and affects all aspects of society” (EC, 2003, p. 20). Virtually the same words are 
used in the EC’s 2004 report: “[C]orruption remains a serious and widespread 
problem in Romania which affects almost all aspects of society. There has been no 
reduction in perceived levels of corruption” (EC, 2004, p. 31). The purpose of 
quoting extensively from these documents is to demonstrate that in the view of the 
European Union (EU) (by all accounts the most influential donor operating in 
Romania), the pervasive practice of corruption persisted despite the government’s 
acceptance of specific reforms recommended by the international community. 
Therefore, the very persistence of the behaviors termed “corrupt” should be 
examined. 
 The Europeans are certainly not the only donors disturbed about corruption in 
Romania. The U.S. Government109 includes references to Romania’s corruption 
problem in State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2005), U.S. Trade 
Representative (2004), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
reports (2004). USAID’s 2004 Congressional Budget Justification submission calls 
corruption “endemic” and specifically flags corruption in the healthcare and social 
welfare sectors (2004). This year’s CIA Fact Book uses the term “rampant” to 
describe corruption in Romania. 
 
109 In 2000, the U.S. Congress added a new section on corruption to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 as part of the “Micro-Enterprise Self Reliance and International Anti-Corruption and Good 
Governance Act of 2000.” 
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 As suggested by the regular reports, like other donors, the EU seems most 
concerned with the ethics of public officials and the matter of bribery. Its 
recommendations for solving this perceived problem is a set of stand-alone programs 
that center on signing international conventions, approving a national strategy, 
increasing law enforcement attention to white-collar crime, and punitively controlling 
rogue behavior. The U.S. Government’s central anti-corruption program in 2001-
2002, for example, provided financial and technical support to a new National Anti-
Corruption Prosecutor’s Office staffed with prosecutors and police (Department of 
State, 2005b). In the same document, the U.S. Government lauds Romania for 
passing anti–money laundering legislation and setting up an office devoted to 
combating money laundering. 
 The point is not to take issue with the legitimacy of donor concern in this 
regard. Corruption has been widely identified as a major post-communist problem 
(World Bank, 2000; Hellman, Jones, and Kaufman, 2000); the evidence that 
corruption, specifically state capture, undermines democracy while administrative 
corruption and the high transaction costs associated with persistent bribery undermine 
economic development is convincing (Open Society Institute, 2002; Center for 
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, 2001; USAID, 2001). 
 However, the current, legalistic approach toward corruption among donors 
appears to breed a certain distain for the recipient country, an attitude that 
“corruption,” being illegal and bad, is practiced by contemptuous people. The 
legalistic approach also encourages a simplistic assignment of causality between 
poverty and corruption. The focus on bribery leads, inevitably, to proposals to 
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increase civil servants’ wage rates—a solution that has been touted by the EU. 
Without a doubt, public salaries could be doubled and the EU would still have to 
complain about corruption a year later: What donors are calling “corruption” can also 
be read as a rational response to an environment of chronic shortage and uncertainty, 
a response that is supported by the “mental models” of people who experienced the 
political economy of state socialism. 
 Let’s look at a specific example of perceptions regarding corruption being at 
odds between donors and local residents. Donors refer to the healthcare system as 
“the most corrupt institution” (Open Society Institute, 2002) and bemoan the toll 
under-the-table payments take on the population (Lewis, 2000). Indeed, polling data 
confirm that the Romanian public is dissatisfied with government activity in the field 
of healthcare (Metro Media Transilvania, Gallup Organization Romania, Fundatia 
pentru o Societate Deschisa, 2004). But an extensive 2003 survey of public opinion 
on health (1,192 respondents) also found that people were very satisfied with their 
experience with doctors, both family physicians and hospital doctors, and the medical 
care they received (Centrul Pentru Politici si Servicii de Sanatate si Metro Media 
Transilvania, 2002-2003). 
 On the following dimensions, over 70% of respondents gave their family 
doctors a score of over 8 out of 10 (10 being excellent): professional preparation, 
advice, prescribed treatment, and attention. Grades given to hospital doctors and 
medical assistants were also high: 75% of respondents considered the professional 
knowledge and technical ability of hospital doctors to rate an 8 (13%), 9 (17%), or 10 
(45%). The speed with which hospital staff resolved patients’ problems received 
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grades of 8 (15%), 9 (15%), and 10 (34%), with only 7% of respondents rating this 
important dimension with a grade of 6 or less. Asked whether they had complained 
about any aspect of hospitalization, patients responded overwhelmingly (86%) that 
there was nothing negative or that they had not complained about anything. Other 
answers reflect overall satisfaction with personnel and care. 
 Respondents are dissatisfied regarding the lack of compensated or free 
medicines (8%), the lack of funding for healthcare (22%), and the absence of modern 
equipment. Only 1% of respondents considered the following to be a problem: 
“money, gifts, bribes taken by doctors” (banii, cadourile, mita primita de medici). 
However, 14% of respondents said they had given money for medical services—an 
average of 1,787,086 lei ($52 USD)—and 8% said they had given a gift.110 Gifts 
averaged in value of 765,277 lei ($23 USD). Interestingly, the payments and gifts do 
not appear to inspire negative impressions of medical personnel; on the contrary, the 
side payments and gifts might reflect the appreciation for treatment and service that is 
also reported in the survey. 
 Healthcare in Romania is not in crisis because of petty “corruption.” It has 
been overwhelmed by weak budget constraints; poor financial management at the 
level of the Ministry of Finance and individual hospitals; lack of competition; lack of 
procedural enforcement especially related to the framework contract; a high level of 
confusion regarding institutional roles and responsibilities, which shrinks the 
planning horizon for all actors; and professional collusion between decision makers 
 
110 It is possible that this figure underreports the number of people who gave side payments to doctors. 
Romanians do not necessarily trust pollsters and generally know that sidepayments are frowned upon 
by Westerners. 
202
and a well-organized professional sector. In this scenario, there is no one for the new 
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office to arrest. 
 Where there are examples of administrative corruption in the cases studies—
for instance, the use of hospital and clinic resources to perform medical services that 
are off the books, or staff siphoning goods and food away from the state-run 
institutions for personal use—it must be recognized that using public assets for 
private gain has been sanctioned in Romania both by the simple, commonly 
understood need for resources (by any means) and the deep, accepted informal norms 
that helped people survive under communism. 
 It is the legacy of communism, especially the soft budget constraint 
characterizing relations between central institutions and sub-national units, that 
explains patterns of behavior that donors see as perverse, defiant, incompetent, and/or 
corrupt. What we see in the domestic, micro-institutional case studies of child welfare 
and healthcare reform is a consistent pattern of extra-budget flagrancy (i.e., a 
tendency to ignore budget constraints, even to exceed budgets with impunity), an 
unwillingness to trim bureaucracy, and a tendency to grow institutions while hording 
resources. These habits have strong roots in the communist past. Much of Kornai’s 
account of the shortage economy applies to ongoing relations in the post-communist 
state. In light of his insights, reform programs and Emergency Ordinances (the 
legislative vehicle of choice in Romanian between 1997 and 2004) were insufficient 
to revise default forms of institutional problem solving—namely, SBCs, central 
control, and bureaucratic coordination. These attributes represent informal norms that 
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decision makers in Romania (within their institutional relations) fall back on, 
especially in the context of gross uncertainty. 
 These findings, supported by Kornai’s explication, offer specificity to the 
observation made by North in the final pages of Institutions, Institutional Change, 
and Economic Performance (1990): When change is dramatic and conclusive, such as 
the revolutionary actions that ended communism, North refers to “discontinuous 
institutional change.” He cautions that radical change is rarely as dramatic as it first 
appears, because although formal rules can change overnight, informal constraints 
never do. Thus, informal constraints will reassert themselves to structure “basic 
exchange problems among the participants be they social, political, or economic. The 
result over time tends to be a restructuring of the overall constraints… to produce a 
new equilibrium that is far less revolutionary” (North, 1990, p. 91). The partial 
equilibrium of rent-seeking winners identified by Joel Hellman, broadly termed 
“corruption” by outsiders, comprises the “less revolutionary” reality anticipated by 
North. 
 Kornai has written many instructive books and articles since the classics 
referenced above. Interestingly, he was hired by the Hungarian government to help 
shape healthcare reform in the mid-1990s.111 His description of the sector at that time 
has similarities with the Romanian system a little later: Limited autonomy for hospital 
management, excessive intervention from the central government, ambiguous 
property rights for health facilities, a tiny private sector, and SBCs.112 He describes it 
as exhibiting characteristics of market socialism, especially because most facilities 
 
111 Kornai,  2001. p. 260. 
112 Ibid., p. 255. 
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are state owned. In a set of recommendations for Hungarian health reform published 
in 1998, Kornai declares, “The central problem in health care is scarcity,” and that 
there is a dangerous “fiscal illusion that health care is free”113—both problems at 
roughly the same time in Romania. In zoning in on the primary problems inhibiting 
sector reform, Kornai identifies healthcare financing as problematic: “[T]he financing 
of the sphere is opaque. The average citizen in uncertain what is going on…[s]tate 
financing must become transparent.”114 Again, this same problem inhibited, and 
inhibits, change in Romania. 
 It seems that Kornai clashed with some Western advisors during his efforts on 
behalf of post-communist reform. In appropriately sarcastic lines, he complains about 
reformers with unrealistic expectations regarding change: “All those controlling the 
classic socialist system, from the tip to the base of the bureaucratic pyramid, are not 
stupid at all. They are quite capable of asserting their interests and objectives. The 
system evolved in the way it did precisely because this is the structure that can 
perform the functions expected of it. It is naïve to imagine that the main features of 
the system can be altered by applying a few ideas for reorganization.”115 Especially 
in the Romanian healthcare story, this is exactly what we discovered. 
 
Decision Making 
Especially when we look at reform implementation in healthcare, we find excessive 
interference from the state in policy sectors that were supposed to be autonomous. 
 
113 Kornai, 1998, p. 192. NOTE: The Word Bank played a role in Hungarian healthcare reform in the 
early 1990s but felt that reform was not going well; in 1996,the Bank took a health reform component 
out of a PSAL (structural adjustment loan). 
114 Ibid., p. 191. 
115 Ibid., p. 371-372. Emphasis added.  
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The Ministry of Finance had a pivotal role that was completely unanticipated by the 
reform legislation approved in 1997. This pattern of central involvement, especially 
interference from the Ministry of Finance which proved to be highly destabilizing for 
newly created institutions such as the NHIH, is a strong legacy from state socialism. 
As Gerard Roland writes in a description of the initial situation before post-
communist transition, “[E]conomic ministries…were thus the spinal column of the 
economy and played a key role in coordinating production and adjusting to 
unexpected disequilibria…Ministries not only played a crucial role in planning the 
yearly outputs and inputs of t heir enterprises, but also interfered constantly in 
enterprise activities. In general, these interventions were responses to perceived 
shortages by enterprises” (Roland, 2000, p. 8-9). This description of economic 
ministries under state socialism is a fitting description of the Romanian Ministry of 
Finance’s (MOF) role in reallocating resources from the health funds to the pension 
funds in order to cover social welfare shortfalls. Despite the absence of a formal role 
for the MOF in the new health regime, it had the ongoing power and authority carried 
over from the political economy of state socialism to interfere in health reform 
implementation. As a result, organizations of interest, especially doctors in the 
hospital system, made choices that maximized their organizational standing and 
professional independence—a decision set that was inefficient and financially 
detrimental, but rational. 
 In a perceptive, albeit unsigned, introduction to Institutional Design in Post-
communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea, Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich 
Preuss (1998) observe that post-communist decision makers are often loath to allow 
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“institutional pluralism,” meaning, the development of autonomous, functionally 
specific units of governance because, “State socialism is an institutional order  that 
systematically obstructs horizontal differentiation and maximizes inter-domain 
convertibility of resources, thereby creating a pattern of ‘tight coupling’ of 
domains…[T]ight coupling nurtures irresponsible behavior as it provides ample 
opportunity, as well as incentives, to either blame others if things go wrong, or to 
exploit others (as in the case of ‘soft budget constraints’)” (p. 31). This general 
description aptly fits the health reform story as well.  It helps explain the legacy of 
control that makes the behavior of: 1) the MOF, as discussed above, rational; and 2) 
the Ministry of Health (MOH), in bringing the Health Insurance House system back 
under its authority despite the legislative vision of an autonomous health insurance 
fund, rational. With the pressure of inadequate financial resources, in a decision 
making environment characterized by crisis not strategic planning, with insecurity 
regarding new rules and their potential impact, and cynicism regarding enforcement 
of the new rules, the administrative hierarchies that survived the breakdown of 
communism, as seen in the MOF and MOH, were true to form in spending power to 
maximize control, not investing power in new, untried, untethered organizations.   
Another adverse legacy inherited from the communist period is a tradition of 
ad hoc policymaking that characterizes decision making to this day. The public 
agenda is determined by a small coterie of individuals around the government power 
who do not document deliberations, let alone engage in consultation with 
stakeholders. In considering public policy options, rudimentary exercises such as 
cost/benefit analysis or impact analysis are rarely done, both because civil servants 
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don’t know how and because decision makers don’t expect them to. Public 
participation is discouraged and ordinances often emerge from Cabinet as surprises, 
even to interests that will be immediately impacted (Ionita, 2004, 2003a, 2003b; 
Sandor, 2000).  These are all aspects of policymaking that characterized healthcare 
reform as well as child welfare. As political scientist Sorin Ionita observed, even after 
a piece of legislation or ordinance is approved, “Formal policy is the basis for 
perpetual negotiations, vertical and horizontal, in the political system and in public 
administration during the implementation stage.”116 Under the communist system, 
decisions were the subject of constant negotiation regarding how to implement a 
decision—or not. In the midst of post-communist reform, this decision making model 
creates a paralyzing level of uncertainty. To this day, decisions rarely seem settled, 
and policy is endlessly revisited as though every law was just a draft. Yet, as has been 
discussed, this environment of uncertainty allows maximum discretion for 
organizations that have benefited from partial reform.  
 
116 Ionita, 2004, p. 14. In the same article, he memorably describes the governing reality in Romania as 
“an uneasy alliance between old-time communist bureaucrats and foreign donors” (p. 8). 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Lessons for Donors 
Interests and Institutions; Money and Incentives  
In some ways the Romanian child welfare (CW) story is unusual: Rarely are donor-
supported reform projects acted out so publicly, under international media scrutiny; 
rarely are the carrots and sticks so enticing, so threatening, as they were in the CW 
bargaining situation, with membership in two powerful geo-political alliances at 
stake. Yet, despite the money from abroad, the attention, and the drama, fundamental 
fiscal reform, sustainable by the Romanian government itself, still eludes the CW 
institution: public expenditure management in child welfare is chaotic, ad hoc, and 
short term. While the central government has completed strategic planning for policy 
(for example, Government of Romania, 1993, 1995, 2001), it is hardly capable of 
multi-year budget planning, or budgeting by program result. Especially considering 
that on and off budget resources are flowing through so many pipes into Romania’s 
child welfare sector,   sub-national government, charged by law with governance of 
the sector, can hardly know the real costs of services being provided to their citizens, 
let alone make strategic, fiscally-sound decisions about the best service mix.  
To make CW reform lasting, donors will have to confront fiscal sustainability, 
although the inherent free rider problem attached to foreign aid, and the fungibility of 
assistance, makes it virtually impossible to enforce hard budget constraints for the 
sector while significant aid is flowing in. This is the paradox of curative politics. To 
overcome this paradox, donors must focus on institutional relationships and political 
and administrative procedures governing money, and “beneficiaries” in order to 
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uncover perverse incentives—keeping a wary eye on organized interests that benefit 
from early phases of reform and insisting that donor investments be tied to 
measurable goals. 
In healthcare reform, donors advanced technical solutions—albeit smart and 
theoretically beneficial—concocted and recommended with virtually no attention to 
the politics of healthcare reform. Of some 50 donor prepared or finance reform-
related documents I read pertaining to healthcare reform (1991-2004), not one 
discussed the role of the medical elite as decision makers, and the multiple incentives 
that existed in the original law for hospitals, led by these elite, to flaunt the reform 
initiatives. Only among a handful of Romanian academic observers and donor 
representatives, was this widely, albeit quietly, acknowledged.  
Organized interests, with access to political decision making, the resources to 
use political opportunities advantageously, the rational incentive to flaunt rules, and 
the conviction that rules are not being enforced anyway—will logically break any 
agreements regarding institutional reform, regardless of the social value these 
agreements represented on paper, or in law. Elite doctors, based in hospitals (as well 
as Parliament and other privileged decision making positions) rationally elected to 
assert their preference for professional freedom against central control—but 
inadvertently brought the healthcare system to the brink of disaster as a paradoxical 
result.  Child welfare interests organized around inter-country adoption temporarily 
pumped tremendous resources from a brand new private sector (foreign adopting 
families), a rational and predictable response, but one that turned babies into 
commodities, an ethically abhorrent result. In each case, the organized interest was 
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not a sufficient source of power to subvert reform: a necessary condition was the 
existence of institutional procedures and politico-legislative lacunae that gave 
organized interests a way in, the consolidated state budget process in healthcare and 
the inter-country adoption scheme in child welfare, for example. Only as a function of 
higher level bargaining, and credible threats exerted by international donors, was the 
child welfare “veto point” closed. And still the sector’s financing can not be called 
efficient or sustainable.  
In considering the politics of reform the following dynamic was identified in 
both case studies: Organized interests (i.e. actors) and institutions interact as a 
function of instititutionally-codified incentives, which inspire the actors to make 
certain choices, which lead to efficient—or inefficient—outcomes. When the 
incentives change, the choices can change. In child welfare, when donors changed 
incentives facing the central government in 2001 (by tying accession to child welfare 
reform), the Romanian government began moving quickly to shut down state-run 
warehouses and move abandoned children to family settings as a result. In the other 
case, after new legislation governing healthcare financing and service delivery was 
implemented, doctors remained with maximum professional latitude including a lack 
of professional protocols regarding treatment decisions, or limits on prescription 
discretion, or enforcement of rules against side-payments. Elite doctors confronted 
few if any incentives to control costs so, rationally making their own daily decisions, 
their choices contributed to a massively inefficient hospital sector. Despite some 
legislative tinkering, few changes had presented new incentives for hospital-based 
doctors to adjust their behavior in socially beneficial ways by the end of 2004.     
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Meanwhile, as mentioned in the opening chapter, foreign assistance is a 
growth industry. More countries are putting more money into more ambitious 
bilateral and multilateral programs. Yet, influential public policy advisors appear not 
to have learned from rational choice and institutionalist insights, since it is still 
common to hear calls for, “More development dollars!” not “Better rules and 
incentives!” For example, writing about his latest book, The End of Poverty (2005a), 
in The Washington Post (2005b), economist Jeffrey Sachs argues that the United 
States should increase contributions to Africa to around $15 billion by 2010. Sachs 
acknowledges the importance of measurable program goals, but he argues as though 
more money alone can solve the poverty problem, a point underscored by David 
Brooks on the same editorial page.117 
More Lessons From the Case Studies 
This research exercise was initiated with a rather open-ended “how” question and 
looked for patterns to explain variance between two reform outcomes. It concludes 
with a strong sense that although the circumstances of every reform effort is unique, 
as every real world situation is, there are critical, routine ways that donors should 
assess potential interventions in order to assure that donor dollars have impact. 
Recommendations based on the case studies follow:  
 
1) In Romanian healthcare and child welfare reform between 1990 and 2004, 
donors promoted, and the recipient governments adopted, reform programs 
 
117 Brooks’ op ed piece includes this revealing critique, “One of the striking features of his book is the 
absence of individual Africans. There is just the undifferentiated mass of the suffering poor, trapped in 
systems, and Sachs traveling around the globe prescribing treatments.” (Brooks, 2005) 
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that emphasized reorganization and legislative change, rather than rewards 
and positive incentives. Legislative reform is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for social welfare change. 
 
2) Donors tend to focus on technical goals without giving sufficient attention 
to the political bargaining occurring among domestic actors over reform 
implementation—and the importance of political processes of allocative 
decision making that help determine outcomes. 
 
3) The greatest incentive for domestic stakeholders is revenue generation and 
employment security, and the central government accommodates this rational 
drive in the process of bargaining, especially since the same needs motivate 
central institutions. Reform initiatives should be scrutinized with this reality in 
mind. 
 
4) The multi-stage nature of complex reform initiatives creates opportunities 
for resource-starved actors to achieve rents, thereby creating a partial-reform 
equilibrium that they are not keen to leave. Donors should expect this 
outcome, as logical and rational. Therefore, donors should think backward 
from this inevitability and address the opportunities for short-term winners to 
hijack the reform process—in a rational way.  
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5) It is essential that institutional reforms start from an empirical analysis. 
This sounds commonsensical, but it is not. In an analysis of commercial 
cases in Romanian courts, Peter Murrell (2001) shows how businesses 
used elements of the justice system to file cases where they faced less 
delay, thereby creating competition between two courts (Judecatororii and 
Tribunale). But a reform of commercial court procedures, premised on the 
theory of the system’s organization, was promulgated by the Romanian 
government in 2000, which worsened commercial justice by removing the 
element of choice (ergo, competition) that benefited business. Institutional 
design that borrows from Western models—or proceeds from theory to 
reform—without considering empirical relationships, the combination of 
formal constraints (especially those governing budgeting and public 
expenditure management), informal norms, and institutional enforcement 
is courting failure. Similarly, policy prescriptions must be keyed to the 
empirical conditions and institutional relationships specific to a country or 
policy regime (Zinnes, Eilat, and Sachs, 2000). 
 
6) Instead of selecting from a virtual menu of program options, donors 
committed to institutional reform need to assess each sector with this 
perspective: 
a) What incentives or pressures can be mobilized to motivate actors to 
change behavior? 
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b) What incentives and pressures are driving behavior in the institution 
under review? 
Donors have a lot of check lists, but more analytical capacity needs to be 
applied in designing assistance programs. The thought process that donors go 
through has to shift. Donors need to think in terms of identifying 
opportunities; assessing organized interests around the opportunity; 
considering how to develop points of leverage; all through the eyes of 
recipient.118 
7) “Corruption” is widely considered a core problem in post-communist 
regimes such as Romania. This is a normative judgment that misses an 
extraordinary lesson from the transition trajectory—namely, that rational 
actors maximize utility, and in the highly uncertain environments of 
institutions in flux, they will utilize resources at hand to enhance financial, 
organizational, and psychological security. Administrative corruption is a 
reasonable response to messy situations. “Corruption” is unfortunate but 
unsurprising considering the rational motivations and lack of serious criminal 
enforcement of laws against white-collar crime. 
 
8) The past is a heavy mantle. Legacies continue to influence the way 
organizations interact with institutions, and vise versa. 
 
118 Of course there are excellent implementing organizations that do this already, including the 
University of Maryland’s Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector,  but it is not the 
norm in development programming.  
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9) To understand the deeper significance of incomplete reform and the way 
institutional decision makers accommodate the need to secure revenue, we 
must consider political and economic legacies especially the legacies of 
political economy. Budgetary rules shape political contests for resource 
allocation and these are sometimes embedded, for example, in the old 
centralized system that privileges the Ministry of Finance as the main 
controller in Romania. 
 
10) Evidence of consolidated democracy in terms of electoral competition and 
the alteration of power does not necessarily imply accountable governance. 
Citizens want both.  
 
Foreign assistance is beneficial as a source of emergency aid, technical 
assistance in structuring reform projects, and credible international commitments that 
can spur difficult, complex change. However, by fixing on teleological end-states and 
normative goals, donors ignore: 1) the powerful impact of inherited institutions and 
slow-changing informal norms; 2) the overwhelming utility for domestic actors of 
raising revenue in an environment of scarcity; and 3) the free-rider problem created 
by donor intervention and the very fungibility of assistance. These factors can 
overwhelm donors’ good intentions—especially at the domestic level of play where 
the interaction between central government actors (who are cooperating with donors) 
and domestic policy implementers (who are strongly motivated to secure resources) 
determine performance outcomes. 
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 Although political structures and the ideology of state socialism were defeated 
in 1989 in Romania, post-communist reforms left bureaucratic coordination largely in 
place, especially in the provision of public services by the state. With norms such as 
the reliance on soft-budget constraints maintained and without the introduction of 
competition—or outside monitoring to enforce accountability—outside attempts to 
help reorganize health services failed. Performance-based conditionality tied to 
credible international threats led child welfare reform beyond stalemate, although 
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